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1INCARNATION AND INSPIRATION
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Incarnation and inspiration are concepts which can be used to
characterise two different ways of thinking about Christ. Although the
history of doctrine suggests they are mutually exclusive, the argument
of this thesis is that John Owen successfully integrated them into one
coherent christology.
The underlying structure of his exposition was that of the incarnation,
understood as the Son's act of condescension whereby he willingly
assumed human nature into personal subsistence with himself. This
assumed humanity maintained its integrity in all its operations
experiencing God always as man. To the question, 'How did the divine
Son act on his own human nature?' Owen answered that he did so
indirectly and by means of the Holy Spirit.
The distinctive work of the Spirit is the establishment of the Church
by the restoration to it of the image of God. The prototype or
foundation of this work of renewal was laid in the humanity of Christ,
which the Spirit formed, sanctified, empowered, comforted and
glorified. Owen thus affirmed an inspirational christology within the
framework of an Alexandrian interpretation of the incarnation.
The coherence of this account is tested with respect to four areas of
concern. Firstly, can a christology which affirms the distinct
operation of Christ's two natures successfully maintain the unity of
his personal action? Secondly, is nature or ontological language too
static to model the dynamic reality of Christ? Thirdly, is Owen
justified in arguing that, other than in its assumption, the divine
Son acts on his own human nature only indirectly and by means of the
Spirit? Fourthly, does Owen's interpretation of the distinct action of
the Trinitarian persons undermine the doctrine of the indivisibility of
their external operations?
Finally the significance of Owen's christology is considered in
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8PIEFACE
Professor C.F.D.Moule gave the title 'Inspiration and Incarnation' to
one of the chapters of his book The Holy Spirit. In his discussion of
the theme of prophetic inspiration he was concerned that some sort of
distinction be maintained between a consideration of Christ as one who
was fully inspired by the Spirit in the manner of the prophets and as
God incarnate in an abso1ute and unique sense. Faced with the
theological difficulties involved in understanding and explaining the
difference between these concepts as they are applied to the same
person, he made the following suggestive comment:
• . . although it may be impossible to work these observations into
a coherent system, it is more realistic to hold them together in
a paradoxical statement than to force sense upon them by
overlooking some of the phemomena.(p.59)
Moule betrays a certain pessimism about the possibility of bringing
these ideas together into a coherent structure. If they do, however,
signify two equally valid perspectives in understanding the person of
Christ, does not our commitment to rationality compel us to carefully
examine whether some level of theological integration is in fact
possible? I believe that it does and the basic intention of this
thesis is to examine how the coherent integration of these concepts
might be accomplished.
It is to Professor Cohn Gunton that I owe the insight that a doctrine
of the Spirit is essential to an adequate christology and it was he who
guided me to read the work of the controversial nineteenth century
theologian Edward Irving. It was with some surprise that I discovered
that a number of Irving's ideas concerning the work of the Holy Spirit
in the person of Christ were remarkably similar to certain aspects of
the theology of the leading Puritan divine, John Owen, who had written
some one hundred and fifty years before him.
I had last read seriously from Owen's works fifteen years ago while
working as an evangelist in the South African townshIps and was
fascinated by the possibility that in his theology we might find a key
9to the integration of the concepts of incarnation and inspiration and
thereby defend the coherence of christology. The whole enterprise has
been both theologically and spiritually stimulating and with respect to
the goal of this thesis I believe rewarding, for it is my argument
that Owen's christology incoporated these distinctive ways of
understanding the person of Christ in a conceptually helpful synthesis.
I gladly acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Gunton, my supervisor
who, in his awareness that theology is an ongoing dialogue with the
leading thinkers of the present and of the past, was continually able
to encourage me to take seriously the work of this great seventeenth
century Puritan. I am also grateful to other members of the theological
research seminar at King's College, including Dr.Christoph Schwoebel
and Professor Join-i Zizioulas, who in our weekly discussion stimulated
my thinking and made the whole task of theology appear both worthwhile
and exciting. Special thanks are due to my friend Graham McFarlane,
who in his research on Edward Irving, and through our ongoing debate
over many late night cups of coffee, has certainly sharpened my own
understanding of the issues. For all their practical help in making
this project possible and for the encouragement to trust God in it, I
am indebted to the ongoing faithfulness of Lizzie and Dixie Dean.
Finally I record my very deep gratitude to my wife Sheila, who followed
her husband on yet another adventure far from the kind Zimbabwe sun,
but this time with the added complication of two restless little boys
who came along for the ride. My thanks then also to Kingsley and




TWO WAYS OF ThINKING AWXT CHRIST
Incarna tion or Inspi ra tion
1. Why did Jesus pray?
In the eighth century John of Damascus raised a question concerning
the prayers of Jesus, "How then did it happen that our Lord offered up
prayer in the case of Lazarus, and at the hour of His passion? For
His holy mind was in no need either of any uprising towards God, since
it had been once and for all united in subsistence with the God Word,
or of any petitioning of God".1
The question is itself a reflection of where Greek theology had
reached at the close of the 'Patristic Age', and John's writing,
especially his 'De Fide Orthodoxa' suninarises for us the best of the
Greek Fathers who had contributed towards what was now indeed widely
accepted as the 'orthodox' faith of the church. But to many modern
ears there seems something strange about the theology underlying the
question, particularly when his answer is considered.
• is it not clear to all that He said this (the prayer in
Gethsemane) as a lesson to us to ask help in our trials only
from God, and to prefer God's will to our own, and as a proof
that He did actually appropriate to Himself the attributes of
our nature. . .?'
Far more natural to many today would be the following understanding of
Jesus' prayer life by a modern author. "It is therefore more than
probable that prayer was Jesus' regular response to situations of crisis
and faith." Here Jesus is understood as praying, not as a lesson in
trust for the onlooker, nor to prove his humanity to the doubter, but
because he himself was in need.
Our interpretation of what was happening when Jesus prayed, as with
almost everything else that he did, is dependent on our christology -
11
our understanding of who he really was. it is apparent, then, that
there is a significant difference in the christology of John of Damascus
and of James Dunn, quoted above. One useful way of characterising these
different ways of understanding Christ is by the concepts of
incarnation and inspiration.4
2. Incarnational christology
The determinative factor in John's explanation above was his belief
that Jesus' mind has once and for all been united in subsistence with
the God Word. This principle was held to be a consequence of the
doctrine of the incarnation, that is, in its simplest form, the belief
that the eternal Son or Word of God had become a man and dwelt among
us. The doctrine had its source in the New Testament, particularly in
the key phrase of John 1.14, 'The Word became flesh...' Its
significance was recognised by the Early Church who gave it official
expression in the Creed of Nicea, and used it extensively as a
criterion of orthodoxy. In the period of christological debate that
followed, the original concept was further elaborated and refined in an
attempt to provide adequate answers to the new questions that were
being raised about the person of Christ. A significant stage in this
development was reached with the formulation of the theory of a
'hypostatic union' between the divine and human natures of Christ.
This theory was affirmed in the 'Definition of Chalcedon' in the fifth
century and became an integral part of the 'orthodox' understanding of
Christ's person. We describe the christology that incorporates this
way of thinking about Christ as incarnational, recognising that this
was the form of christology held by John of Damascus.
John, with many other theologians, interpreted this subsistent or
'bypostatic' union of divine and human in such a way that, although he
acknowledged the appearance of prayer and the growth in wisdom and
grace in the life of Jesus, he effectively denied their reality. We
are not arguing that this was a necessary consequence of an
incarnational christology, but simply illustrating how easily it arose
in this context historically.
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For if in truth the flesh was united with God the Word from its
first origin, or rather if it existed in Him and was identical in
subsistence with Him, how was it that it was not endowed
completely with all wisdom and grace?5
John is sure that to allow any growth in grace or wisdom in the person
of Christ would be to deny a real incarnation, at least as it was
defined at Chalcedon.
But those who hold that He progressed in wisdom and grace in the
sense of receiving some addition to these attributes, do not say
that the union took place at the first origin of the flesh, nor
yet do they give precedence to the union in subsistence, but
giving heed to the foolish Nestorius they imagine some strange
relative union and mere indwelling. . .
He is persuaded that if the relation of God to the man Jesus was a 'mere
indwelling' there would be no difficulty in affirming his growth in
wisdom and grace. This suggests our second christological type which we
have characterised by the concept of inspiration.
3. Inspirational christology
By an inspirational christology we mean the interpretation of Christ as
one in whom God has acted graciously through his Spirit, comforting and
strengthening him in his spiritual life, equipping and empowering him in
his service for God.
Such an understanding is reflected in a number of New Testament
passages, most notably in the accounts of the descent of the Spirit on
Jesus at his baptism, the explanation given of his exorcisms and the
interpretation of him as the anointed one of Isaiah 61.1, in fact the
very title 'Messiah' points to his particular unction by the Spirit.
The account in Acts of Peter's sermon to Cornelius suninarises the
concept. ". . .how God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Spirit
and power, and how he went around doing good and healing all who were
under the power of the devil, because God was with him."
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It is this type of christology which is suggested by Dunn in his book
'Jesus and the Spirit'. His starting point in understanding Jesus is
that he is a man who experienced an intimate relationship of sonship in
prayer:
• . .he found God characteristically to be 'Father'; and this sense
of God was so real, so loving so compelling, that whenever he
turned to God it was the cry 'Abba' that came naturally to his
lips. We can also say, though with less confidence, that Jesus
himself thought or sensed this relationship to be something
distinctive - not unique, but distinctive. . . $
However it is his understanding of Jesus' relation to the Spirit which
is of particular interest to us.
• Jesus' consciousness of the Spirit of God empowering him,
inspiring him was basic to his mission. . . (his) experience of God
was of a supernatural power compelling him to speak and to act.
The bridge that Dunn finds difficult to build is the one that would
allow him to move from this understanding of Jesus to the Church's
traditional affirmation of divinity to Jesus. Constructing his
christology on Jesus' experience of God, he interprets his divinity as
the qualitative uniqueness of such an experience, "his divinity means
his relationship with the Father as son and the Spirit of God in him"°
- or more specifically, '.. .the Spirit was the 'divinity' of Jesus".1'
There are two weaknesses in this approach. The first, as James Mackey
rightly points out, is Dunn's "persistent tendency to look for the
distinctiveness, and perhaps the uniqueness of Jesus in what must be
considered subjective qualities of his consciousness... " s We simply do
not have the access to it to be able to draw some of his conclusions.
The second is that the 'divinity' that he seeks to establish does not
clearly accord with what is normally understood by this term. There has
been a loss of content in the meaning of the word and it is by no means
certain that it fulfils the functions which the Church has required of
Jesus' divinity, not least of which was to safeguard the status of him
as the worthy recipient of its worship.
14
We are not suggesting that JXnn is opposed to the idea of incarnation or
to a high view of the divinity of Jesus. we simply draw attention to the
difficulty he has in making contact with it starting, as he does, from
his concept of inspiration outlined above.
4. Compatibility and the witness of tradition
Now this brief analysis emphasises the significant difference in the
cb.ristology of these two men. In our discussion of John of Damascus we
saw his reluctance, from the standpoint of the doctrine of the
incarnation, to affirm the reality of either Jesus' prayer life or of
his growth in wisdom and grace, both so essential to an inspirational
christology. On the other hand, Dunn's approach suggests the
inadequacy of the concept of inspiration as a basis on which to found a
doctrine of Jesus' divinity, particularly if that divinity is to be
understood in terms of his essential equality with the Father. In fact
a suspicion naturally arises as to whether the concept of inspiration
might in itself logically preclude such a doctrine.
Xir interest is in the relation, and possible integration into one
coherent christology, of the concepts of incarnation and inspiration.
If we assume that the christologies of John of Damascus and James Dunn
more or less adequately represent the two types of christology
characterised by these concepts, we have so far only discerned a certain
hostility between them.
That they are difficult to harmonise or integrate into one system is
evident from the Church's christological tradition. For the history of
Christian doctrine bears witness to the general growth, development and
triumph of incarnational Christology within the church in both east and
west till well after the Reformation. Alongside this is a widespread
neglect or misunderstanding of the concept of inspiration within the
central tradition, 1 ' and its promulgation outside that tradition only
as an alternative to incarnation. Although both play an integral part
in the New Testament portrayal of Jesus, it is only in a very few
theologies that we see an affirmation of both inspiration and
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incarnation and some movement towards their integration into one
coherent theology. This pattern is best illustrated by a brief survey
of some of the christologcial types that arose in the Early Church.
a. Spirit-christology
In a number of early Christian writings, including those of Ignatius,
and Second Clement, there are indications of what has been termed a
'spirit-christology',' 4
 but this is not to be confused with what we
have described as the concept of inspiration. 'Pneuma' is used by them
either to denote Jesus' divine nature, or as an alternative expression
for the pre-existent Christ. The former is evident in Ignatius'
outline of Jesus' person:-
There is one Physician, of flesh and of Spirit, originate and
unoriginate, God in man, true life in death, son of Mary and Son
of God...
By contrasting flesh and Spirit in this way Ignatius indicates that
there is in Christ both a human and a divine form of being. He is not
making a direct reference to the Holy Spirit. Justin Martyr in his
exposition of Luke i.35 provides an example of the way 'Spirit' is used
to signify the pre-existent Christ.
It is wrong, therefore, to understand the Spirit and the power of
God as anything else than the Word, who is also the first-born of
God. . .
This identification was cosinon among theologians at that time,
including Tertullian and Cyprian. As Kelly notes, "the all but
unanimous exegetical tradition of Luke 1,35, equated 'the holy spirit'
and 'the power of the Most High' which were to come upon Mary, not with
the third person of the Trinity, but with the Christ Who, pre-existing
as spirit or Word, was to incarnate Himself in her womb".' 7 These
christologies, although using the word 'Spirit' are clearly
incarnational, and show no awareness of Jesus' dependence in his life
and ministry on God's empowering through his Spirit.
16
b. Basil of Caesarea
Another theological type which should not be confused with an
inspirational christology is that of Basil of Caesarea. In his major
treatise 'On the Holy Spirit', the Spirit is closely related to the
work of Christ in a way which superficially resembles the concept we
have described as inspiration.
But when we speak of the dispensation made for man by our great
God and Saviour Jesus Christ, who will gainsay their having been
accomplished through the grace of the Spirit? Whether you wish to
examine ancient evidence.. .or on the other hand the things done in
the dispensation of the coming of our Lord in the flesh; - all is
through the Spirit. In the first place He was made an unction,
and being inseparably present was with the very flesh of the Lord,
according to that which is written, "Upon whom thou shalt see the
Spirit descending and remaining on Him, the same is" "my beloved
Son;" and "Jesus of Nazareth" whom "God anointed with the Holy
Ghost." After this every operation was wrought with the co-
operation of the Spirit. He was present when the Lord was being
tempted by the devil.. .He was inseparably with Him while working
His wonderful works. . .And He did not leave Him when He had risen
from the dead.. .
We see here a number of ideas that seem to imply the concept of
inspiration. Basil boldly credits all that is done in the incarnate
life of Jesus to the activity of the Spirit, which he understands to be
inseparably present with the Lord's flesh or human nature. His account
appears to suggest that the Spirit strengthened or comforted Jesus
during temptation, and there is a clear acknowledgement of the Spirit's
participation in Jesus' ministry after his baptism, particularly in his
'mighty works'.
Yet it would be a mistake to interpret this as an example of an
inspirational christology. Basil's real concern is to uphold the divine
status of the Spirit and in this context he does so by positing that "in
every operation the Spirit is closely conjoined with, and inseparable
from the Father and the Son". 's
 Thus the key to understanding the
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argument in the passage above is that the Spirit is 'inseparably
present' with the Lord throughout his ministry - their operation is
indivisible. The function of his argument is to demonstrate the
equality and indivisibility of the divine activity of the Spirit and Son
in the incarnate life of Jesus. It is not his concern to affirm that
Christ as man was totally dependent on the Spirit in his relation to
God.
It is not surprising then that Basil's chrIstology is unaffected by the
ideas which derive from inspiration. For example he is unwilling to
concede any real growth in wisdom or knowledge in the life of Jesus and
is forced to resort to one of the traditional methods to evade the
import of Jesus' lack of knowledge in Mark 13.32.20
The theologians of the early Church seldom related the Spirit to the
person or work of Jesus and when they did it was not necessarily in the
form of what we have described as an inspirational christology. Outside
of the orthodox tradition, however, there were movements in which the
concept of inspiration was clearly asserted.
c. Adoptionism
The most significant example of these was Adoptionism, a term loosely
applied to the heterodox theologies of the Ebionites and of men like
Theodotus of Byzantium, and Paul of Samosata, which have in coninon an
interpretation of Jesus as 'an ordinary man whom the Spirit had inspired
rather than indwelt'. 31
 In his 'Refutation of all Heresies',
Hippolytus' suninarises Theodotus' position.
[According to this, Theodotus maintains] that Jesus was a [mere]
man, born of a virgin, according to the counsel of the Father, and
that after he had lived promiscuously with all men, and had become
pre-eminently religious, he subsequently at his baptism in Jordan
received Christ, who came from above and descended [upon him] in
form of a dove. And this was the reason, [according to
Theodotus,] why [miraculous] powers did not operate within him
prior to the manifestation in him of that Spirit which descended,
[and] which proclaims him to be the Christ. But [among the
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followers of Theodotus] some are
was this man made God, [even]
whereas others [maintain that
resurrection of the dead.'2
disposed [to think] that never
at the descent of the Spirit;
He was made God] after the
This account of Theodotus' position indicates a theology clearly opposed
to an incarnation of the Deity. It had little support, even in Rome
where it was propagated, 23 for the belief that Christ was far more than
a 'mere man' was deep-rooted, and the real threat to the catholic
tradition during this period was rather from the docetic christology of
the popular gnostic systems. What is significant for our study is that
the main argument put forward as an alternative to incarnation should
take the form of an inspirational christology. This reinforces our
earlier impression that inspiration and incarnation, or the
understanding of Jesus as both the receiver and the giver of the Holy
Spirit, are two ways of thinking about him which have not been easily
reconciled by the Church into one coherent christology.
This means that when a theologian did affirm the concept of inspiration
within the framework of an incarnational theology, it is of particular
interest to us to see how, if at all, he was able to relate or integrate
them.
d. Irenaeus
Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons, considered by many as the first great
biblical theologian of the church, is well known for his expansive view
of the saving work of Christ, often sumarised under the concept of
'recapitulation'. The idea of inspiration played an integral part in
this, for Irenaeus related our experience of salvation through the
Spirit directly to Jesus' own life-experience and in particular to his
own anointing by the Spirit.
Therefore did the Spirit of God descend on Him, [the Spirit] of
Him who had promised by the prophets that He would anoint Him, so
that we, receiving from the abundance of His unction, might be
saved. 3
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This link is further developed in a rather difficult passage which
suggests that the Holy Spirit recreates God's image in the human nature
of Jesus, which in turn serves as the pattern for the Spirit's work in
us. "...the Lord commending to the Holy Spirit His own man, who had
fallen among thieves, whom He Himself compassionated, and bound up his
wounds, giving two royal denaria; so that we, receiving by the Spirit
the image and superscription of the Father and the Son might cause the
denarium to be fruitful...
A major part of Irenaeus' writing was aimed at the refutation of the
teaching of the Gnostics. One of their principal arguments was that
Christ had descended upon the man Jesus at his baptism, thereby
indicating that there was a radical distinction between the two. In
response to this Irenaeus emphasised the doctrine of incarnation to
secure the unity of Christ's person, but he was also forced to explain
precisely what was implied by the descent of the Spirit on Jesus at his
baptism.
For Christ did not at that time descend upon Jesus, neither was
Christ one and Jesus another: but the Word of God - who is the
Saviour of all, and the ruler of heaven and earth, who is Jesus,
as I have already pointed out, who did also take upon Him flesh
and was anointed by the Spirit from the Father - was made Jesus
Christ. . .For inasmuch as the Word of God was man from the root of
Jesse, and son of Abraham, in this respect did the Spirit of God
rest upon Him, and anoint Him to preach the gospel to the lowly.2'
Of particular significance here is the manner in which Irenaeus relates
the anointing of the Spirit to the incarnate Word of God: - the
anointing takes place in so far as he is man. Does so simple a
suggestion provide the basis for integrating the concepts of
incarnation and inspiration? It would seem that much depends on
whether it is legitimate or meaningful within an incarnational theology
to refer certain activities to Jesus Christ 'inasmuch as he was man'.
Irenaeus clearly does so and offers a precocious explanation of how it
is that either the divine or human is operative in Jesus.
For as he became man in order to undergo temptation, so also was
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He the Word that He might be glorified; the Word remaining
quiescent, that he might be capable of being tempted, dishonoured,
crucified, and of suffering death, but the human nature being
swallowed up in it (the divine), when it conquered, and endured
[without yielding], and performed acts of kindness, and rose
again, and was received up [into heaven].'
What is particularly startling here is the affirmation of two distinct,
although carefully related, principles of action in Jesus in the context
of a theology which so strongly emphasised the unity of his person.
However to inquire into the legitimacy of such a procedure is to raise
questions which were only to surface in the christological discussions
of the fourth and fifth centuries and to expect a sophistication to the
concept of incarnation somewhat beyond that of Irenaeus. For by
'incarnation' he understood that the Son of God, who existed with the
Father from the beginning, became incarnate and was made man. In fact
he saw no need to qualify his statement above that 'the Word of God.. .is
Jesus', continually stressing that they were 'one and the 5'ae The
logical difficulties involved in making such a straightforward
identification were not yet fully apparent, nor were the theological
implications of referring certain experiences to Jesus Christ 'as man'.
In short Irenaeus did affirm both incarnation and inspiration with
respect to Jesus, and by referring the anointing of the Spirit to the
incarnate Word considered as man he indicated a possible way forward in
the integration of the two concepts. However his understanding of
incarnation is insufficiently developed to explain how it is possible
that in that one incarnate Word the man, or humanity, was anointed by
the Spirit while the Word itself remained quiescent. In fact it was
some two hundred years later before the relation of the divine and
human in Jesus became the central theological concern of the Church and
the problem was clearly addressed.
During that time the general neglect of inspirational christology
continued and the church failed to build on, or even maintain, the broad
biblical perspective of Irenaeus in this area. How is this to be
explained? It is true that until Basil's work at the end of the fourth
century pneumatology was comparatively underdeveloped in all its aspects
and so theologians were ill-equipped to handle the ideas involved in the
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relationship of the Spirit and the incarnate Son. Yet the Arian
conflict was surely also a factor in the church's reticence to draw
attention to Jesus' dependence on the Spirit. Sensitive to any
suggestion of subordination, it would seem the Church simply passed by a
doctrine which appeared to undermine the 'homoousion' and which was
already tainted by its link with Adoptionism. However, certain
developments in christology in the fourth century led to the
reintroduction of the concept of inspiration into the christological
discussion and with it the difficult question of its relation with that
of incarnation was again raised.
e. The Antiochenes
One factor facilitating this reconsideration of an inspirational
christology was the outcome of the Apollinarian debate and the general
acceptance within the Church that Christ was a complete man possessing
not only a physical body but also a human mind and soul. For Theodore
of Mopsuestia this was far more than the formal recognition of the
presence of a human soul in Jesus. Rather for him it was an awareness
that the experiences of Jesus were themselves fully human.
But suppose, as you would have it, that the Deity took the role
of consciousness in him who was assumed. How was he affected
with fear in his suffering? Why, in the face of imediate need,
did he stand in want of vehement prayers - prayers which, as the
blessed Paul says, he brought before God with a loud and
clamorous voice and with many tears?'°
This is reminiscent of Dunn's earlier coninent that 'prayer was Jesus'
regular response to situations of crisis and decision'. Now, where
Jesus' spiritual experiences are recognised as being fully human,
inspiration becomes the natural way to interpret his relation with God.
It is not surprising then that like Dunn, Theodore had an
'inspirational' understanding of the person of Christ.
The man who was thus assumed by the Word. . . received in himself the
grace of the Spirit in its entirety, while to other men he gave a
portion of that which was his in its fulness. . . . It was this
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man. . .and not the Divine Word, that needed the Spirit to justify
him, to enable him to overcome Satan and work miracles, to teach
him what he should do; and for all these purposes he received the
indwelling of the Spirit at his baptism.'1
The 'man assumed' is here differentiated from all others by the fulness
of his experience of the Spirit. By it he is not only empowered for his
ministry but is taught, sanctified and strengthened in his own spiritual
life. Theodore even understood Jesus' sinlessness as itself a fruit of
the Spirit's work, claiming that Jesus "was always without stain by the
power of the Holy Spirit".' 2
 The implications for soteriology suggested
in Irenaeus are also apparent in Theodore's exegesis of John i.16:
Of his fulness, he says, we have all received - that is to say, it
is of his abundance that we receive the grace of the Spirit which
we are given. .. .For through union with God the Word, by the
mediation of the Spirit, he has become sharer in the true Sonship.
We receive a part of his spiritual grace, and through this same
(grace) we are made participants with him of adoptive sonship,
although we are far away from this honour."
We participate in that which the human nature of Jesus received through
the Spirit. With such a clear exposition of inspirational christology
it is easy to understand why he was considered by some as an Adoptionist
and linked with Paul of Samosata.' 1 What gave this charge apparent
plausibility was Theodore's identification of the object of the Spirit's
anointing with 'the man assumed by the Word'. This is a rather more
substantially distinct concept than the related one of 'Jesus Christ
considered as man', which was used by Irenaeus, and it places a greater
emphasis on there being in Jesus Christ two quite ontologically separate
beings, the divine Word and the 'assumed man'. Does his interpretation
in effect undermine the idea of incarnation?
To put such a question is not to ask whether Theodore sought and
established some basis of unity between the Word and 'the man assumed'.
The argument by R.A.Norris that it was Theodore's intention to
reconcile divine prevenience and human freedom in a single action,$S
and that he was able to do so in his doctrine of inhabitation,' is I
believe essentially correct. 	 Nevertheless the rather different
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question which is of interest to us is, 'Does the inspirational
christology , outlined above, exclude a doctrine of incarnation?'. The
ensuing conflict over the concept of inspiration in the christological
debate focuses our attention on the issues at stake.
Nestorius, who was at the centre of the controversy, followed the
christology of Theodore in his emphasis on inspiration.
The Spirit formed in the Virgin's womb the man who was assumed by
the Word, and afterwards caine down upon him at the Baptism, and
glorified him, giving him the power to work miracles. It was the
Spirit, moreover, that made him terrible to unclean spirits; that
made his flesh a temple; that gave him power to ascend to
heaven.
However, this understanding of the Spirit's ministry in the life of
Jesus was strongly opposed by the Alexandrians.
f. The Al exandrians
What offended the anti-Nestorians was the concept, implied here, of the
Spirit as an external or superior power to Jesus. They maintained, on
the contrary, that the Spirit was his (Christ's) own and that he
performed miracles by his own divine power.' Their argument is
clearly expressed by Cyril of Alexandria in his famous third letter to
Nestorius.
He (Jesus) talks of having been glorified by him (the Holy Spirit)
because he used his own Spirit in the performance of great acts to
show his personal Godhead; in the same way an ordinary person
might talk of the physical strength or particular skill he has as
'bringing glory' to him.'9
He anathematizes the alternative position put forward by Nestorius.
Whoever says that the one Lord Jesus Christ has been glorified by
the Spirit, Christ using the force mediated by the Spirit as an
alien force and having acquired from him the ability to act
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against foul spirits and to perform miracles on human beings
instead of saying that the Spirit whereby he effected the miracles
is Christ ' s own, shall be anathema. 40
Why was Cyril so opposed to the argument that the Spirit, as an external
principle, empowered Jesus? The answer surely lies in the incarnational
nature of his christology. Theologically well-informed, he realised
that the earlier affirmation that 'the Word became man' needed
qualification. For if God was immutable and Jesus was a complete man
with a human body, mind and soul, as was generally accepted, the notion
of 'God becoming man' was clearly inadequate, for there could be no
real change in the being of God. Yet Cyril believed that the concept
of incarnation could be maintained by affirming the ontological
continuity of the person, or more accurately of the 'hypostasis' of the
Son or Logos, with the person or 'hypostasis' of Jesus Christ. The two
were in fact 'one and the same'. The immediate implication of this is
that Jesus Christ, who was in his own person the divine Word, could
have no need of any external divine help. It was for this reason that
Cyril was unable to countenance the view that Jesus was empowered by
the Holy Spirit.
g. Chalcedon
It seems possible, therefore, to interpret the christological debate
that led to the Chalcedonian Definition, as a conflict between an
incarnational and inspirational christology. Of course Theodore's
christology is far more complex than a straightforward understanding of
Jesus as one who is empowered and strengthened by God through the
Spirit. The 'Word' plays a central part in his interpretation of
Christ and is understood to be conjoined with, or united to, the 'man
assumed'. Yet Theodore makes no clear distinction between the action
of the Word and that of the Spirit on the human nature of Jesus arid it
is not apparent how he would be able to do so. It means that the
relation of the Word to the 'man assumed' can itself be interpreted as
a form of inspiration. His central metaphor of the Word 'indwelling'
the man, contributes to this impression. In short the essential
structure of Theodore's christology is inspirational. Its strength is
its recognition that Jesus' psychological activity was that of a human,
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which is reflected by, and inevitably related to, the continual need in
his own spiritual life of God's strengthening and comforting by his
Spirit.
We have already seen that Cyril's christology was of the incarnational
type, its central emphasis being the qualified identification of the
person of Jesus Christ with the Son of God himself, which he secured in
his theory of 'the hypostatic union'.
Now, it is generally acknowledged that the Definition of Chalcedon was
an affirmation of the positive aspects of both the Antiochene and
Alexandrian christologies. But if we are to interpret it as the
settlement of the conflict between an inspirational and incarnational
christology, it means that both of these, or at least the conditions
necessary for both of these to operate, were formally endorsed at
Chalcedon. That this in fact happened is clear from the contents of
the Definition. The vital interests of inspiration are upheld most
notably in the phrase 'the characteristic property of each nature being
preserved... '41, for an inspirational christology and the
interpretation of the experiences of Jesus being fully human, are
mutually dependent. On the other hand by ratifying Cyril's thesis that
the union took place in one 'hypostasis', the major concern of
incarnational christology is safeguarded. Now to recognise this
inspirational dimension underlying Chalcedonian christology is to
discern its dynamic and functional possibilities, rather than merely
the static and ontological categories that have usually dominated its
interpretation.
Although both sides in this long debate learnt to appreciate the
strength of the opposing arguments and modify their own positions
accordingly, there does not seem to have been a successful integration
of the underlying concepts in any one coherent christology. Both
Theodore and Cyril had approached the christological problem from one
particular perspective, and their followers tended to do the same. It
is small wonder that Chalcedon was considered by many as a compromise
rather than as a solution. However, its apparent theological
instability might well be simply due to the lack at that time of a
coherent christology that affirmed and successfully integrated the
concepts of both inspiration and incarnation.
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5. John Owen
In practice the difficulty in holding together these two seemingly
incompatible concepts meant that the church continued to emphasise
incarnation to the neglect of inspiration, with a consequent loss of
awareness of the full humanity of the experiences of Jesus, as we saw
above in the christology of John of Damascus. It was only in the
sixteenth century that a clear challenge to the doctrine of incarnation
again emerged. The group known as Socinians, after their Italian
founder Faustus Socinus, fled under persecution from southern Europe to
Poland where they flourished. In the seventeenth century some of their
doctrines were introduced to England by a Mr. John Biddle. The question
he asked has for us by now a familiar ring.
What need was there that the holy Spirit should be given unto
Christ, to enable him to do miracles; and an Angel appear from
heaven unto him to strengthen him; or why should he so earnestly
expostulate with God for forsaking him, if Christ were he, by whom
the First Creation was performed, had a Divine Nature and was God
himself?. . .would it be said of him that had the Divine Nature,
that he did miracles, because God was with him, and not rather,
because he was God?.. .would not the Divine nature in Christ, at
this rate, be in the mean time idle and useless?42
The 'fact' of inspiration and its implications are put forward as an
argument against incarnation. Biddle was a brave man to publish his
ideas, for at that time a denial of the Trinity was a capital offence
in England. He was imprisoned and his works burned by the hangman.
Indeed the matter was serious enough for the Council of State to
request John Owen, the Vice-Chancellor of Oxford to reply to his
work."
Owen, believing the truth of the Gospel to be threatened, was quick to
answer Biddle and the Socinian theology that 1ay behind his arguments
with a detailed refutation in Vindiciae Evangelicae. However, what is
of particular interest to us is not merely Owen's orthodox defence of
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the deity of Christ in his reply to Biddle, but sone of the positive
features of his own theology. Following the Socinian debate he went on
to develop a christology that carefully incorporated the different ways
of understanding Christ, which we have described as incarnational and
inspirational. It is our intention to investigate his exposition of
these and to examine whether he was able to successfully integrate them
in one coherent account.
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The Son assumes human na ture
1. The writing of Christologia
Dark days fell on the Puritan movement with the accession of Charles II
to the throne of England. The reversal of political fortunes in the
Restoration was mirrored by the changes that took place in the life of
the English Church. 1
 Those who were unwilling to conform to the
Established Church were ejected from their livings and many who
continued to preach were prosecuted and often imprisoned. John Owen,
the former Dean of Christ Church and chaplain to Oliver Cromwell,
worked tirelessly to aid his close friends and associates in their time
of suffering.
It was during this period that he wrote his major work on the person of
Christ, 'Christologia', not intending it as a treatise for scholarly
discussion, but rather as a message of hope to the world of political
and theological strife in which he lived. "The re-enthroning of the
Person, Spirit, Grace, and Authority of Christ, in the hearts and
consciences of men, is", he argued, "the only way whereby an end may be
put unto these woful conflicts." 3
 He understood the individual's
relation to Christ's person not merely as a central matter of theology,
but also as having a direct bearing on the stability and peace of the
realm. His description of this relation, though as always analytical
and precise, gives us a glimpse of his own vibrant faith in him.
Unto them that believe unto the saving of the soul, he is, he
always has been, precious - the sun, the rock, the life, the
bread of their souls - every thing that is good, useful, amiable,
desirable, here or unto eternity. In, from, and by him, is all
their spiritual and eternal life, light, power, growth,
consolation and joy here; with everlasting salvation hereafter.
By him alone do they desire, expect, and obtain deliverance from
that woful apostasy from God. . .By him are they brought into the
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nearest cogriation, alliance, and friendship with God, the firmest
union unto him, and the most holy coninunion with him, that our
finite natures are capable of, and so conducted unto the eternal
enjoyment of him. $
O.ir intention in this chapter is to examine whether Owen's
interpretation of the incarnation is an appropriate way of explaining
the being or constitution of this person.
2. Christ as the way of our knowing
Where is the proper place to begin an enquiry into Christ's person?
Are we to assume he is a man, as we are, and then determine from his
life in what sense he is divine? Or is our task quite different,
requiring us not to establish or prove his deity, but rather to give a
coherent explanation of how God took the form of a servant and dwelt
among us as a Galilean Jew?
Wolfhart Pannenburg in Jesus - God and Man argues that Christology must
be done from below, that is starting from the historical man Jesus of
Nazareth.
A Christology from above presupposes the divinity of Jesus. The
most important task of Christology is, however, precisely to
present the reasons for the confession of Jesus' divinity.
Instead of presupposing it, we must first inquire about how
Jesus' appearance in history led to the recognition of his
divinity.
John Owen was also aware of the significance of Jesus' historical
appearance as the ground for all our theological knowledge. But he
believed that it was a disclosure, in the first place, not of his own
deity, but of the very nature and being of God. He based his argument
on a conception of our knowledge of the divine being as one which is
indirect or mediated. Let us follow his development of it from the
beginning.
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The Divine Being itself is the first formal reason, foundation,
and object of all religion. It all depends on taking God to be
our God; which is the first of his coninands. For religion and
the worship performed in it, is nothing but the due respect of
rational creatures unto the divine nature, and its infinite
excellencies.
But the divine essence or nature is unknown apart from its
manifestation to the minds of rational creatures, in the light of which
they are obliged to give all honour and glory to God. Thus the
ininediate ground or cause of our religious response to God is the
manifestation of the divine being. How does this take place? Owen
held that it is mediated through God's outward acts and effects. It
is through what God has done that we are able to know and respond to
him. Initially this took place in his work of creation, for:
it was to express himself, that God made any thing without
himself. He made the heavens and the earth to express his being,
goodness, and power. He created man 'in his own image,' to
express his holiness and righteousness; and he implanted love in
our natures to express this eternal mutual love of the holy
persons of the Trinity.7
So it is that the creation of man himself - with a rational,
intelligent nature and a conscience indicating his subordination to God
- and the creation of all other things, declaring the glory of his
wisdom, goodness and power is the basis of all of our natural knowledge
of God and therefore the ininediate ground of all natural religion.
Yet Owen believed that there was a general awareness among mankind of
the need for a fuller or clearer representation of God. Although the
heavens declared his glory and the firmament showed his handy-work,
these things were misused and instead of leading men to acknowledge his
infinite power, goodness and wisdom, they became rather the stimulus to
idolatry and wickedness. John Calvin, whose approach was similar,
argued here that it was through the Scriptures that this clearer
representation was given. 5 Owen, however, emphasised that the mere
external doctrinal revelation was insufficient and that there was need
of a real exemplification or representation of the divine nature to
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bridge the infinite distance between God and man.'° This was done in
the person of Christ.
He is the complete image and perfect representation of the Divine
Being and excellencies. I do not speak of it absolutely, but as
God proposeth himself as the object of our faith, trust, and
obedience.''
All other things were produced by an outward emanation of power from
God.
But this assumption of our nature into hypostatical union with
the Son of God, this constitution of one and the same individual
person in two natures so infinitely distinct as those of God and
man - whereby the Eternal was made in time, the infinite became
finite, the Ininortal mortal, yet continuing eternal, infinite,
ininortal - is that singular expression of divine wisdom,
goodness, and power, wherein God will be admired and glorified
unto all eternity.'2
So it is that the ininediate cause of all acceptable religion and
worship is the person of Jesus Christ.' 3 Although Owen believed
Christ's person and mediatory work are inseparable,' 4
 it is significant
that his emphasis here is on the constitution of Christ's being and not
just his message or actions. It is through him, that is through the
historical reality of his person as the representative of the divine
nature and will, that we have a basis or ground for our knowledge of
and response to God.
But how, then, do those of us who are temporally and geographically
separated from the life of Jesus come to know him so that through him
we might learn of the nature and will of God? Owen held that it was by
the Gospel. This is the 'objective light' by which the knowedge and
perception of Christ is brought to our understanding. It is
'objective' in that it is open to rational scrutiny and discussion by
believers and unbelievers alike. It becomes for us a spiritual
knowledge, that is one in which we are able to truly discern the glory
of God in him, as our minds are internally and spiritually illuminated
by the Holy Spirit." It is, therefore, by means of the message of the
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Gospel and the illumination of the Spirit that we come to know Christ
and by him the nature and being of God. Nevertheless, the ground or
basis of this knowlege of God is always the historical person of Jesus
himself.
3. The context in which Christ is known
We see then that Owen granted epistemological priority to the person of
Christ in all our theological knowledge. This does not mean, however,
that we can understand who he is in isolation from God's purpose and
activity to save fallen humanity through him. We cannot simply detach
the discussion of his divine status from the great drama which includes
the story of the world's creation by God, its alienation from him and
its reconciliation to him through Jesus Christ. For, considered on its
own, Jesus' divinity is an abstraction. It is made concrete only when
understood in relation to the God of Israel and his redemptive action
in our history.
Pannenberg's programme outlined in the quotation above suggests a
christological journey that moves from humanity towards divinity,
uncluttered by a framework of theological assumptions. 1 Yet by
interpreting Jesus' deity in terms of his resurrection from the dead
and the meaning this obtains within the context of a general
resurrection as a central factor in God's revelatory purposes, the
direction he actually takes is seen to be rather more complex. For
Pannenberg presupposes the God of the Jewish apocalyptic tradition who
reveals his divinity in the consummation of all things and by
implication has done so in Jesus' resurrection.' 7 Although it is
somewhat disguised, he in fact assumes the being of God, his purposes
and his action in revealing himself, as a basis from which he aims to
provide adequate grounds for the confession of Christ's deity. The
concept of incarnation is replaced by that of revelation but the
movement is essentially the same, having its origin in the redemptive
purposes of God and coming to fruition in the history of Jesus.
John Owen's method was somewhat similar though he was more explicit in
his recognition of the link between our understanding of Christ's
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person and of God's saving purposes. He certainly had little respect
for any christology which was developed without reference to it.
That which was designed unto the eternal glory of God in this
great work of the incarnation of his Son, was the redemption of
mankind, or the recovery and salvation of the church. What hath
been disputed by some concerning it, without respect unto the sin
of man and the salvation of the church, is curiosity, and indeed
presumptuous folly. iS
To provide the context in which the person of the Son is to be
understood, he sketched an outline of the conditions that led to God's
redemptive action in the world and the requirements that were necessary
for it to be effective. But he did so from the perspective of the
wisdom of God, a wisdom whose highest purpose in the recovery of man is
to glorify the divine nature in all its properties.
4. The wisdom of God and the person of Christ
By considering the constitution of the person of Christ with respect to
the wisdom of God, Owen was not suggesting we have a full view of God's
mind or his purposes, on the contrary he was always ready to profess
the unfathomable depths of the divine wisdom.
We can do no more but stand at the shore of this ocean, and adore
its unsearchable depths. What is delivered from them by divine
revelation we may receive as pearls of price, to enrich and adorn
our souls.15
Nevertheless he finds here the ke y to interpreting God's redemptive
activity as one which most fully manifests his own divine glory, that
is the full expression of all the attributes of the divine nature.
We saw earlier that Owen held that the purpose of God's creative action
was to manifest or express himself, in particular, his wisdom, goodness
and power. He understood the divine goodness to be the 'coninunicative
property' of all the external works of God. Whatever is good in any
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creature is an emanation of the divine goodness. His wisdom is that
attribute of his by which he guides directs and orders all things,
according to their nature, towards his own glory. Power he understood
as the effective property of God's nature whereby he effects and
accomplishes what his wisdom designs and orders. These are the
principal divine qualities made known in the creation of the world.'0
It was, however, only in the creation of man that God was able to give
expression to his righteousness and holiness. For he had originally
made man in his own image, "that is in such a rectitude of nature as
represented his righteousness and holiness - in such a state and
condition as had a reflection on it of his power and rule." 1
 Man was
thus understood by Owen to be a bearer of the divine image in his moral
likeness to God. His dominion and power on the earth are to be
interpreted as a consequence of this image, rather than belonging to
the substance of it.
God's purpose in communicating his image to man's nature was threefold.
Firstly, through it he was able to manifest or make a representation of
his own holiness and righteousness to his creatures. Secondly, it
enabled him to give glory to God for all his other works of creation,
which in themselves are dumb in that they can only declare God's glory
passively and objectively.
They were as an harmonious, well-tuned instrument, which gives no
sound unless there be a skilful hand to move and act it. What is
light, if there be no eye to see it? or what is music, if there
be no ear to hear it?"
Man as the bearer of God's image provided the hand to play the
instrument; the eye to see the glory; the ear to hear the music.
Thirdly, being created in the divine image meant that man was empowered
to obey God and thereby enjoy him eternally. Thus for Owen, the divine
image in man is in fact more than a moral likeness to God, and includes
both the ability to recognise and respond to the manifestation of his
glory in creation and also the power to obey him and thereby to live
continually with him in a relation of love and trust.
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However with the entrance of sin and the apostasy from God man
voluntarily defaced this representation of the righteousness and
holiness of God. No longer were these properties of the divine nature
given expression in our world. Neither could the full glory of the
remainder of creation continue to redound to God for only man had been
able to actively glorify him for it. Further, in defacing the image,
man lost the power to attain the eternal enjoyment of God for which he
had been made2 3
For Owen, then, what constituted the most serious consequence of sin
was the dishonour that was brought on the holiness of God through man's
wilful spoiling of his image and on his righteousness as sin brought
disorder and disturbance into the whole rule of God.
But does not this emphasis on God's righteousness suggest that there is
a moral law higher than God, which he is coninitted to uphold even at
the cost of his own sovereign freedom? Should we not argue instead
that God's absolute sovereignty allows him to forgive or dismiss sin
without repect to any conditions externally imposed by his
'righteousness'? Owen had little sympathy with this sort of approach.
It was not a mere free act of his will, whereby God chose to rule
and govern the creation according unto the law of the nature of
all things, and their relation unto him; but it was necessary,
from his divine being and excellencies, that so he should do.34
God's rule is not alien to his being, but flows from his own essential
righteousness. Divine freedom is, therefore, never a freedom to do or
pass by that which is evil.
Here, then, is the context of God's redemptive activity. Sin and
rebellion had brought dishonour to God's being, in particular to his
righteousness and holiness, and through it man had become captive to
by the power of evil. The task of divine wisdom was nothing less than
to devise a way whereby this state could be redressed and a new and
greater glory brought to God in all his attributes. It would be a free
act of grace, for God's nature does not, from any internal necessity,
require that he should reconcile to himself a recalcitrant world.
Nevertheless it was eminently suitable to God's being that he should
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redeem man, for in this work other properties of the divine nature such
as his love, grace and mercy, unknown in the first creation, were now
to be openly and gloriously expressed.3
It is clear that salvation must be of God. Man could not restore
himself, for in defacing the image of God he has lost the power to obey
God and live for his praise. Worse, he was unwilling to affect his own
recovery. His fallen condition meant he was at enmity with God and
alienated from his life. Although he often retained a fear of divine
power, which might outwardly affect his lifestyle, he no longer had
that love of divine goodness, which was necessary if he was to choose
freely and wholeheartedly to return to God. He also had no means of
making reparation for the glory of God which had been so dishonoured in
his rebellion. For we remember that Owen understood the principal
aggravation of sin in terms of the contempt brought to the holiness,
righteousness and wisdom of God. This man was powerless to undo.ae
What then is required in the redemption of man so that the nature and
being of God is suitably glorified? Owen held that in the first place
there should be an obedience yielded to God which would bring him more
glory, than all the dishonour which has accrued from man's
disobedience. This would mean a restoration of the image of God in our
nature, not only as the principle which empowered such obedience but
also as a new manifestation of God's holiness and righteousness in
creation.
Secondly it was necessary that the disorder brought into the rule and
government of God by sin and rebellion should be rectified. It is
required that sin be dealt with and satisfaction given to divine
justice in a manner which is in every way appropriate and glorifying to
the rightousness of God. Thirdly the power of evil had to be overcome
and Satan justly despoiled of his advantage over man. Sin was thus
considered by Owen with respect to both its past ravages and its
present power and he saw that both must be met and answered by God's
grace if we are to be redeemed and his glory is to be fully manifest.
What then can we infer about the nature of the one who would yield this
obedience to God, make satisfaction for the dishonour done to his
holiness and righteousness and overcome evil, thereby effecting the
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salvation of the Church? Owen recognised that this must be
accomplished in the same nature that sinned or disobeyed if mankind was
in any way to benefit from it. He must be our close 'kinsman' if his
obedience is to compensate for our disobience, he must be as we are and
meet sin as we do if he is to be of comfort to us in our temptation and
a model for us in our faith.
Yet clearly the work of a 'mere man' could have no influence on the
recovery of mankind or the salvation of the Church. One who was man
only could not bring to God a greater glory by his obedience than the
dishonour that arose from the sins of so many, nor could he restore so
vast a multitude to a condition of greater honour than had been held
before. The life and death of a mere man, however exemplary, could not
break the power of evil so that all things might finally be united in
him and the righteousness and holiness of God be everywhere apparent.
It was, therefore, required that the agent of reconciliation although
being a man should also have a divine nature, that is, that he himself
should be God. (Owen's argument here is considered in greater detail
in our chapter on the 'Mediator'.)
In this state of things did infinite Wisdom interpose itself, in
that glorious, ineffable contrivance of the person of Christ - or
of the divine nature in the eternal Son of God and of ours in the
same individual person. Otherwise this work could not be
accomplished. 2?
With such an understanding of the background to and requirements for
God's work of redemption it becomes apparent why Owen found the concept
of the incarnation so fitting in explicating the person of Christ.
5. The appropriateness of the incarnation
We have seen that Owen held man to have been made for high honour. He
bore in his being the divine image, expressing God's nature, giving
glory to him for all his works and able to live with him in a relation
of love and trust - a relation that recognised God's essential lordship
and his own servanthood. In all his faculties, powers and senses, in
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all that was given or entrusted to him, he was not his own but in every
way a servant of his God and it was here he found his true humanity,
his fulfilment, freedom and dignity. However, he sought to put aside
this condition of service and obedience and attain self-sufficiency,
and so have in himself and of himself both dominion and rule. He would
be as God, that is no more subject to him or dependent on him. His
desire was rather to advance his own will above the will of God and it
is this which has led to his ruin, which included his loss of freedom,
dignity and relation with God, even as he defaced the divine image.
Divine wisdom responded in a way which was both fitting and effective,
that is, by the incarnation of the Son of God.
.for he was Lord of all, had absolute dominion over all, owed
no service, no obedience for himself - being in the form of God,
and equal unto him. From this state of absolute dominion he
descended into a condition of absolute service.2
As Adam sinned by leaving the state of trusting service which was
proper to his nature and attempted to attain a state of absolute
dominion which was not his own, nor due to him, so the Son of God, as a
second Adam, relieved us, by descending from that state of dominion,
appropriate to his being and enterin g a condition of absolute service,
which was not his own nor due to him.
And this being inconsistent with his own divine nature, he
performed it by taking our nature on him - making it his own. He
descended as much beneath himself in his self-humiliation, as
Adam designed to ascend above himself in his pride and self-
exaltation. 2
Owen has at last come to the essence of the doctrine of the
incarnation. The Son of God, to effect God's saving purpose among men,
humbled himself and became an obedient servant and experienced poverty
so that we who were poor might now become rich. As the essential image
of God, he took human nature as his own and in it bore a representation
of the divine image so that man might again share in it. In his own
nature the eternal Son could not do these things, but although he was
divine he was able to accomplish them all through his humanity.
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To suninarise, we have considered the redemptive context in which Owen
believed Christ's person must to be understood. Man's condition he
interpreted in terms of the loss of the divine image, but the ultimate
motivation for God's redemptive work he recognised as the manifestation
of the glory of the divine nature. This he believed was most
effectively accomplished through the incarnation. For the holiness and
righteousness of God were more glorified by the Son of God's
condescension to service and obedience than they had been dishonoured
by the self-exaltation of man.
Thus, the recognition that Jesus of Nazareth is God's anointed
instrument for the salvation of the Church leads us, according to Owen,
to the concept of the incarnation as the most appropriate way of
understanding his person. However, before we examine what
'incarnation' actually entails and consider the coherence of the
concept, we must face some difficulties that arise from the argument so
far. The most pressing of these have to do with the person of the Son
of God. Who is he? How do we know of him? What is his relation to
the wisdom of God?
6. The pre-existent Son
Firstly, there is the problem of our knowledge of the Son of God. How
can we use the concept of the incarnation of the eternal Son to
understand the person of Jesus Christ when it is only through the life
of Christ that we are able to infer the existence of this pre-existent
Son? This problem has become acute in an age in which questions of
epistemology exercise a virtual tyranny over the theological mind.
Alan Richardson reflects the temper of our times.
We now understand (as previous ages did not) that an institution,
an idea, or a theological viewpoint cannot be understood without
knowing how it came to be what it is. 30
Epistemology is held to be a determinative factor in the comprehension
and explanation of a belief. In theology this has led to a shift of
interest from the coherence of theological claims to detailed studies
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of their evolution. The assumption is that the rational way to justify
these claims is through an examination of their historical development.
So William Temple argued:
If our faith in the revelation of God thus given and in the God
thus revealed is to be a reasonable faith, we must trace the
process whereby they reached that degree of understanding which
made it possible to formulate, to propogate, and to trust the
convictions embodied in the Christian Creed."
What does this mean for a belief in the eternal Son? Well if such a
belief is to be reasonable it is held that we must be able to trace
through the history of the development of christian traditions the
process by which such an idea came to be formulated. As our experience
of the historical person of Christ is epistemologically prior to the
concept of his pre-existence, the justification of the latter must be
done in terms of the former rather than vice versa. The problem, then,
with the doctrine of the incarnation is that it moves in the wrong
direction.
But is the underlying argument valid? Is the reasonableness of our
faith dependent on our understanding of the different stages of its
historic development? In short, is our comprehension of the evolution
of an idea a determinative factor in its justification? John Rodwell's
unambiguous response is so out of step with the current assumptions of
many theologians that it seems almost heretical.
• . it matters not one jot for the legitimacy of a hypothesis how
it came to be framed.'2
What is somewhat surprising is that Rodwell is using an argument which
has for some time been regarded as convincing by a number of
philosophers. In his book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Richard
Rorty entitles one section 'Locke's confusion of Explanation with
Justification'. That the two are in fact distinct becomes apparent as
soon as the problem is unfolded. He quotes Wilfed Sellars:
In characterising an episode or a state as that of knowing, we
are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state;
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we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying
and being able to justify what one says."
Rorty is interested in why we should have ever thought "that a causal
account of how one comes to have a belief should be an indication of
the justification one has for that belief".' 4 The problem is traced
back to a confusion made by John Locke in his misconception of
knowledge as a relation between persons and objects rather than as a
relation between persons and propositions. A causal account might
explain how a person comes to know a proposition but it does not
justify the content of that proposition. Similarly, the examination of
the development of a belief can provide no validation for its claims.
However, what is important for our present discussion is simply to
recognise that there is a distinction between justification and
explanation. Owen is clear that Jesus Christ is the ground for all our
knowledge of God - his person as experienced in history forms the basis
by which we can explain how it is that we have come to believe what we
do. A quite different matter is the justification of a particular
belief concerning Christ. One criterion he regarded as important was
its coherence with respect to God's work of redemption in the world as
a manifestation of the divine glory. If one grants to Owen the
essential correctness of his outline of God's saving action, then the
incarnation does appear to be an appropriate way of explicating the
person of Christ. This is so, regardless of the fact that our
knowledge of the pre-existent Son is inferred epistemologically from
our knowledge of Christ in the flesh.
A second question that arises from Owen's outline is whether it is
justifiable to conceive, as he does, of the incarnation as an act of
the Son's volition. For he emphasised that God was glorified, not
simply by the incarnate life of Christ, but by the condescending act of
the Son in which he chose to enter that life by assuming the form of a
servant. He emphasised that the glory of the Gospel does not lie in
the poverty of Christ as such, but in the fact that though he was rich
in himself, yet for our sakes he became poor. But is such an
interpretation consistent with Owen's conception of the incarnation as
arising out of the divine wisdom and purposes? Is there any room for
the Son's volition? In short, have we any justification for an
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interpretation of the Son's presence among us as the consequence of a
free act of his self-giving love?
To answer these questions we need to consider Owen's understanding of
the divine counsels or plans.
7. God's eternal counsels
Owen held that lying behind all of God's activity in creation and
redemption were the divine purposes or counsels.
For all his delight in his works is but in the effects of those
divine properties whose primitive and principal exercise is in
the counsels themselves, from whence they proceed.$s
He takes seriously the Scriptural affirmation that there is in God from
eternity a firm and determined purpose, which it is the Church's great
privilege to make known through the Gospel.(See Eph.i.9,lO; iii.9-1l)
He understood God's eternal purpose as one which was not surprised by
sin and which from the beginning had made provision for the world's
recovery. It is in this sense that Christ's atoning sacrifice can be
conceived of as having taken place before the foundation of the world.
Here is the outline of Owen's argument.
In the beginning God had made all things exceedingly good, manifesting
his glory in their harmony and beauty. Man had been made so that in
him God might receive the glory that he aimed at in and by the whole
inanimate creation. Yet he permitted the entrance of sin whereby this
whole order and harmony were disturbed, for they depended on the
natural subordination of creation to man, and of his subordination to
God through moral obedience. Divine wisdom, however, was not surprised
with this disaster.
God had, from all eternity, laid in provisions of counsels for
the recovery of all things into a better and more permanent
estate than what was lost by sin.'
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This is the revivication or restitution of all things, the gathering of
all things into a new head in Christ Jesus. Although the ultimate
cause of these was the divine will, the "design of their accomplishment
was laid in the person of the Son alone. As he was the essential
wisdom of God, all things were at first created by him. But upon a
prospect of their ruin of all by sin, God would in and by him - as he
was fore-ordained to be incarnate - restore all things."3'
So it is that all God's plans with respect to the calling,
sanctification and salvation of the church were based or founded upon
the incarnate person of Christ.' They were laid in and with him, and
they were to be accomplished in and by him.
For therein was he 'fore-ordained before the foundation of the
world;'(l Pet.i.20;) viz., to be a Saviour and a deliverer, by
whom all the counsels of God were to be accomplished; and this by
his own will, and concurrence in counsel with the Father.39
We have here an indication as to why Owen prefers the term 'counsel' to
'decree' when referring to God's eternal plans. For there is suggested
in them a transaction between Father and Son as distinct persons. He
treats of this at some length in his coninentary on Hebrews.
And these (the eternal transactions) were carried on 'per modum
foederis,' 'by way of covenant', compact and mutual agreement,
between the Father and the Son; for although it should seem that
because they are single acts of the same divine understanding and
will, they cannot be properly federal, yet because those
properties of the divine nature are acted distinctly in the
distinct persons, they have in them the nature of a covenant.
Besides, there is in them a supposition of the susception of our
human nature into personal union with the Son. (i the
consideration hereof he comes to have an absolute distinct
interest, and to undertake for that which is his own work
peculiarly. "40
Owen is aware of the difficulties in conceiving of a transaction or
covenant taking place within the one undivided will of God. Yet his
understanding of the triune nature of God allows him to appropriate
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distinct activity to the divine persons in the eternal counsels. In
them the Son voluntarily undertook to assume human nature and
accomplish God's purposes. 4 ' His conception of 'the eternal counsels'
provides him a basis for understanding the course of the incarnate life
of Christ as an outworking of God's determined purpose, grounded both
in the Father's giving or sending of the Son into the world and the
Son's complementary act of voluntary self-humiliation.
The incarnation is thus held to arise out of God's wisdom and purpose,
but only as God is conceived of as Trinity and his purpose as a counsel
or covenant.	 It is within this framework that Owen is able to
interpret the incarnation as an act of the Son's volition.
8. The agent of the incarnation
We see, then, that Owen held the incarnation to arise out of the divine
trinitarian counsels, whereby within the undivided will of God the Son
willingly condescended to fulfil the Father's gracious purpose of love
to the world by humbling himself and taking the form of a man.
The effective or material cause of the incarnation, however, is God as
Trinity.
As unto original efficiency, it was the act of the divine nature.
and so, consequently, of the Father, Son and Spirit. . .As unto
authoritative designation, it was the act of the Father. Hence
is he said to send "his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh".. .As
unto the formation of human nature it was the peculiar act of the
Spirit.. .As unto the term of the assumption it was the peculiar
act of the person of the Son.43
Although all three persons are active in the event of the incarnation,
it is the Son alone, the second person, who actually undertakes the
work and is himself incarnate. It was particularly appropriate that it
was the Son who should do so, for as we saw above, as man had by sin
lost the image of God, it was fitting that this image should be
restored by him who is the essential image of God the Father.4'
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Receiving his personal subsistence, and therewithal the divine
nature, with all its essential properties, from the Father by
eternal generation, he was thereon the express image of his
person, and the brightness of his glory.'
So it is that the subject of the incarnation is the eternal Son, a
divine person from eternity and as Son distinct from the Father.
Unlike the plans he was to fulfil, his own divine person was not
contingent on the Father's will. "His being was not a voluntary
contrivance or effect of divine wisdom and goodness, his eternal
generation being a necessary internal act of the divine nature in the
person of the Father." 5 The Son, although distinct from the Father,
was yet of one substance with him and thus eternally a full participant
in the divine nature.
In this chapter we have been considering whether the incarnation is an
appropriate way of unfolding or explaining the person of Christ. To
clarify the issue we have drawn attention to a distinction, implicit in
Owen's theology, between an explanation of how we come to know God in
Christ, and the justification of a particular explication of his
person. Such a distinction, we have argued, is both legitimate and
helpful. It is legitimate because the mariner in which an idea or
belief is attained does not of itself provide any validation of its
truth-claims. It is helpful in that it sets the christological
enterprise free from its present bondage to the concerns of
epistemology. It thereby allows us to use other criteria by which to
judge the propriety of a particular form of christolgical explication.
The primary criterion used by Owen was that of coherence with the whole
body of theological truth, arguing that our interpretation of the
person of Christ must be consistently related to God's redemptive
purpose. His exposition above is in effect an answer to the query,
'How are we to explain Christ's being if he is the one through whom the
triune God reconciles the world to himself and thereby manifests the
glory of his nature?' The answer he gave was: as the incarnation of
his Son.
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However it is also required that this way of unfolding or expressing
the person of Christ is shown to be internally coherent. This involves
a consideration of the following sort of questions. What is actually
meant by incarnation? How is it consistent with what we understand of
divinity and with what we know of human nature? Does an interpretation
of Christ from this perspective accord with the Biblical testimony of
his life among us?
In the remainder of this chapter we will consider, therefore, Owen's
defence of the internal coherence of the concept of the incarnation as
a way of understanding the person of Christ. The issues involved,
which include those of the nature of Christ's divinity and humanity and
the relation between them, were of central concern to the Early Church,
and it is around these matters that most of the great theological
battles of the day raged. One consequence of having many of the finest
minds of the time engaged in these controversies is that precise and
therefore technical concepts and language were formulated to understand
and clarify the complex issues involved. Owen, who was in continual
dialogue with this tradition, consequently found it necessary to make
some use of this terminogy and the ideas that are implied in it in
order to do justice to the subject.
9. The Word became flesh
Kai ho logos sarx egerieto. How are we to interpret this deceptively
simple statement? Owen has already identified its subject as God's
eternal Son, who fully participates in the divine nature. Now if there
is a qualitative distinction between the creator and the creature,
between human and divine nature, are we logically compelled to concede
some sort of metamorphosis as taking place in the divine being, some
form of change or transformation of the divine nature into that of the
creature?
The orthodox tradition has generally avoided any hint of this kind of
change in the Son's divine being. In the nineteenth century, however,
a number of theologians developed the concept of 'kenosis' which had
earlier been applied by some Lutheran scholars to Christ's humanity,
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and argued for a real 'self-emptying' of the divine nature in the
incarnation. Writing at the end of the century Richard Ottley in The
Doctrine of the Incarnation represents their argument.
But we believe he did "become poor" in such a sense that He
voluntarily laid aside the exercise of those attributes of Deity
that would have hindered a real human experience.4'
However the theological problems involved in this concept were soon
seen by many to be insuperable. Pannenberg draws our attention to some
of them.
Yet apart from the question of how he rules the world as Logos in
the meantime, the opposite objection iaNnediately arises here: a
man on whose will it depends to be almighty, omniscient, and
omnipresent would be "simply an apparent man, not a real
man"... .The vere hoino is achieved only proportionately to
subtractions from the vere deus. '
Owen was careful to insist that in condescending to take human form,
the Son experienced no change or alteration in his divine nature.
Rather it remained the same in him "in all its essential properties,
actings and blessedness as it was from eternity." 4 ' He perceived that
the presupposition underlying the argument for the limitation of the
divine attributes of the Word was a monophysite conception of Christ's
person.
Eutyches and those that followed him of old conceived that the
two natures of Christ, the divine and the human, were mixed and
compounded, as it were into one. And this could not be without
an alteration in the divine nature, for it would be made to be
essentially what it was not. . ."
It would seem that as long as Christ is viewed as having one integrated
nature, the doctrine of the incarnation will inevitably be interpreted
either docetically or as involving a radical limitation of the divine
nature, as suggested in the kenotic theory.
If Owen refused to interpret the incarnation in terms of a limitation
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of divinity how did he understand Phil.ii.6,7?
• . . but made himself nothing (ekenosen), taking the very nature of
a servant, being made in human likeness.(NIV)
He held this 'humbling' to imply, among other things, a veiling of the
glory of the divine nature in human form, so that there was no
appearance or outward manifestation of it. "The world hereon was so
far from looking on him as the true God, that it believed him not to be
a good man."°
In his exposition, therefore, he insists that nothing was lost to the
divine nature, nevertheless the incarnation did result in something
new. Owen was particularly careful in the form of words he chose to
describe this.
This Word was made flesh, not by any change of his own nature or
essence, not by a transubstantiation of the divine nature into
the human, not by ceasing to be what he was, but by becoming what
he was not, in taking our nature to his own, to be his own,
whereby he dwelt among us."5'
Some of the Fathers, including Cyril of Alexandria, spoke of this as a
'natural union' or a 'union by composition'. Owen believed the latter
expression to be misleading. For "because there neither was nor can be
any composition, properly so called, of the divine and human natures,
and because the Son of God was a perfect person before his incarnation,
wherein he remained what he was, and was made what he was not, the
expression hath been forsaken and avoided; the union being better
expressed by the assumption of a substantial adjunct, or the human
nature into personal subsistence with the Son of God. . .
We see then that he preferred to describe the incarnation as the Son's
'taking' or 'assuming' of human nature. Before we consider this
further, it is important to notice that although Owen was insistent
that the Son never ceased to be what he was, he did nevertheless
acknowledge that in the incarnation the Son became something that he
was not before. The person of the incarnate Christ was not to be
identified without qualification with the eternal Son.
51
10. The assumption of human nature
Owen held that 'flesh', although scriptural, was an inadequate term to
use in relation to the incarnation, for it could be interpreted as
merely the physical aspect of man, to the exclusion of his mind or
soul. 'Human nature' was therefore preferred as a more inclusive
concept, which when ascribed to Christ adequately safeguarded his bethg
as one which was fully human. Thus to affirm a human nature of Christ
was simply to affirm his full and complete humanity.
And he is therefore a true and perfect man: for no more is
required to make a complete and perfect man but the entire nature
of man subsisting.63
Nevertheless Owen was quite clear that it was not a man that the Son
assumed or took to himself but human nature. What is meant by this
distinction and why was it so important? It is helpful to consider the
nature of the union that arises if it is maintained that the Son of God
assumed or took to himself a particular man. The union would be one in
which the Son was in some way related or inseparably united to this
man, but he would not himself 'be' a man, or equivalently he would not
himself have a human nature.
For if he had by any way or means taken the person of a man to be
united unto him, in the strictest union that two persons are
capable of, a divine and a human, the nature had still been the
nature of that other person, and not his own.'4
But Owen's understanding of the incarnation required that the incarnate
Son was himself a complete man, that he had a human body, mind and
soul, in short that he had all that was requisite to being fully human.
This is what the concept of the Son's assumption of human nature was
meant to secure and this is why it was important to make a distinction
between 'human nature' and 'a particular man'.
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11. Anhypostasia
However, to conceptualise the nature of this distinction, Owen in
accordance with the general practice of the tradition, had recourse to
an essentially Aristotelian theory of the relation of the particular to
the universal. The Greek word 'hypostasis' (often translated 'person')
was used to describe a concrete and distinct, individual entity,
separable from all others of its class. According to the theory 'a
particular man' was understood to be human nature subsisting or
existing in a distinct 'hypostasis'. Now applying this analysis to
Christ's person, it was held that his human nature, considered on its
own, was without 'hypostasis'.
In itself it is 'anhypostatos', - that which hath not a
subsistence of its own, which should give it individuation and
distinction from the same nature in any other person. But it
hath its subsistence in the person (or 'hypostasis) of the Son,
which thereby is its own.55
In short, Christ's human nature considered on its own was not a
distinct individual man. The corollary to this was that in being
assumed, the human nature had its 'hypostasis' in the 'hypostasis' of
the Son.' This meant that the incarnate Son was indeed a concrete and
particular man. We see then that the function of the theory of
'anhypostasia' was used by Owen to conceptualise the distinction
between Christ ' s human nature and a self-subsisting man and so
safeguard the belief that the Son of God as incarnate had his own human
nature, that is, that he himself became truly man. This was an
alternative to the view that the Son was in some way externally related
to a man who was quite other than himself, a view that would imply
either a multiplicity or mixture of persons in Jesus Christ.5'
The adequacy of such an analysis of being and the legitimacy of the
particular use that has been made of it with respect to the
Christological discussion in the Church has been widely questioned.5
However it is not necessary to interpret the concept of 'anhypostasia'
as implying that some human element, such as a psychological centre of
experience, was missing fran Christ's humanity, or that he was man in a
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generic or inclusive sense but did not exist as a particular or
distinct man.
In the first place, as we saw above, 'hypostasis' is not to be simply
identified with the modern understanding of the word 'person' or
'personality', it is rather a metaphysical concept that refers to
individuation. Secondly, to assert of Christ that he has a human
nature is to affirm that he has all the attributes of humanity:
physical, mental, psychological and spiritual. The human nature of
Christ is therefore not a nature that lacks any human attributes. It
has its own existence, that is it is 'h ypostasised', in being assumed
by the Son. This idea is generally known as 'enhypostasis' and it
means that the the incarnate Christ is a man as we are. Thirdly Owen
is not suggesting that Christ's human nature is in some sense
universal. John McIntyre in The Shape of Christology summarised what
has been a widely held conception regarding Christ's humanity.
It is important to acknowledge the universality of Christ's human
nature so that all men may share in the benefits of the
atonement.. .
Owen, however, does not hold that the human nature of Christ exists as
some sort of ideal or Platonic reality, which incorporates all mankind,
and thereby accounts for the universal efficacy of the incarnation.el
Rather he is here thoroughly Aristotelian, holding that human nature
exists only as it is particularised or hypostasised in individual men
and women. Jesus Christ is therefore one, and only one, distinct human
person.
To suninarise, the concept of 'anhypostasia' was used by Owen as a way
of distinguishing between 'human nature' as a universal concept which
has no reality outside its manifestation in particular men and women,
and as the concrete expression of it in an specific person. The Son of
God did not unite himself to a man, that is to a particular expression
of human nature, rather his taking to himself of anhypostatic human
nature meant that it only came to concrete expression in himself.2
In Christ, therefore, we are not strictly speaking considering the
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union of two already existing entities - God and a man. Rather our
concern is to explicate how one entity or 'hypostasis' operates in
two distinct natures.
12. The hypostatic union
The union resulting from this assumption by the Son of human nature
into subsistence with himself was generally termed a bypostatic union
in that it took place in the one 'hypostasis' or person of the Son.
Owen described it as a substantial rather than an accidental union,°
meaning that it was a unity of the essence of the natures rather than
merely an external relation between them.
In expounding the hypostatic union his central concern was to show how
distinct this re1ation was from any other relation which may exist
between God and believers, or between God and any other creature.4
The Socinians, who were contemporaries of Owen, held that it was only
in degree that Christ's relation with God differed from that of
believers. He suninarises their argument.
The eternal Word was so united unto the man Christ Jesus, as that
thereby he was exalted inconceivably above all other men, though
ever so holy, and had greater communications from God than any of
them. Wherefore he was on many accounts the Son of God in a
peculiar manner, and, by a communication of names, is called God
also.
Taking Nestorius to have proposed a position similar to the Socinians,
Owen considered the five basic descriptions which he gave of the nature
of the presence of the Son of God with the man Christ Jesus and
responded to each of them in turn.
a. The Son of God was present with the man Christ Jesus 'by
inhabitation' as a man dwells in a house or ship to rule over it.
He dwelt in him as a temple. Owen conceded that this was true of
Christ particularly with respect to that fulness of the Spirit
whereby God was with him and in him. Yet the Scripture testifies
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that in him dwelt 'all the fulness of the Godhead bodily'
Col.2.9. He believed 'bodily' was equivalent to 'substantially'
which is unique to Christ and explicable only in terms of the
Word's assumption of human nature.
b. Nestorius allowed an especial presence by 'a union of
affections' as is between intimate friends. The soul of God
rested always in that man, in him was he well pleased: and he was
wholly given up in his affections unto God. Although Owen
acknowledged this to be true, he was quick to point out that the
man Christ Jesus consistently relates to the Father and not to
the Word and so this does not help us to understand Jesus'
relation or conjunction to the Word.
c. Nestorius held the union to be 'by way of dignity and honour'.
For this conjunction is such, as that whatever honour is given
unto the Son of God is also to be given unto the Son of man.
Owen believed that apart from a substantial union any ascription
of divine honour to the man Jesus was idolatrous.
d. Nestorius asserted that it lay in the 'consent and agreement'
that was between the will of God and the will of the man Christ
Jesus. Owen responded by showing that there was nothing unique
in this for the angels in heaven perfectly complied with the
divine will.
e. Finally Nestorius held that it took place by 'equivocal
denomination', the name of the one person 'the Son of God' being
accoriinodated to the other 'the Son of man'. Owen argues that in
the few places that divinity is directly ascribed to Christ in
the Scriptures there is no homonymy or equivocation.ee
Although there was some value in these arguments, Owen believed that
they all missed the point with respect to the constitution of Christ's
person, for they failed to take into full account what was at the heart
of the Biblical testimony concerning the incarnation.
This was in the first place that 'The Word was made flesh', John 1:14.
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As we have seen Owen held that this could not be interpreted as the
substantial transformation of the Word into flesh which is destructive
of the Divine Being and all its essential properties. Therefore it
must mean that without ceasing to be what he was, the Word took on all
the properties of 'flesh', or more precisely that the Son assumed human
nature into personal subsistence with himself. None of the above
descriptions adequately express this.
The second passage Owen considered was Phil.2:6-8. 'Being in the form
of God, he took upon him the form of a servant, and became obedient.
The person who shared the same nature as the Father 'took on him the
form of a servant' - that is the nature of a man in the condition of a
servant. It was in this nature that he was obedient. This is the
critical part of Owen's argument - the person was obedient in human
nature, that is as a human. The human nature was his own, he was a
man, he did not merely dwell in a human.
Thirdly we look briefly at the point Owen drew from Isaiah 9:6. 'Unto
us a child is born, unto us a son is given; and his name shall be
called The mighty God.' The child and the mighty God are the same
person. Here is the essential idea that the doctrine of the hypostatic
union aimed to preserve - the eternal Son of God and the man Christ
Jesus are one and the same person. But this is precisely what
Nestorius' various conceptions of the nature of the union failed to
establish. °
There were, however, a number of points in Nestorius' arguments of
which Owen approved, which although ineffective in explaining the
constitution of Christ's person, were of value in considering the
relation between the two distinct natures.
13. The natures distinguished
The above account of the doctrine of incarnation has emphasised that
the Word, in becoming 'flesh', suffered no change in his own divine
nature, but rather took to himself the complete nature of man and made
it his own. To this extent it fully accords with the Definition of
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Chalcedon.
• . .our Lord Jesus Christ, at once complete in Godhead and
complete in manhood, truly God and truly man, consisting also of
a reasonable soul and body; of one substance with the Father as
regards his Godhead, and at the same time of one substance with
us as regards his manhood. •
Understanding or explaining this affirmation that the incarnate Son
participates fully in both Godhead and manhood is generally conceded to
be the primary problem of Christology. A simple and superficially
attractive explanation of it is that the incarnation resulted in a new
person whose one new nature was an amalgam or mixture of divinity and
humanity. But the consequence of such a theory is either the loss or
sublimation into the divine of essential aspects of Christ's human
nature as the mind or will, or the effective denial of the Son's full
divinity during the time of incarnation.
Eutyches' monophysite christology, we saw above, was the outstanding
example of this. "(He) supposed such a composition and mixture of the
two natures in the person of Christ, as that the human nature at least
should lose all its essential properties, and have neither
understanding nor will of its Own." 10
 On the other hand the denial of
the Son's full divinity during the incarnation, so that the properties
of the divine nature should not overwhelm his humanity, is the
temptation to which kenotic theorists have so often succumbed.
Yet the dependence of an effective soteriology on the completeness both
of Christ's humanity and his divinity and the belief in the radical
distinction between the two, led the Church, not without much
dissension, to finally affirm at Chalcedon that the same Christ is
'recognized in two natures without confusion'. 7 ' Owen outlines the
implications of this.
Each nature doth preserve its own natural, essential properties,
entirely unto and in itself; without mixture, without composition
or confusion, without such a real coninunication of the one unto
the other as that the one would become the subject of the
properties of the other.'2
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Owen was in part responding here to the Lutheran interpretation of the
'coninunicatio idiomatum' as a real participation by the two natures of
the attributes or properties of one another. In particular, their
understanding of the eucharist demanded a transfer of the property of
ubiquity from the divine to the human nature. He argued instead that
each nature remains the subject of its own properties. "The divine
nature is not made temporary, finite, limited, subject to passion or
alteration by this union; nor is the human nature rendered immense,
infinite, omnipotent." 3
 What is true of the being of each nature is
also true of its activity.
Each nature operates in him according unto its essential
properties. The divine nature knows all things, upholds all
things, rules all things, acts by its presence everywhere; the
human nature was born, yielded obedience, died, and rose again.
But it is the same person, the same Christ, that acts all these
things, - the one nature being his no less than the other.'4
We see that Owen took very seriously the ascription of full humanity to
Christ, yet he was no less anxious that divinity should function
according to its nature. His interpretation of Christ, therefore, is
clearly opposed to any form of amalgam of the two natures, as for
instance in the view that Christ's human nature is the instrument by
which or through which the Logos as a divine centre of action relates
to the world. Having a human nature means that Christ has a human mind
and psychology. There is no suggestion of Apollinarianism, in which
divinity in effect replaces some aspect of the human condition.
Yet with such a clear affirmation of the distinct operation of the two
natures, the question that naturally arises is, 'How do two natures
with such disparate principles of operation interact?'
14. Interaction between the natures
We have been following Owen's exposition of the concept of incarnation
in which he has given an explanation of the substantial union of the
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divine and human natures in the person of Christ. It was described as
a hypostatical union in that the two natures were conceived to be
substantially united in the person or 'hypostasis' of the Son. The
person of the Son though never ceasing to be what he was, became what
he was not, in assuming human nature to be his own. It is not that the
Son united himself to a man, but rather that he became man, as he took
human form.
But this says nothing of the practical interaction of the divine and
the human in his person. If his human nature is to maintain its
integrity, it must, as Karl Rahner argues, possess a 'genuine,
spontaneous, free, spiritual, active centre, a human selfconsciousness,
which as creaturely faces (God) in a genuinely human attitude of
adoration, obedience, a most radical sense of creaturehood. 7
 (Where
Rahner had 'the eternal Word', I have substituted 'God') How does the
divine nature relate to such a human nature in Christ? Or conversely,
how does Christ as man experience God?
Owen's answer to both these questions was simple and illuminating - it
was by the Holy Spirit. The importance to Christology of such a
perception cannot be overestimated. If it is justified it means that
the person of Jesus Christ cannot be adequately explained apart from a
recourse to work of the Holy Spirit.
The significance of this for our present discussion is apparent. We
have been considering whether the concept of the incarnation is an
appropriate way of unfolding or expressing the person of Christ.
Owen's exposition has shown how it coheres with his understanding of
God's redemptive activity as a manifestation of the glory of the divine
nature. In his attempt to demonstrate its internal coherence he has
followed some of the main lines of the classical and in particular
Alexandrian christology of the Early Church. The inner logic of his
argument, however, has led to the position, where the incarnation, on
its own, is seen to be finally inadequate as an expression of the being
of Christ. For of itself a doctrine of the Son's assumption of human
nature leaves unexplained the manner in which that nature experiences
God. It needs to be supplemented by a theology of the work of the
Spirit in the man Christ Jesus, a perspective which for ease of
discourse we have described simply as 'inspiration'.
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16 Consider Frances Young's provocative conundrum: "If Jesus was an
entirely normal human being, no evidence can be produced for the
incarnation. If no evidence can be produced, there can be no
basis on which to claim that an incarnation took place."
Although her argument is not 'watertight', she nevertheless
highlights the inherent difficulty any approach faces which would
aim to argue without theological presuppositions from the premise
that Jesus is human to the conclusion that he is divine.
Incarnation and Myth: The Debate Continued, Ed. by Michael
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The Spirit renews God's image in Christ 's human nature
1. Quakers and Soc inians
Amid the political upheavals and theological intensity of mid-
seventeenth century England a variety of new religious ideas found the
soil fertile for their own propagation.
One of these was the Quaker doctrine of the 'inner light'. George Fox,
the apostle of the movement, believed that God spoke to mankind directly
by the Spirit or 'Divine light', in contrast to the generally accepted
belief that it was through the Scriptures that he made himself known.
In his journal of 1646 he shares the revelation or 'opening' God had
given him of how men came to faith:
• that every man was enlightened by the Divine Light of Christ,
and I saw it shine through all, and that they that believed in it
caine out of condemnation and came to the Light of Life, and became
children of it; but they that hated it, and did not believe in it,
were condemned by it, though they made a profession of Christ.'
The Divine or 'inner' light was held to be a universal principle through
which all men could have an ininediate and individual access to God as he
revealed himself directly and inwardly by his S pirit. The individual
human spirit was considered as the place where God was to be heard for
this was the dwelling place of God's Spirit. Such an inward
illumination was considered to be self-authenticating, needing the
support of neither Scripture nor reason for its authority.3
Robert Barclay writing thirty years later was one of the most able of
the Quaker apologists. A key principle he used in the defence of a
direct or unmediated revelation was that the Christian's experience of
God was essentially the same as that of the prophets of olf. "God's
converse with man from Adam to Moses was by the unmediated manifestation
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of his Spirit... Furthermore, none was excluded from this unmediated
fellowship who earnestly sought after it and waited for it."' The
implication of his argument was that it is not only possible for God to
speak to us as he did to the prophets, but if we have the appropriate
attitude and take the necessary action we will hear him so speak.
Geoffrey Nuttall makes the interesting observation that the Quakers
denied a close conjunction between the Spirit and the Word precisely
because of the seriousness wikh which they read the Old Testament
prophets.
It was this seriousness, making them regard prophetic behaviour as
a model for their own, which also made them so insistent that the
same Spirit which was in the prophets, and in the writers of the
Scripture, was in themselves.4
The Quaker understanding of divine revelation had far-reaching
consequences for the practice of their faith. As the final or
authoritative principle of their lives was neither reason nor the
Scriptures, but the inner voice of the Spirit it was essential, they
believed, to develop a habit of 'listening' for him and obeying only
what they heard him say. It was perhaps to be expected that in the
beginning this doctrine should lead to a number of religious excesses
and these began to be related in the coninon mind with any theology that
emphasised the work of the Spirit. Dependent on God's ininediate and
spontaneous guidance the Quakers grew to despise all fixed or formal
religious structures including the ministry, sacraments and even church
buildings. Their refusal to take oaths or pay tithes eventually gave
rise to their persecution as a perceived threat to the stability of
society. As a result of the reports associated with them, many
observers linked any profession of dependence on the Spirit with a
blind religious fanaticism.
On the other wing in the world of religious ideas at that time was the
intellectually sophisticated approach of continental Sociriianism.
Socinians were in the vanguard of the movement which would have all
knowledge submit to the bar of reason. This approach was proving to be
singularly successful in the field of science and it was natural that
many, who were not directly connected with Socinianism, should also
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think it was appropriate in matters of religion. At the end of the
century the title of John Locke's book The Reasoriable,nesg
 of
Christianity as Delivered in the Scriptures reflected not only the
temper of the age but was to beccxne the major thesis "of Christian
theology in England for the greater part of a century."5
In this context any recourse to the work of the Spirit was regarded with
great suspicion, for it seemed to offer an excuse for irrationality in
Christian faith. The principles of reason and the work of the Holy
Spirit were often considered to be mutually exclusive. For it appeared
that the duties and objectives of the Christian life were either
reasonable in themselves and therefore worthy of being followed and by
implication possible to be fulfilled by the enlightened man, or the
Christian life was one of implicit obedience to the ininediate promptings
of God through his Spirit and questions of reasonableness were
irrelevent.
These were not the only two possible alternatives, but they do represent
the Charybdis and Scylla between which John Owen had to steer in his
exposition of the person and work of the Holy Spirit. The prevalent
attitude inclined towards the idea that reason should judge in matters
of religion, and there was at that time a widespread reaction to the
spiritual 'enthusiasts', which led to the derision by many of any
activity ascribed to the Spirit. Owen described the conwnon mood:-
The very name of the Spirit is grown to be a reproach; nor do some
think they can more despitefully expose any to scorn than by
ascribing to them a "concern in the Spirit of God."
This was not only an attitude among those outside the church, for many
who professed a faith in the gospel were also reluctant to admit of or
desire any personal participation in the work of the Spirit.
How was the activity of the Spirit to be described and defended in this
religious context? On the one hand there were the enthusiasm and
spiritual excesses of the Quakers who with the same Spirit as the
prophets of old were each guided directly and for whom the ultimate
criterion of judgement was always the inner and direct experience of
that Spirit. On the other hand there was the religious movement spawned
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by the Socinians which held the Christian faith to be reasonable, by
which they meant that a rational explanation could be given for all its
beliefs and duties. Consequently it tended to be conceived of as a
moral life pursued in accordance with a rationally justifiable belief
system. In such a view there was not much need, or in fact room, for
the present, dynamic activity of the Hol y Spirit.
The nature of the task lying before Owen was, firstly, to show that the
Spirit, far from being unnecessary to it, was in fact the very essence
of the Christian faith and, secondly, to defend the conjunction of the
Spirit to the Word and also uphold the right use of reason in Christian
understanding. In 1674 he published his monumental study entitled
Pneumatologia, or A Discourse Concerning the Holy Spirit, which was the
major work on the subject in an age which treated the doctrine more
thoroughly than any before. I believe Nuttall is essentially correct in
his assertion that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit "with its manifold
implications, received a more thorough and detailed consideration from
the Puritans of seventeenth-century England than it has received at any
other time in Christian history."9
Let us consider, then, Owen's argument that the Holy Spirit is the great
promise of the Gospel apart from which we can neither know nor respond
to God.
2. The Spirit in the Christian life
Owen held that once the Son had come and completed his work as a servant
among us the ppef remaining promise of the New Testament, the
spring of all the rest, concerned the sending of the Holy Spirit.' 0 To
convince those who were dismissive of the central role of the Spirit in
the life of the Christian, he brought forward the following arguments.
Firstly, Jesus promised the disciples that it was to their advantage
that he should go and be replaced by the presence of the Spirit.
• .f or although it was a great privilege to have known Christ in this
world after the flesh, yet it was much greater to enjoy him in the
dispensation of the Spirit." It is through the Spirit that every
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believer knows and experiences the risen Christ. Conversely, it is by
the Spirit alone that the presence of Christ is mediated to the church.
The Spirit is thus the objective and dynamic reality through which the
risen Christ continues to be made present to the Church today.
Secondly Owen drew attention to the fact that the whole dispensation of
the gospel is called 'the ministry of the Spirit', in contrast with the
Mosaic covenant or 'ministry of the law'.(II Corinthians 3) This, he
argued, indicates that it is a ministry which the Spirit makes effective
or one in which the Spirit in his gifts and graces is communicated to
men.' 2
 To separate the Spirit from the gospel would be to destroy it
and leave it a dead letter, which is what happens when the proclamation
is treated as simply a system of truth.' 2
 The gospel, therefore, cannot
be considered as merely a message or system, or even a history, rather
it is an ongoing event in which the Spirit is the principal agent. it
is certainly not possible to interpret it as a moral life lived in
conformity to a particular set of beliefs.
Thirdly he argued that, "There is not any spiritual or saving good from
first to last communicated unto us, or that we are from and by the grace
of God made partakers of, but it is revealed to us and bestowed on us by
the Holy Ghost." God gives to us and acts among us only by his
Spirit, how then shall we receive his mercy or grace apart from it? It
is useful to examine here how Owen's understanding of the Spirit's role
as the revealer of divine truth differed from that of the Quakers.
He considered God's revelation to us of his nature and will in three
stages. First, the person of Christ is the real, formal object of our
faith. As the Son of God incarnate he is the representative image of
God to us. Second, there is the medium of revelation whereby this
objective reality is conveyed to our minds. This is the Gospel apart
from which we know nothing of the image of God. Third, there is "the
internal light of the mind in the saving illumination of the Holy
Spirit, enabling us - by that means, and in the use of it - spiritually
to discern and behold the glory of God in the face of Christ." 15 It
would appear that Owen understands the Spirit to give us a knowledge of
God in the face of Christ which, although mediated by the Scripture,
nevertheless has an intuitive aspect and is not wholly discursive.
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• . .we who were "darkness" become "light in the Lord," or come to
know God in Christ savingly, looking into and discerning spiritual
things with a proper intuitive sight.
The careful ordering of these three aspects in Owen's thought safeguards
the centrality of the person of Christ as historically experienced among
men in all our knowledge of God; the gospel preached end written as the
objective criterion by which that knowledge may be evaluated; and the
essential role of the Spirit in enlightening our minds that we may
spiritually know God and be enabled to respond to him in faith. The
Quakers, we have seen, would not allow the Scriptures as an objective
reality to either mediate or be a principle by which to evaluate the
truth of their inner revelations. It was not long before they also
considered that the knowledge of Christ's historical life was not
essential for faith.
We willingly admit that this knowledge (of the life and death of
Christ) is very beneficial and inspiring, but not absolutely
necessary for those from whom God himself has withheld it. For, if
they allow his seed and light to enlighten their hearts, they may
become partakers of the mystery of his death, even though they have
not heard of it.l?
Aware of the inability of the mere letter of the Scripture to impart
spiritual life, and distinguishing between an academic knowledge of God
and real faith, the Quakers untied revelation from the objective Gospel
record in the interests of a personal or existential response to God
himself. As a consequence the knowledge of the historical life of the
incarnate Christ became a matter of secondary importance. It is of
interest that in more recent times an existential theology has again
emphasised the gap between an intellectual knowledge and the reality of
spiritual experience. Thus Emil Brunner writes in The Mediator:
That which can be known, that which is continuous with our own
knowledge, and can be connected with it, is not revelation nor is
it faith; it is knowledge and intellectual truth. . . for any truth
which can be humanly proved to be true by a process of examination
and inquiry is, eo ipso, not revelation but an intellectual idea.
Faith does not come into the reckoning at all.
between our intellectual
are broken in this wa
are bound, as the early
of the historical life of
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However, where the lines o





Quakers did, to come to regard the content
Jesus as non-essential for faith.
Owen's final thesis was that there in no good that we ourselves do that
is holy and acceptable to God "but it is an effect of the Holy Spirit;
it is of his operation in us and by usft.ao For the Scriptures make
clear that we can do nothing apart from Christ, yet it is only by the
Spirit that we receive and are empowered by his grace. This does not
mean that Owen gave no place to the use of reason in religious thinking
or confined theological debate to the 'regenerate'.
Nor do we here plead that reason is blind and corrupted, and that
the natural man cannot discern the things of God, and so require
that men do prove themselves regenerate before we admit them to
judge of the truth of the propositions under debate.. .1
Understanding the grammatical and literal sense of the propositions as
they appear in the Scripure is open to all, but it is only by the Spirit
that we are able to fully acquiesce in what God has revealed, receiving
it as the truth and through it being captivated to the 'obedience of
faith'. It was in this that he differed from the Socinians, not that he
decried the use of reason, but rather that he denied the sufficiency of
it, apart from the action of the Spirit, to bring us to a true faith and
saving knowledge of God.
Owen thus presented a comprehensive argument for the essential role of
the Spirit's work in all aspects of the believer's faith and life,
demonstrating from the Scriptures that it is by the Holy Spirit "we are
regenerated; by him we are sanctified; by him we are cleansed; by him
are we assisted in and unto every good work." 32
 However, in the course
of the discussion he also developed a conception of divine revelation
which was able to meet, on the one hand, the Quaker concern about the
spiritual nature of God's word to the believer, and on the other the
Socinian awareness that reason must play a part in our religious
understanding.
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In so attributing to the Spirit's activity all the believer's experience
of and response to God, Owen was not suggesting that such a work of the
Spirit was thereby some universal phenomenon, coainon to end underlying
the experience of man as a religious being. He was careful, rather, to
maintain a clear distinction between a general work of the Spirit in
nature or creation and his particular work of grace in the formation of
the church.
3. The Spirit in Nature and in Grace
John Taylor in his recent study on the Holy Spirit wrote, "Every time I
am given this unexpected awareness towards some other creature and feel
this current of coninunication between us, I am touched and activated by
something that comes from the fiery heart of the divine love, the
eternal gaze of the Father towards the Son, of the Son towards the
Father".' This 'awareness of the other' is held by him to be brought
about by the direct activity of the Spirit. Taylor goes on to relate
the Spirit to other experiences cormxon to the human condition such as
responsible choice, self-oblation and sacrifice. 24 It seems to me that
he understands the Spirit to be the active principle underlying this
general spirituality, much as the Logos was understood by the Greeks to
be the foundation of all rationality. The work of the Spirit in Christ
and the Church is thereby believed to be continuous with his wider work
in humanity as a whole.
And it is essential for our doctrine of the Holy Spirit to
recognize that so much can be said about him which is universal.25
Owen's approach was rather different. He strongly affirmed the Spirit's
work in the natural order and in assigning to the Spirit the perfecting
or finishing role in the divine creative activity he was dependent on a
conception first used by Basil of Caesarea.
And in the creation bethirik thee first, I pray thee, of the
original cause of all things that are made, the Father; of the
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creative cause, the Son; of the perfecting cause, the Spirit. . .
Owen developed this idea and argued that the Holy Spirit's work was a
cherishing and preserving of the created world, carrying it towards that
form, beauty and perfection for which it was designed. "Hence, upon the
command of God, it brought forth all sorts of creatures in abundance,
according to the seeds arid principles of life which were communicated
unto the rude, inform chaos, by the cherishing motion of the Holy
Spirit. "27
As for man, it was by the Holy Spirit that "his soul was made meet and
able to live for God, as his sovereign lord, chiefest good, and last
end." 2 We saw in the last chapter that Owen considered this moral
uprightness of man's nature as the essential characteristic of the image
of God which he bore. Yet this divine image has now been marred and is
in need of restoration by a new work of the same Spirit.
This new work or new creation, as Owen calls it, entails the founding,
building and completing of the church of God. It is God's work of
grace, based in the person and on the mediation of Christ and made
effectual by his Spirit. It means that in the midst of the Spirit's
continuing work in the 'old' creation, preserving and upholding all
things according to their own nature, particularly the care and guidance
of men in all their relations with one another, there is nevertheless a
new and different work of the Spirit in progress, the formation of the
church.
It is this formation of the Church which Owen describes as the Spirit's
gracious work, a work which is always related to the person and mission
of Christ.
4. Christ as the foundation and goal of the Spirit's work
This new creation or formation of the church of God is centred on Jesus
Christ. He is its foundation, its model, its goal. The gracious work
of the Spirit is therefore directly related to him, whether in the
preparation for the new creation or the actual establishment of it. As
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to the preparatory work of the Spirit Owen argued that:
Whatever the Holy Spirit wrought in an eminent manner under the Old
Testament, it had generally and for the most part, if not
absolutely and always, a respect unto our Lord Jesus Christ and the
gospel; and so was preparatory unto the completing of the great
work of the new creation in and by him.23
The giving of prophecy, the writing of Scripture and the miracles, were
all understood by Owen, as a work of preparation by the Spirit for the
coming into being of the church. "From him (the Spirit), therefore,
was the word of promise and the gift of prophecy, whereon the church
was founded and whereby it was built; from him was the revelation and
institution of all the ordinances of religious worship; from him was
that coninunication of gifts and gracious abilties which any persons
received for the edification, rule, protection, and deliverance of the
church." 3 ° But by making ready for the church in this manner, the
Spirit was in fact preparing the way for Christ.
Secondly, Owen recognised that it is also in the actual establishment
of the church, the bringing about of the new creation, that the
Spirit's work is directly related to Jesus. In the first place the
Spirit's activity presupposes and brings to completion Christ's work of
mediation between God and man, making it effectual in the church. 3 ' In
the second place, and of particular interest to our study, the Spirit,
in recreating the image of God in the church, must work directly in the
life of Jesus Christ himself, for as its head he is himself an integral
part of that church. We shall consider this idea and its implications
in greater detail in the rest of this chapter.
Before we do, however, let us briefly consider what Owen's argument here
means for the relation between our knowledge of Christ and our knowledge
of the Spirit. A study of the growth of Christian traditions would
suggest that the Spirit was the known and coninon factor in the religious
world into which Jesus of Nazareth entered and in terms of which his
person and mission were to be interpreted. As Alasdair Heron rightly
points out with respect to the Gospels:
.very little is said to fill out the picture of the Spirit: it
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is, so to speak, a known quantity, whereas Jesus' identity and
destiny needs to be interpreted and proclaimed.'3
Yet we have seen from Owen's above outline that theological reflection
also encourages a perspective in which the order is reversed. In it
the Spirit is interpreted and understood in relation to Christ; Christ
is the centre and goal of all the Spirit's activity; his atoning work
and resurrection is the ground or basis of the Spirit's outpouring; it
is his life that the Spirit imparts and his likeness that he creates in
us; in short, he is the one that the Spirit has been given to glorify.
Such an understanding meant that the New Testament authors were
compelled to interpret the action of the Spirit in the Old Testament in
the light of Christ and even designate him as the Spirit of Christ.(I
Pet.l.lO-12) ()ir thesis is concerned with the way we are to understand
Jesus Christ, and this chapter in particular is examining how he is to
be interpreted in relation to the Spirit. Nevertheless in doing so we
are aware that there exists a subtle interrelationship between our
knowledge of Christ and of the Spirit and that neither of them can in
fact be considered simply as the given in terms of which the other is
to be known.
We return now to examine Owen's thesis that the Spirit worked directly
in the life of Christ as he was the head of the Church.
5. Firstborn among many brothers
In the previous chapter we considered Owen's exposition of the doctrine
of the incarnation, or what it meant for the eternal Word to become a
man. In it the reality of Christ's manhood was vigorously affirmed.
Owen maintained, however, that the Son not only took our nature, but
also entered into our condition. "His conformity unto the brethren...
consisted in two things: first his participation of their nature;
secondly, His copartnership with them in their condition of suffering
and temptation."3'
This was a perspective of which orthodox theology had often lost sight.
It had generally been assumed that the affirmation that Christ was
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ontologically one with us - that he had a human nature including body,
mind and soul - was a sufficient description of what was implied by
being human. Owen was aware that to be a man also meant to be part of
the human condition. Christ did not simply have our being, but he was
part of our world and it history, its complex human relationships and
social structures, its joy and its suffering.
His calling us brethren, and owning of us, made him instantly
obnoxious unto all the miseries the guilt whereof we had contracted
upon ourselves. The owning of the alliance unto us cost him, as it
were all he was worth; for being rich, "for our sakes he became
poor." He caine into the prison and into the furnace to own us'4
The Son of God did not only become a man, but by owning us as his
brothers and sisters he entered fully into all the suffering and
temptation to which we are exposed. He became one with us not simply
through sharing our nature and lineage, but by participating in the
conditions which bring such pain and impoverishment to our lives. The
Son thus became an integral part of humanity, a humanity which needed to
be created anew and reformed so that it might be the church of God.
One of the reasons that many theologians have been reluctant to follow
through the implications of the incarnation in this way is their
commitment to a doctrine of the sinlessness of Christ. They would
argue that Christ was among us to forgive rather than to be forgiven,
to renew others rather than himself to be in need of renewal. Owen was
not, however, insensitive to these issues, and so was always careful to
affirm that although Christ shared the consequences that arose out of
our guilt, yet he himself was guiltless, that although tempted as we
are, he was without sin.' 6 He believed that the doctrine of the
sinlessness of Christ was consistent with his argument that the Son bad
identified with fallen humanity and that the image of God, lost in
Adam, had to be first restored in Christ the man," our elder brother,
the head of the church, before being restored among us, his mystical
body.
God, in the human nature of Christ, did perfectly renew that
blessed image of his in our nature which we lost in Adam, with an
addition of many glorious endowments which Adam was not made
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partaker of... .God designed and gave unto Christ grace and glory;
and he did it that he might be the prototype of what he designed
unto , and would bestow upon us.
This is similar to the position that Edward Irving was to maintain so
vigorously and at such cost to himself some hundred and fifty years
later. Defending himself from the charge of heresy he argued, "The
point at issue is simply this: Whether Christ's flesh had the grace of
sinlessness and incorruption from its proper nature, or from the
indwelling of the Holy Ghost. I say the latter. I assert, that in its
proper nature it was as the flesh of His mother, but, by virtue of the
Holy Ghost's quickening and inhabiting of it, it was preserved sinless
and incorruptible." His concern, like Owen's before him, was that
Christ's life should be seen as the dynamic overcoming of sinful
temptation and real growth in grace, and thus be the prototype of the
believer's life. While Irving spoke of the incarnate life of Christ as
one which demonstrated that a created substance, in which sin and Satan
bad power, might yet be wrested out of their hands, and presented
blameless and faultless in the presence of God, 39 Owen stressed the
complementary concept, that is, that in the life of Christ the image of
God was restored to human nature.
But how is the divine image to be restored to the human nature of
Christ? We have seen above that Owen held it to be the particular work
of the Spirit to establish the new creation, to restore the image of God
in the church. Now what the Spirit was to do in the Church, that is
Christ's mystical body, must first be accomplished in Christ's physical
body or human nature. "The same hand which laid this foundation doth
also finish the building." 4 ° There is thus a direct correspondence
between the work of the Spirit in the man Christ Jesus and his work in
all believers.
And this belongs unto the establishment of our faith, that he who
prepared, sanctified, and glorified the human nature, the natural
body of Jesus Christ, the head of the church, bath undertaken to
prepare, sanctify, and glorify his mystical body, or all the elect
given unto him of the Father.41
How firm is the biblical base for Owen's argument that the Spirit renews
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the divine image in the human nature of Christ? In considering his
answer to this question we need to remember that he used the expression
'renewal of the divine image' to include all that the Spirit does in
sanctifying, equipping, comforting and protecting the individual as he
transforms him into the likeness of God.
6. The Spirit's work in Jesus
Owen suninarised the Scriptural testimony to the Spirit's activity in
different aspects of Christ's life, from his conception in the Virgin's
womb to his glorification at the right hand of the Father.
a. The miraculous conception and formation of the body of Christ in the
womb of the Virgin was, he held, the work of the Holy Spirit. Owen
conceded that in the Scriptures this is also ascribed to the Father
(Heb.x.5), but only for his eternal designation of it; and to the Son
(Heb.ii.14) for voluntarily assuming it. "But the ininediate divine
efficiency in this matter was the peculiar work of the Holy Ghost".42
His argument was based on the 'birth narratives' recorded in the Gospels
of Matthew and Luke.
• .an angel of the Lord appeared to him in a dream and said,
"Joseph son of David, do not be afraid to take Mary home as your
wife, because what is conceived in her is from the Holy
Spirit" . (Mt . i. 20)
This was not, however, the interpretation that most of the Fathers gave
to these passages, and even as late as Thomas Aquinas the expression,
"The Holy Spirit will come upon you, and the power of the Most High will
overshadow you" was understood as referring to the Word rather than to
the Spirit.' 3 Owen, nevertheless, made a clear distinction between the
Spirit's action in forming the body and the Word's act in assuming it to
himself. The actual conception, or formation of the physical body of
Christ must, he insisted, be referred to the direct, formative action of
the Holy Spirit.
He recognised that this creative work of the Spirit, as described in the
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Gospels, was not 'ex nihilo', rather the body of Christ "was formed or
made of the substance of the blessed Virgin". 44
 This ensured the
physical descent necessary, not only for the fulfillment of the
Abrahamic and Davidic promises, but in order that Christ might be
related to us as a 'kinsman'. We saw earlier that Owen did not consider
the human nature of Christ in a Platonic sense as some ideal form of
universal or inclusive reality, but he held, rather, that it was
substantiated in the Son as a distinct and individual entity. The
relation that Christ as man has to us, is not, then, that of a universal
to its particulars, but rather that of an individual man sharing with
other men and women in a coownon ancestry. It was on the basis of this
natural or family relationship that he was able to be our mediator.
The miraculous conception of Christ by the creative or formative act of
the Holy Spirit on the substance of the Virgin was, therefore,
understood by Owen as a biblical witness not to his divine nature, but
to the reality of his humanity. The 'virgin birth' does not provide us
with a way of conceiving how one person can be both man and God, for the
conception of Christ, considered in itself, does not indicate that he is
partly divine. Rather the Spirit's work in 'overshadowing' Mary is
linked by Owen to the Spirit 'hovering' over the original unformed
creation, in neither case is the resulting work invested with divinity.
The divine nature of Christ is to be understood, rather, in terms of
incarnation, for although the Holy Spirit formed the body and soul, the
eternal Son, as an act of' love and wisdom, assumed that human nature in
the instant of its formation into personal union with himself.
As to the purity of the body thus formed, Owen argued that he was
without any constitutional tendency or capacity for evil. Although he
took on the normal weaknesses of the human frame there was none of those
frailties which result from the misuse of the body or from a corrupted
temperament. 4
 Owen here is not arguing that Christ's humanity was
quite different from other men, but merely that he was not afflicted
with the sort of weakness of character, which is contingent to, rather
than being a necessary part of human nature.
Hence it is that one is disposed to passion, wrath, and anger;
another to vanity and lightness; a third to sensuality and fleshly
pleasures; and so others to sloth and idleness.4
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The freedom from this type of character deficiency did not, he believed,
detract from the fact that Christ had to face all the rigors of
suffering and temptation that it was possible for a man to endure. On
the contrary he believed that the purity of Christ's nature made him
more sensible than others to these things.
b. At the moment of its conception the Spirit sanctified the human
nature of Christ and filled his soul with grace appropriate to its
receptivity. This sanctifying work of the Spirit was necessary "for let
the natural faculties of the soul, the mind, will, and affections, be
created pure, innocent, undefiled.. .yet there is not enough to enable
any rational creature to live to God"." Underlying this argument is
Owen's belief that man as a creature has no natural ability in himself
by which he is able to respond to and live in relationship with God.
The power to love and obey God must have a divine source. Christ as
man, sinless though he be, is thus in need of the sanctifying work of
the Spirit that he might live to God."
Owen is also aware that if we take the humanity of Christ seriously we
are required to conceive of him as one who received grace appropriate
to his receptivity. For instance, the grace that Jesus could receive
as a babe in arms was far different from the gracious comfort and
support given to him by the Spirit when as an adult he offered himself
in obedience to God.
c. The Spirit continued the work of sanctification in Christ's life.
Onr attention is draz to two matters of importance. Firstly, Christ as
man experienced God's grace "by the rational faculties and powers of his
soul, his understanding, will, and affections; for he acted grace as a
man"." Not the divine nature, but his rational soul was the motivating
principle of his moral actions. "Now, in the improvement and exercise
of these faculties and powers of his soul, he had and made a progress
after the manner of other men; for he was made like unto us 'in all
things,' yet without sin." 0 And this development required a
progression in grace through the Holy Spirit.
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And the child grew and became strong; he was filled with wisdom,
and the grace of God was upon him... .And Jesus grew in wisdom and
stature, and in favor with God and men. (Luke ii .40.52)
Secondly, the human nature of Christ was capable of growing in
knowledge. For lack of knowledge is an aspect of human nature and is
not a blamable defect. And so through his experience he grew in wisdom
and knowledge and "in new trials and temptations he experimentally
learned the new exercise of grace." 5 ' This was constantly done by the
Holy Spirit working in his human nature.
It is here that Owen's independence from the tradition is most apparent.
He has taken firmly hold of the nettle which so many orthodox
theologians were unwilling to grasp, that is, the scriptural witness to
Jesus' lack of knowledge and growth in grace. The principle which
enabled him to do so was his argument that it is not Christ's divine
nature but his rational soul which motivates his moral actions. We will
consider the implications of this conception more fully in a later
chapter,
d. The Holy Spirit anointed him with all those extraordinary powers and
gifts which were necessary for the performance of his office. The
outstanding witness to this is the prophecy from Isaiah which Luke
records as having been read publicly by Christ in Nazareth and applied
by him to his own ministry.
The Spirit of the Sovereign Lord is on me, because the Lord has
arinointed me to preach good news to the poor.(Isaiah lxii)
This, Owen held, refers in particular to his prophetic office for which
he was "fitted by this unction of the Spirit." 63 The fulness of gifts
for this work he received only at his baptism, before which God's
presence with him was only occasionally made manifest. 53 But from this
time he was said to be 'full of the Holy Spirit' . (Luke iv. 1)
e. By the power of the Spirit Jesus wrought the miracles which attested
to and confirmed his ministry. Owen refers to Peter's description of
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Jesus' ministry on the day of Pentecost.
approved of God by miracles and wonders a
him... "(Acts ii.22) The signs and wonders
of divine power, but this power is always
through the working of the Holy Spirit.54
"Jesus of Nazareth, a man
id signs, which God did by
were thus ininediate effects
made manifest in the world
That the miracles in Jesus' ministry should be ascribed to the Holy
Spirit receives additional support from the Gospel accounts of his
exorcisms. Luke's Gospel indicates that Jesus casts out devils by the
'finger of God', that is, by the infinite power of God. The parallel
account in Matthew refers the exorcisms directly to the Spirit of God.
But if I drive out demons by the Spirit of God, then the kingdom of
God has come upon you. (Mt.xii.28)
f. The Spirit guided, directed. comforted and supported Jesus in the
whole course of his ministry, temptations, obedience and sufferings.55
He was led by the Spirit into the wilderness; by his assistance he was
carried triumphantly through the temptations and he was empowered by him
in his preaching. Through his whole ministry he was supported and
consoled by God through his Spirit.50
g. Christ gave himself as an offering to God through the Hol y Spirit.
How much more, then, will the blood of Christ, who through the
eternal Spirit offered himself unblemished to God... (Heb.ix.14)
Externally Christ's death appears merely as an act of penal suffering,
but its principal efficacy lies in his obedience in offering himself to
God. He dedicated himself to God, went voluntarily to the garden, and
in "all that followed hereon, unto his giving up the ghost, he offered
himself to God in and by those actings of the grace of the Holy Spirit
in him."5'
The principal graces of the Spirit in this offering of himself were his
love to mankind and compassion to sinners; his zeal and desire for the
glory of God; his submission and obedience to the will of God and his
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faith and trust in God arid his promises, both for himself and for the
covenant which he was sealing with his blood.'
Apart from this free offering of himself the death of Christ would have
been ineffective. For God was not atoned by "the outward sufferin g of a
violent and bloody death" but rather he was so "delighted and pleased
with these high and glorious acts of grace and obedience in Jesus
Christ.. . that he would be angry with (mankind) no more". This
offering of himself as a sweet-smelling savour to God (Eph.v.2) was
accomplished in his human nature by the Holy Spirit.
h. At his death the Holy Spirit protected his soul and preserved from
corruption the body of Jesus.
i. The resurrection was the particular work of the Holy Spirit. For
"although the Father is said to raise him from the dead by taking off
the sentence of the law, which he had answered, (and) he himself also
took his life again by an act of the love, care, and power of his divine
nature, his living again being an act of his person, although the human
nature only died."eo Yet the immediate power which brought him again to
life was the Holy Spirit.
And if the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead is living
in you, he who raised christ from the dead will also give life to
your mortal bodies through his Spirit.. .(Rom.viii.11)
j. The Holy Spirit glorified the human nature of Christ and prepared it
for its place in the presence of God.
Owen has here drawn a profile of the life of Jesus Christ as a man who
was prepared, sanctified, empowered and glorified by the Spirit of God.
In it he describes a mental, physical and spiritual development of
Christ's human nature through the action of the Spirit which is in no
way qualitatively different from our own possible experience.
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What encouraged him to follow this path, along which so few orthodox
theologians had been willing to tread? It seems to me that among other
influences it was his awareness that Christ was truly one of us,
sharing not only our being but also our condition, that enabled him to
give due weight to the Scriptural witness to the Spirit's work in
Jesus' life. For if Christ is our prototype, manifesting a pattern of
life to which we are to be conformed, then he must stand before God as
we do. His experience, not only of suffering and of temptation, but
also of grace and of God, must be continuous with our own. As a man
before God, all that he received from him in comfort and empowering, or
gave to him in adoration and obedience, must have been through the
enabling power of the Holy Spirit.
Now this way of understanding the person of Christ was not entirely new.
A number of different groups, sometimes classified as Adoptionists and
nearly always considered heretical by the orthodox church, had held
views of Christ which were in some ways similar to Owen's above outline.
For ease of reference we have characterised these christologies as
inspirational. For they have in convnon the conception that Jesus as a
man was inspired by the Holy Spirit with respect to his service for God
and his relationship to him.
7. Inspiration and Incarnation
What is so interesting about Owen's exposition of the person of Christ
in terms of the Spirit's inspiration, is that it took place within th
context of an incarnational christology. It appears to me that this was
the first time since the brilliant defence of the Christian faith by
Irenaeus in the second century, that a theologian with an 'orthodox'
understanding of the incarnation had recognised so clearly what it meant
for Christ as a man to be inspired by the Holy Spirit.
We have suggested before that one of the reasons why the Church failed
to hold together these two ways of thinking about the person of Christ
was that they appear to be mutually exclusive. As a result it is
possible to characterise most christologies, both within and without the
orthodox tradition, as having either an inspirational or an
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incernational conception of Christ. It would seem that the attempt was
almost never made to affirm both or to integrate them into one coherent
chrjstology. We have referred to Irenaeus' exceptional synthesis of the
two concepts and his understanding of the relation between the two
natures.
For as he became man in order to undergo temptation, so also was He
the Word that He might be glorified; the Word remaining quiescent,
that he might be capable of being tempted, dishonoured, crucified,
and of suffering death, but the human nature being swallowed up in
it (the divine), when it conquered, and endured [without yielding],
and performed acts of kindness, and rose again, and was received up
[into heaven].e1
Irenaeus, in effect, divides up the activity of the incarnate Christ.
In some actions the Word remains quiescent so that the human nature
might act, but in the triumphant aspects of Christ's ministry he
suggests that the humanity is incorporated into the divine, so that the
actions are those of divinity. 2
 His brilliance lay in the fact that
he had recognised the problem. We must somehow allow for the reality
of both divine and human action in Christ, for he is both the Word
incarnate and the Messiah inspired by the Spirit. That Irenaeus'
solution is somewhat forced and ultimately inadequate should not blind
us to the depths of his theological insight. He wrote long before the
great christological debates of the fourth and fifth centuries and it
is to be expected that he did not address some of the complex issues
which were yet to come to light.
Owen, writing more than a thousand years after Chalcedon, was well
acquainted with the Patristic christological debate. The major concern
of this thesis is to examine how it was that he could, in the light of
the apparent difficulties, so confidently explicate the person of Christ
in terms of both inspiration and incarnation and whether he was
justified in the way he did so.
We begin by considering the christological implications of Owen's
profile of Christ as a man whose birth, life, death, resurrection and
glorification are understood with respect to the direct action of the
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Holy Spirit. What can we learn of the relation or interaction between
his divine and human nature if as man he always experienced God through
the Spirit? Owen was aware of the theological importance of the
question and gave a summary of this relation in the following theses.
a. (That) the only singular immediate act of the person of the
Son on the human nature was the assumption of it into subsistence
with himself...
b. That the only necessary consequent of this assumption of the
human nature, or the incarnation of the Son of God, is the
personal union of Christ, or the inseparable subsistence of the
assumed nature in the person of the Son...
c. That all other actings of God in the person of the Son towards
the human nature were voluntary, and did not necessarily ensue on
the union mentioned; for there was no transfusion of the
properties of one nature into the other, nor real physical
coeMnunication of divine essential excellencies unto the
humanity...
d. The Holy Ghost. . . is the immediate, peculiar, efficient cause
of all external divine operations...
e. The Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, no less than the
Spirit of the Father. . .And hence is he the immediate operator of
all divine acts of the Son himself, even on his own human
nature...
f. .. . the immediate actings of the Holy Ghost are not spoken of
him absolutely, nor ascribed unto him exclusively, as unto the
other persons and their concurrence in them.'3
To suninarise, although Owen affirmed the traditional doctrine that the
Son assumed human nature into a personal union with himself, he denied
that this requires of necessity anything more than the indissoluble
existence of such a union. The divine nature does not act directly on
the human nature and there is no real communication of properties
between them. Rather all ongoing direct, divine activity on or in the
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human nature of Jesus is the work of the Holy Spirit.
We concluded the last chapter by describing Owen's exposition of
incarnation, that is the assumption by the Son of human nature into a
personal union with himself, as being ultimately incomplete as a
description of Christ's person. This was because in itself it failed
to explain how the human nature, so assumed, interacted with the divine
nature, or equivalently how Christ as man responded to God. The answer
suggested then, and filled out in the above exposition, is that the
relation between these natures must be explained in terms of the Holy
Spirit. We must have recourse to a doctrine of the Spirit to give an
adequate explanation of Christ's person.
Owen's theology, although affirming what we have described as
incarnational and inspirational christologies, did not indicate that
these were separate and sufficient accounts of the person of Christ.
Rather each was clearly incomplete or inadequate on its own. The
incarnation does not of itself explain how Christ as man experienced
God, while a doctrine of inspiration fails to describe the relation of
Christ to God in such a way that he might, as the agent of our
reconciliation, adequately express the glory of the divine nature. The
two require one another if a complete account is to be given of his
person, and it is on this basis that his theology was able to
consistently maintain both.
Owen might well have considered our interest in the integration of the
concepts of inspiration and incarnation with some surprise, for he did
not, himself, directly address the question of the compatibility or
complementarity of these two ways of explicating Christ's person.
However, from the exposition above it is clear that he did in practice
distinctly affirm each of these christological types and we have argued
that he was able to consistently do so for they were in his theology
complementary rather than complete descriptions of the person of Christ.
However, to speak simply of ccmplementarity does not solve all our
conceptual difficulties. Inspiration and incarnation suggest to our
minds quite different ways of thinking about Christ and if we are to
intelligently maintain both we need to to be able to bring them into
some sort of conceptual unity. To help clarify what we mean by that
let us briefly consider how these concepts function in christology.
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8. Master-stories
Owen's account of the Spirit's work in the new creation is in certain
respects parallel to his outline of the Son's mission to the world.
This story, as the other, has its starting point in the counsels of God
and the sending act of the Father.
(W)hen God designed the great and glorious work of recovering
fallen man and the saving of sinners, to the praise of the glory of
his grace, he appointed in his infinite wisdom two means thereof.
The one was the giving of his Son for them, and the other was the
giving of his Spirit unto them.°4
Whereas the Son was given by God that "all breaches and differences
between him and us be removed, perfect peace and agreement made, and we
rendered acceptable and well-pleasing in his sight", 65
 so the Spirit was
sent that "we may be kept and preserved meet for conmuinion with him as
our God, and for the enjoyment of him as our reward."°°
This parallelism is also apparent in his accounts of the Son and the
Spirit's action with respect to the humanity of Christ. It was the Son
who assumed human nature into subsistence with himself, yet it was the
Spirit who formed, sanctified and energised that assumed nature. Now
these respective narratives are in essence what we mean by the concepts
of incarnation and inspiration. They are not just any two of a large
number of stories that could be told of the person of Christ, rather
they provide a determinative framework for all other accounts of
Christ's person, we could say they function as 'master-stories'.
This analysis would help us understand why the early church took just
one biblical notion - the Word became flesh - from among the many
possibilities, expounding and formalising it in the Creed of Nicea and
using it as a test of christological orthodoxy. The narrative suggested
by those few words operated as the hermeneutical key to the
interpretation of all else that was said of Christ's person. C the
other hand, one could argue that those who were dissatisfied with
orthodox christology and developed an alternative along inspirational
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lines, were in fact implicitly operating with a quite different master-
story' essentially of the form, 'God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the
Holy Spirit and with power'. It was the inherent difficulty in bringing
these two stories together into one coherent account that led to most
christologies having either an inspirational or incarnational form.
The significance of Owen's christology is that it makes possible the
incorporation of these two master-stories into one narrative. The
respective missions of the Son and the Spirit to the world, in
particular as they are considered with respect to the human nature of
Christ, were not perceived as mutually exclusive accounts but rather as
complementing one another. They can therefore be woven into one story
which we might suninarise as, 'The Holy Spirit formed, sanctified and
eriergised the human nature which the eternal Son had assumed into
personal subsistence with himself'. The narrative of the incarnation is
thus incomplete apart from the story of the Spirit's mission to renew
the divine image in Christ as a prototype of what he would do in the
Church.
But we suggest that the bringing together of these two master-stories
into one coherent narrative is in effect what is required when we speak
of the need to harmonise the concepts of incarnation and inspiration,
for it is to these stories that the concepts refer.
Owen's theology, however, also allows us to broaden the perspective and
recognise that it is not simply the action of the Son and the Spirit
with respect to the human nature of Christ that can be integrated into
one story. For underlying this there are the two great themes that
encompass the whole redemptive work of God, that is, the respective
missions of the Son and of the Spirit into the world. Now these should
be seen, not as two quite distinct or unrelated movements, but as
themselves complementary aspects of a more comprehensive account. The
Father has indeed sent the Son for us and given the Spirit to us, yet
these are in fact simply two branches of the one great covenantal
promise that God will be our God and we will be his people.
We would, therefore, argue that it is the comprehensive nature and in
particular trinitarian determination of Owen's theology that ultimately
both leads him to, and provides the basis for, his integration of what
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we have described as an incarnational and an inspirational christology.
If Owen's work was indeed successful in holding together both these ways
of understanding the person of Christ, it has far reaching implications
for the whole christological debate. ir ininediate task, however, is to
consider some of the difficulties which are suggested by his christology
and examine to what extent he is able to meet them.
9. Integrity of the Person
One of the theological problems which appears to arise from Owen's
argument concerns the integrity of Christ's person. By so emphasing the
distinct operation of his two natures was he not repeating the Nestorian
error and in effect implying the existence of two persons?
In his exposition of the incarnation Owen outlined the Alexandrian
argument for the ontological integrity of Christ by describing the
union of his divine and human natures as a hypostatic union. The
incarnate Christ is thereby one being, one individual entity.
Nevertheless in the description above there appears to be two distinct
agents active in that one being. There is both the giver and the
receiver of the Spirit, God with us and the prototype man of faith
totally dependent on God. Does this mean that there is a dual agency
in Christ? Owen looks to the role of Christ as Mediator to understand
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Cie person acting in two natures
For there is one God and one mediator between God and men, the
man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a ransom for all men - the
testimony given in its proper time.(I Tim.i.5,6)
If Christ is the mediator between God and man, does this require that he
is in his own being both divine and human, and if it does how can we
conceive of his redemptive activity as that of just one person? Or more
precisely, how is a christology which is based on the 'two nature' theory
able to treat of Christ's saving work as that of a single agent? We
begin by considering the manner in which two classical soteriologies have
done so, for they highlight the inherent difficulties of the task and
provide an illuminating introduction to the way in which Owen was to
interpret the agency of Christ's saving activity.
1. Atbanasius - The Incarnation of the Word of God
The shape and content of any particular soteriology is usually
dependent on the interpretation given of man's predicament in the
world. Athanasius believed that as a consequence of the Fall marl had
lost God's image and that this had brought to his being corruption,
death and finally a return to non-existence.' These ideas of
corruption and death consequently played a determining role in his
exposition of Christ's work as Redeemer.
Thus taking a body like our own, because all our bodies were
liable to the corruption of death, He surrendered his body to
death in place of all, and offered it to the Father... .This he did
that he might turn again to incorruption men who had turned back
to corruption, and make them alive through death by the
appropriation of His body and by the grace of his resurrection.
Thus he would make death to disappear from them as utterly as
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straw from the fire.2
Man was also faced with the loss of all true knowledge of God. The
divine image had been in him a representation of God's likeness, and
without it he no longer had any apprehension of his Maker. 3 This
spiritual desolation was compounded by the cosmological rebellion
arising from the Fall, whereby Athanasius understood the air to have
become the sphere of the devil, who with the other evil spirits tried
both to keep souls from the truth and to hinder the progress of those
who were trying to follow it. 4 Athanasius does make mention of man's
broken relationship with God and refers to the concepts of ransom and
sacrifice, but this was a secondary idea in his exposition and is
subservient to the central theme of man's loss and recovery of
immortality.
Now 3 Athanasius argued that each of these difficulties facing man in
his fallen condition could only be met and overcome through the action
of the divine Son, for:
only the Image of the Father could re-create the likeness of
the Image in men, that none save our Lord Jesus Christ could give
to mortals ininortality, and that only the Word Who orders all
things and is alone the Father's true and sole-begotten Son could
teach men about him and abolish the worship of idols. . . .having
proved his Godhead by His works, He might offer the sacrifice on
behalf of all, surrendering His own temple to death in place of
all, to settle man's account with death and free him from the
primal transgression.
It is apparent that the agent in all of Christ's saving activity is
held by Athanasius to be the divine Word. The human body assumed in
the incarnation is real and necessary in order that the corruption in
mankind might be overcome, but it is always only an instrument of the
Word.
He, the Mighty One, the Artificer of all, Himself prepared this
body in the virgin as a temple for Himself, and took it for His
very own, as the instrument through which He was known and in
which He dwelt.
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This is evident in his explanation of the death of Christ: "He
surrendered his body to death in place of all, and offered it to the
Father". 7 The agent is the Word who although active in the death of
his body is ultimately untouched by it himself.
He Himself was unhurt by this, for He is impassible and
incorruptible; but by His own impassibility He kept and healed
the suffering men on whose account He thus suffered.e
It would seem then that Athanasius had no difficulty in integrating the
activity of Jesus Christ, for he constantly assumed that the subject of
all his deeds was simply the divine Word or Son of God. Even dying was
understood as an act of the Word surrendering his body to death and
offering it to the Father. The strength of his christology lay in its
ability to satisfy the requirements of his underlying soteriology. The
impassible Word of God, present among us in a human body which he gave
over to death, was able to bring to us ininortality, often spoken of as
divinisation, knowledge of God and the defeat of the demonic powers, as
he settled our debt with death on the cross.
It was, however, a shift in the generally accepted soteriology of the
time that first suggested the weakness of this form of christology.
The belief developed that the actual assumption of human nature by the
Word of God was not merel y a means towards our salvation or
divinisation, but a direct cause of it. The salvation of human nature,
therefore, lay in its assumption by the eternal Word. Now this meant
that the Church had to think through what was involved in Christ
assuming a complete human nature, that is one which included a human
mind or soul. It was not just a body which the Word took to himself,
but human emotions and a human will.
However, it appears to me that the radical implications of this
development were not fully recognised by the Church at large and that
those in the Alexandrian tradition continued to use a sophisticated
form of the Athanasian christology, in which the agency of the
incarnate Christ was implicitly if not explicitly simply referred to
the eternal Word.
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The direction in which soteriology was to develop in the West, however.
precluded the possibility of such a procedure.
2. Anselm - Ithy was God made Man?
For Anselm the major difficulty confrontin g man in this life was not
considered primarily to be his subjection to mortality, but rather his
estrangement from God arising from his sins. It was from this
perspective that his soteriology was developed.
He redeemed us from our sins, and from His wrath, and from hell,
and from the power of the devil.. .
Although there is some overlap here with the concerns of Athanasius, it
is inMnediately apparent that there has been a significant shift in
emphasis from the question of ininortality to the problem of our
relation with God. The model underlying Anselm's understanding of this
relation is that of a servant to his feudal lord to whom he owes
satisfaction in the event of any failure to render the homage that is
due to him. Consequently he argued that as a rational creature man's
whole will ought to be subject to the will of God. "And thus to sin is
nothing else but not to repay to God one's debt."° In sinning,
therefore, man has defrauded and thereby dishonoured God. This creates
the central problem for man - how shall the outstanding debt to God be
paid?
It is therefore necessary that either the honour abstracted shall
be restored, or punishment shall follow; otherwise God were
either unjust to Himself, or were powerless for either, which it
is a shame even to imagine.''
The satisfaction required by God must bear a direct proportion to the
sin coninitted, whose gravity is in turn related to the dignity of the
person of fended." This level of satisfaction, although required of
man, lies outside human possibilities. Being a payment "which God only
can, and man only should, make, it is needful that it should be made by
one who is both God and man". '
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Man must therefore freely give sonething of infinite value to God which
is not already owed to Him.' 4 Christ was able to do this by freely
offering him his life. This effectively repaid the debt which man owed
to God, for the life of Christ was more deserving of love than sins are
hateful. 1
We see then that Anselm tended to treat Christ's human nature as the
agent of his saving activity. Divinity was necessary to his person so
that the act of satisfaction might have the required value, but it
calls for the deed of a man, a deed whereby man as creature honours God
as creator. Thus, in his analysis of Christ's death, Anselm
interpreted it as an act of his humanity towards his divinity, the
human nature dies, the divine nature as one of the Trinity receives the
offering.' It is only by linguistic convention, on account of the
unity of Christ's person, that we ascribe the act of mediation also to
God.
But granting that what Man did, God is said to have done, (on
account of the unity of Person:)...
Anseim did not, then, seem to have any real difficulty in treating
Christ's saving activity as that of a single agent, for he refers its
agency constantly to his human nature. The will that chose freely to
give its life was a human will, while the life itself was itself
considered as fully human, having a natural ininortality not through its
divinity, but because it was untainted by the Fall. The subject of
Christ's saving work was generally perceived to be a man, albeit a man
personally united with God.
We are not implying that Anseim ever denied a divine nature of Christ,
or suggested that his divinity was wholly extraneous to his redemptive
work. On the contrary he held, as we have seen, that as the
satisfaction Christ offered was one that only God can make and that
only man should make, "it is needful that is should be made by one who
is both God and man.' Nevertheless the difference between his
soteriology and that of Athanasius is remarkable. Whereas Anselm
tended to conceive Christ's redeeming work as the deed of a man who was
united with God, Athanasius viewed it as the action of the eternal Word
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indwelling a human body.
Both theologians were able to consider Christ as a single agent by
implicitly referring the agency of his saving work to either the divine
Word or to the Man assumed. The need to attribute Christ's saving
action exclusively to either one or the other of his two natures is a
dilenina which some theologians still find confronting them today.
Brian Hebblethwaite is an articulate representative of those who would
follow the Athanasian alternative.
It emerges that much depends on what one sees as the primary
subject of christological statements. It is no good suggesting
that Jesus, qua God, could do this, and, qua man, could do that.
That would already be to confuse the natures b y predicating
unlimited divinity of the man instead of predicating real
humanity of God incarnate. The primary subject of all
christological statements is God. It is God qua God, who cannot
die, and it is God incarnate, i.e. God, qua man, who suffers and
dies for our salvation. Nor is there any question of sundering
the natures here, when it is made quite clear that we are not
talking of two separate individuals, but of the divine substance,
which is such as to include within its own subjectivity, the
human subject, Jesus, as the expression and vehicle of God's
incarnate life.la (my italics)
However, where the salvation wrought by Christ is recognised to be the
action of both God and man in Christ's person, incorporating the
soteriological perspectives of both Athanasius and Anselm, then the
above manoeuvre is no longer effective and we must think anew of how we
are to maintain the integrity of his action.
3. Calvin - Incorporating both perspectives
It is in the theology of John Calvin that we find this dual
perspective, with its emphasis on the dramatic action of both God and
man in the redemptive work of Christ.
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It was his to swallow up death: who but Life could do so? It was
his to conquer sin: who could do so save Righteousness itself?
It was his to put to flight the powers of the air and the world:
who could do so but the mighty power superior to both? But who
possesses life and righteousness, and the dominion and government
of heaven, but God alone? Therefore God, in his infinite mercy,
having determined to redeem us, became himself our Redeemer in
the person of his only-begotten Son. Another principal part of
our reconciliation with God was, that man, who had lost himself
by his disobedience, should by way of remedy, oppose to it
obedience, satisfy the justice of God, and pay the penalty of
sin. . .Finally, since as God only he could not suffer, and as man
only could not overcome death, he united the human nature with
the divine, that he might subject the weakness of the one to
death as an expiation of sin, and by the power of the other.
maintaining a struggle with death, might gain us the victory.20
However, if the action of both God and man in Christ's saving work are
emphasised in this way, how are we to conceive of the subject or agent
of his activity? Although Calvin did not deal with this question
directly he did imply that this redemptive action should not be
referred simply to Christ's divine or human nature but to his person in
his office as Mediator, re-emphasising the christological model which
had been much used by the Latin fathers.2'
Let us, therefore, regard it as the key of true interpretation,
that those things which refer to the office of Mediator are not
spoken of the divine or human nature simply.33
It is the idea implied here, that the person of Christ in his role as
Mediator is the agent of the saving work accomplished in both his
natures, which John Owen recognised to be so crucial for christology
and which he, therefore, went on to develop as a foundation of his own
theology. The essence of Owen's argument was that the actions of both
God and man in Christ must be referred to one subject or agent, that is
to his person as Mediator.
The divine and human nature in Christ have but one personal
subsistence; and so are but one Christ, one distinct personal
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principle of all operations,
mediator. 2 ' Whatever acts
iiwnediately performed, in or by
his divine nature, they are all
whom are both these natures.'4
of all that he did or doth as
are ascribed to him, however
• the human nature, or in and by
the acts of that one person, in
Does so simple a strategy solve the problem of agency in Christ's
saving activity? It certainly raises a number of important issues that
need to be examined more thoroughly. Let us, then, consider in outline
Owen's discussion of Christ's role as Mediator as it relates to our
understanding of his personal agency.
4. The office of Mediator
By the Mediator Owen referred in the first place to the role or office
instituted by God, by means of which he would reconcile his people to
himself. In keeping with the Reformed tradition Owen understood it as
three-fold, incorporating into one the major religious functions of the
Old Testament tradition, that is, the offices of prophet, priest and
king. It was this office which the eternal Son, as an act of humility,
freely condescended to make his own that through it he might accomplish
his Father's redemptive purpose. Thus Owen maintained that it "is by
the exercise and discharge of the office of Christ - as the king,
priest, and prophet of the church - that we are redeemed, sanctified,
and saved" 22
What was the theological motivation for this emphasis on the concept of
office? It was recognised that the actions of Christ were not of
themselves able to provide a sufficient explanation of the efficacy of
his passion, rather they needed to be interpreted in the light of God's
covenant, that is the Father's free decision to be gracious to men
under the righteous terms which he had appointed. The Son's role or
office as Mediator is the basis of that covenant, for the Father had
eternally appointed it to be so, and therein lies its power to
accomplish what was intended in it. For apart from the office into
which he was inaugurated, the action of Christ would have been
ineffective. For instance, taken by itself his penal suffering
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"absolutely considered, without respect unto the ends of the covenant.
would neither have been good in itself, nor have bad any tendency unto
the glory of God; for what excellenc y of the nature of God could have
been demonstrated in the penal sufferings of one absolutely and in all
respects innocent?"2e
The theory underlying this argument was derived in part from medieval
nominalism, of which William Courtenay gives a helpful suninary.
Causal efficacy results not from forces or inherent virtues
placed within created things but rather from a value which God
ascribes to things and which he rewards on the basis of covenant
or agreement with creation and the church.27
It means that the death of Christ is not to be interpreted merely in
terms of the direct influence it had on the political, social and
religious realities of that time or of its exemplary significance for
future ages. Rather it has abiding value and efficacy in that it
constituted God's new covenant with his people.
Owen, however, was far from being a thorough-going nominalist and
argued that the offices to which Christ was appointed could,
nevertheless, not of themselves wholly explain how he was able to
accomplish what was intended in them and were, therefore, unable to
adequately account for his universal significance.
"God gave of old both kings, priests, and prophets, unto the
church. He both anointed them unto their offices, directed them
in their discharge, was present with them in their work, and
accepted of their duties; yet by none of them, nor by all of them
together, was the church supernaturally enlightened, internally
ruled, or eternally saved: nor could it be."ze
In short, Christ's mediatorial office, represented in terms of prophet,
priest and king, does not of itself sufficiently explain the
effectiveness of his saving activity.
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5. The Person of the Mediator
We need, then, to consider not just the nature of the office of the
Mediator, but also his person; "from thence alone all power and
efficacy is derived, and transfused into his offices, and into all that
is due in the discharge of them."3'
Much of Owen's christology depends on or flows from this simple idea,
"The church is saved by his offices because they are his." 3 ° And many
who disagree with Owen's conclusions might well find that the
differences they have with him stem from a divergence at this point.
The idea in its essence is that the particular power or efficacy of
Christ's work is derived primarily from his person and only secondarily
from his function or office. Conversely we might say that his office
or function owes its effectiveness to the nature of his person.
How does he establish so important a principle? We have seen above
that he argued that the various functions or offices which Christ
filled had long since been operative in the church and yet were never
able to accomplish what the Son was to do as Mediator.
Some of them - as Moses in particular - had as much power, and as
great a presence of God with him, as any mere man could be made
partaker of; yet was he not in his ministry the saviour of the
church - nor could he be so any otherwise than typically and
temporally. 31
Christ was fitted to redeem the Church for unlike Moses he was in his
person a son and not merely a servant. Owen maintained that the
primary aim of the book of Hebrews was to demonstrate the truth of this
one principle:
That the glorious excellency of the person of Christ doth enable
him, in the discharge of his offices, to accomplish those ends, -
which none other, though vested with the same offices, could, in
the excercise of them, attain unto - is the sum and substance of
the doctrinal part of that discourse.32
Without, at this stage, entering into a detailed discussion of the
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argument of the letter to the Hebrews. it seems to me that his thesis
is difficult to overturn. Even a cursory outline of the contents of
the epistle would suggest that it was the purpose of the author to
establish the superiority of Christ's person to the angels, to Moses
and to the Levitical priesthood, along with his close alliance to
mankind, as the basis for proving the greater efficacy of his priestly
sacrifice to that offered by the Levites.
Now if the effectiveness of his redemptive work in his role as mediator
is dependent on his person, what is it that we must say about it? Owen
draws our attention to the two things that are required of Christ's
person so that his mediatorial office might be effective in the
salvation of the church.
a. a human nature
He held that, "The first of these is, that he should have a nature
provided for him which was originally not his own. For in his divine
nature, singly considered, he had no such relation unto them for whom
he was to discharge his offices, as was necessary to communicate the
benefit of them, nor could he discharge their principal duties."33
These duties derive from the nature of man's predicament. We have seen
earlier that Owen believed dishonour has been brought to God's wisdom,
holiness and justice by the disobedience of mankind. The image of God
wherein we were created has been defaced, rebellion has arisen against
his rule and government and the law representing the holiness of his
own being has been broken. So it is fitting for God's glory that
through human nature his image be restored, that punishment be received
proportionable in justice to the demerit of sin and that the law be
fulfilled by obedience. The nature that has so demeaned and despised
God's holiness should now more fully exalt it and conspicuously
represent it.34
But a human nature is also necessary if Christ is to be related to us
in a way that enables us to benefit from his work. "For hereby he
became our goel - the next of kin - unto whom belonged the right of
redemption, and from whom alone we could claim relief and succour in
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our lost condition."' 5 This relationship of brotherhood or kinship
depends on us sharing not only the same nature as Christ, but the same
coninon stock or parentage. If God had made a new man out of nothing or
from the dust of the ground, even though that man shared our nature
there would be no "cogriation or alliance between him and us, so that we
should be any way concerned in what he did or suffered." To be able
to call us brethren it was necessary that he be born of a woman.
Owen is aware that if Christ is to be mediator between man and God he
must take upon himself not only man's nature but also enter his
condition of suffering and temptation. He had experience of the
weakness, sorrows, and miseries of human nature under the assaults of
temptations; ". . .he tried it, felt it, and will never forget it."37
Thereby he was qualified to be merciful and faithful in his office of
high priest. Owen is, however, careful to allow some distinction
between the experience of Christ and that of all other men, for he
remained without sin even though he truly suffered under temptation as
we do.
In short, it was necessary that the work of mediation should be
accomplished by a human, so as to fulfil man's required duties and also
to establish a relationship with those who are to receive its benefits.
b. a divine nature
On the other hand, Owen argued that the person of Christ could not have
effectively accomplished the work of mediation if he was no more than a
man, if he had no nature but ours.
He could not have been the great prophet of the church if he had been
merely a man, however exalted or glorious. For as mediator he was to
be prophet of the whole church, caring and teaching all the elect of
God, "all that shall be saved in all ages and places, from the
beginning of the world to the end thereof." 5 This was not possible
for a man who was geographically and temporarily confined. Secondly,
he was to have a full comprehension of the mind and will of God, of the
whole divine counsel, for he was to make him known as one who had seen
God. Such knowledge could not reside in any mere creature.'° Thirdly
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as prophet of the church it was necessary that he had power and
authority to send the Holy Spirit to make his revelation of divine
truth effective in the minds of men. Only he from whom the Holy Spirit
proceeded had such authority.40
The same is true of his kingly office. The extent of his rule over the
whole creation of God, with all power in heaven and earth cannot be
conceived of in one who is only man. This is particularly true of his
interna1 arid spiritual rule over the minds, souls and consciences of
all believers.
There is rio one gracious acting of soul in any one believer, at
any time in the whole world, either in opposition unto sin or the
performance of duty, but it is influenced and under the guidance
of the kingly power of Christ.4'
Human nature alone is also inadequate in accounting for the
effectiveness of his priestly office. Although he offered himself a
sacrif ice for us in and by his human nature, it was not simply the work
of a man, by one offering of himself, to expiate the sins of the whole
church and forever to perfect them that are sanctified.42
Once we grant to Owen his earlier thesis that Christ's mediatorial role
is dependent for its efficacy on his person or being, his argument
leads naturally to the conclusion that if Christ indeed rules,
enlightens and redeems the whole church of God, then he must in his own
per son be both divine and human.
The traditional shape of Owen's apologetic here must not be allowed to
dull our minds to the full implications of the argument. If we ask
Anselm's question, 'Why did God become man?', the answer given is that
his work of mediation required the being and deeds of one who was human
and divine. This, then, was not something that God could do as God.
For humanity is not an aspect of the divine nature, or a natural
predicate of God's essence. A 'becoming' had to take place. In the
language of the tradition it is said that a human nature, which is
other than his own, had to be assumed. The 'humanity of God' is an
expression which is,
	 therefore, only appropriate when applied
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specifically to the incarnate Christ. Far from being a timeless truth
of God's eternal essence, it is a reality of our history "which we have
heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked at and
our hands have touched".
Owen's soteriology was, therefore, of the same sort as that of John
Calvin, emphasising that Christ's mediatorial work included in it the
action of both God and man. To the question, 'How are we then to
understand his saving activity as that of a single agent?' he
responded, as we indicated above, by referring the actions ininediately
performed in both natures to the person of the Mediator as the one
distinct personal principle of all operations.
But what is meant by the person of the Mediator, is he in some way
different from the person of the eternal Son?
6. From Logos to Mediator
We now enter one of the most interesting, and I think valuable, areas
of Owen's christology. The matter before us relates to the susception,
or taking to himself, by the divine Logos of the office of Mediator.
We have seen how Owen argued that in the susception of his office it
was necessary that the Word or eternal Son should assume a human nature
as his own. Now what were the implications of this assumption of human
nature for the person of the Word? Great care had been taken by the
orthodox fathers in the patristic debates to emphasise that the
incarnation did not entail any change to the being of the Word." So
far Owen fully upheld the tradition. He argued that:
a. This condescension of the Son of God did not consist in a
laying aside, or parting with, or separation from, the divine
nature, so as that he should cease to be God by being man.
b. Much less did this condescension consist in the conversion of
the divine nature into the human...
106
c. There was not in this condescension the least change or
alteration in the divine nature.44
Nevertheless, Owen recognised that the incarnation nLlst also be
conceived of as a development or a 'becoming' of the person of the
Word. But this had to be formulated in a way which did not imply any
change or loss to the divine nature.
This, then, is the foundation of the glory of Christ in this
condescension, the life and soul of all heavenly truth and
mysteries, - namely, that the Son of God becoming in time what he
was not, the Son of man, ceased not thereby to be what he was,
even the eternal Son of Gbd.'5
What is significant for our study is that Owen was able to affirm of
the Word that there is a sense in which he became in time what he was
not. In short, there is a distinction between Christ's person
absolutely considered as he is the eternal Son of God, and as he became
the Mediator, the God-man. It is a distinction that Owen insists is
essential to the Gospel.
To deny the person of Christ to fall under this double
consideration - of a divine person absolutely, wherein he is
"over all, God blessed for ever," and, as manifested in the
flesh, exercising the office of mediator between God and man - is
to renounce the Gospel.le
It seems that such a dual perspective of Christ's person, considered
both as Mediator and as eternal Son is essential if we are to
understand how in his ministry among us he is dependent on God and
therefore subordinate to him; why his authority needed to be given to
him rather than being his by nature; how in his person he prays, learns
obedience through suffering and experiences death; even as he also
forgives men their sins, teaches with divine authority and bestows the
Holy Spirit on his people. All this happens to his person as he is
Mediator. It is the person of the Mediator, the God-man, that dies on
the cross. Does this imply that the imortal God suffers death? No.
Owen answers, but the person who is both God and man, dies in his human
nature:
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• . .none affirming that Christ died any otherwise than in his
human nature, though he who is God died therein.47
For Owen, therefore, the subject of all these actions is neither simply
the divine or human nature, but the person of the Mediator, in whom
both these natures subsist. God cannot die, man cannot bestow the
Spirit, but he who in his own person is God and man is the subject of
both of these mediatory acts. This interpretation of Christ's activity
is quite different from the early tendency in the Antiochene tradition,
which in its emphasis on the distinct operation of the two natures,
struggled to find any unifying basis for Christ's actions. For
example, Eustathius emphasised that the divine nature did not die.
The God dwelling in him was not led like a lamb to the slaughter
nor killed like a sheep, since he is by nature invisible... .For
it is not right to say that the Word of God died.4
But he could only point to a man as the subject of death. Owen,
however, although agreeing that God as God did not die, was always
quick to emphasise that the person who was God did suffer death.
Was Owen here in danger of postulating a third principle neither divine
nor human as the nature or being of the Mediator, or to use his own
expression, has there been a "blending of natures into one cosinon
principle of operation"?4 a The theory that in Christ there was only
one mode of activity, rnia energia, had been put forward in the seventh
century as a compromise between the Monophysites and the Chalcedonians,
but was rejected for it inevitably led to understanding Christ as a
tertiuin quid who was neither God nor man. Owen, however, was always
careful to avoid any suggestion that there was an amalgamation or
fusion of Christ's divine and human nature. They remain separate and
operate distinctly, even though all Christ's redemptive work nst be
considered as the act of his whole person. He was careful to emphasise
each of these perspectives:
a. Each nature doth preserve its own natural, essential
properties, entirely unto and in itself.. .The divine nature is
not made temporary, finite, limited, subject to passion or
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alteration by this union; nor is the human nature rendered
ininense, infinite, omnipotent.
b. Each nature operates in him according unto its essential
properties. The divine nature knows all things, upholds all
things, rules all things, acts by its presence everywhere; the
human nature was born, yielded obedience, died, and rose again.
c. The perfect, complete work of Christ, in every act of his
mediatory office.. . is not to be considered as the act of this or
that nature in him alone, but it is the act and work of the whole
person. °
How, then, does Owen integrate these rather different ideas, on the one
hand that each nature operates according to its own characteristic
properties, and on the other that the principle of operation of all
Christ's saving activity is that of his whole person?
7. The Mediator as agent
Key to Owen's exposition, was a distinction he made between the
particular acts of Christ's life and death considered in themselves,
and the effects of these acts in making atonement or satisfaction for
sin and in reconciling us to God. The atonement or satisfaction of
Christ was not simply the act of one or the other of his natures.
Rather,
it is the apotelesma or effect of the actings, the doing and
suffering of Christ - the dignity of what he did in reference
unto the end for which he did it."61
For instance, Christ suffered physical death in his human nature, but
that death is able to constitute our reconciliation with God only
because it is the act of his person, God and man, and it is from his
person that it receives dignity, value and efficacy. To clarify
this rather complex idea he invites us in all the mediatory actions of
Christ to consider:-
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a. The agent; and that is the person of Christ.
b. The immediate principle by which and from which the agent
works; and that is the natures in the person.
c. The actions; which are the effectual operations of either
nature.
d. The effect or work with respect to God and us; and this
relates to the person of the agent, the Lord Christ, God and
man. 6 2
Through this simple but illuminating analysis of Christ's activity, a
theory is formulated which aims to hold together both aspects of the
christological problem. On the one band, the person of Christ as
mediator between God and man, is one distinct hypostasis or person and
is as such the agent or principium quo of all his redemptive action.
On the other hand, in his person there subsists a divine and a human
nature, which as they each operate according to their own
characteristic properties are the immediate principles or principium
quod of all that he does. 53 In summary,
(W)hatever he doth in and about our salvation, it is done by that
one person, God and man. . .Whatever acts are ascribed unto him,
however immediately performed, in or by the human nature, or in
and by his divine nature, they are all acts of that one person,
in whom are both these natures."54
8. Evaluation
The aim of this chapter has been to consider whether Owen was able to
maintain successfully the unity of Christ's personal action. He
strongly opposed the direction taken by Nestorius, who was believed to
have implied that there were in Christ two sons, divine and human.
Perhaps Owen was aware that his own emphasis on the reality of the two
natures of Christ could itself so easily collapse into the form of
christology associated with Nestorius, if he did not carefully and
vigorously defend the unity of his person. The two-fold argument he
used to do so is, in fact, summarised in his attack on Nestorianism.
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But the personal union between these two natures they (the
Nestorians) denied. .. .But that the Son of God assumed our nature
into personal subsistence with himself - whereby (the) whole
Christ was one person, and all his mediatory acts were the acts
of that one person, of him who was both God and man - this they
would not acknowledge."'5
Owen held that Christ's unity is in the first place an ontological one.
Christ is only one entity, one being, his two natures forming a
bypostatic union, that is, a union in one person. He offers a suninary
of the argument.
That the person of the Son of God did not, in his assuming human
nature to be his own, take an individual person of any one into a
near conjunction with himself, but preventing the personal
subsistence of human nature in that flesh which he assumed, he
gave it its subsistence in his own person; whence it hath its
individuation and distinction from all other persons whatever.
This is the personal union. The divine and human nature in
Christ have but one personal subsistence; and so are but one
Christ, one distinct personal principle of all operations, of all
that he did or doth as mediator.'
As we have seen, it is this ontological unity of person which Owen
believes is the ground for the integrity of Christ's action. As the
person is ultimately one so is his activity in all his redemptive work.
However, one of the difficulties in the use of the word 'person' in
this context is its ambiguity. Owen employed it with reference to
Christ in a technical sense to signify an individual, distinct,
subsisting entity, in much the same way that patristic theologians
of ten used the Greek equivalent hypostasis. He was, however, not
always consistent in this use and the idea of a person as one who
thinks, wills and responds in a rational manner was sometimes also
present. His argument on occasion appears to me to move from one to
the other of these ideas without sufficient warrant.
An added confusion is that the modern reader usually brings to this
ill
discussion a rather different conception of 'person', largely
influenced by the nineteenth century advance in psychology. The
prestige acquired by this branch of study has meant that the notion of
person is often identified with a more or less clearly formed
psychological model of human constitution and behaviour. Consequently
the method of some modern christology has been to use this conceptual
model of 'person' as the key to explicate the God-man 'person' of
Christ. One of the many attempts to reconstruct christology in this
way is suggested in the following theses of Dr.Sanday, quoted by
Maurice Relton.
(1) 'That the proper seat or locus of all divine indwelling, or
divine action upon the human soul, is the subliminal
consciousness.'
(2) 'That the same, or a corresponding, subliminal consciousness
is the proper seat o locus of the Deity of the incarnate
Christ. '6'
But this seems to me to miss the point. Our understanding of human
psychology is relevent to our interpretation of Christ Jesus the man,
that is, his human nature, for in that sense he is a person just as we
are. But this psychological structure must, by the very nature of' the
case, be inadequate to model the whole reality or 'person' of one who
is both God and man. We surely cannot allow the word 'person' when
applied to the Mediator to be totally determined and therefore limited
to our understanding of human psychology. So too, Owen's analysis of
Christ's action must not be judged as deficient simply because it
cannot be successfully translated into this structure.
A second concern relates to the status ascribed by Owen to the natures
of Christ. Arthur Headlam maintains that 'nature' can be treated
either as an abstraction, the expression of something logical, or as
the ancients often did, it can be conceived somehow or other as having
real existence. "The term nature, then, may be used either formally or
materially." 6
 Such a neat distinction is probably an over-
simplification. D.M. MacKinnon's discussion on 'substance' highlights
the complexity of Aristotle's philosophical thinking in this area.5
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Nevertheless, I think it is fair to describe Owen's understanding of
Christ's natures as having a strong element of realism running through
it.
Considered on its own, he implied that the human nature of Christ is an
abstraction, but enhypostasised in Christ it has reality. It is an
individual, distinct, existing entity. Christ is a real man.
Physically, mentally, socially and spiritually he acts and responds as
a human. In his life among us Christ Jesus the man, or equivalently
his human nature, was an empirically observable reality.
The same is in essence true of his divine being. Of course when we
discuss Christ's divine nature we must take seriously the concern of
Schleiermacher that the two natures are not to be treated as though
they were much the same sort of thing.
For how can divine and human be thus brought together under any
single conception, as if they could both be more exact
determinations, coordinated to each other, of one and the same
universal?°
Rather, we do well to remind ourselves of the awesome task involved in
attempting to bring to verbal expression the relation of the divine
being to human existence in Christ. It is important, it seems to me,
to keep before our minds the mystery and ineffability of that being.
In the Judaeo-Christian tradition it is consistenty understood as
majestic, transcendent, and ultimately holy, before the manifestation
of which men either took off their shoes, fell on their faces, or cried
out in confession of their own unworthiness. Man cannot see God and
live. Owen argued that it is this nature with which we have to do in
the incarnate Christ.
He is infinitely distanced from us in his person in respect of
his divine nature, wherein he is and was 'God over all, blessed
for ever.' He did not so become man as to cease to be God.
Though he drew a veil over his infinite glory, yet he parted not
with it.°'
The glory and being of God, although hid from our view, was not
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'domesticated' in Christ, neither was the reality of his human life and
experience translated into some higher form. Like his humanity, the
presence of God in Christ was not considered as an abstraction. For
when under the enlightening power of the Holy Spirit men are brought to
a recognition of it, albeit imperfectly and indirectly, the general
response is one of awesome fear; a sense of personal unholiness and a
confession of unworthiness; and in the experience of grace there is
heartfelt praise and worship. Can that which solicits such a response
be in some way less than real? Is it not rather the basis and ground
of all reality?
Owen's christology suggests that an appropriate way of 'unpacking' the
concept that Jesus Christ is true God and true man, is to describe the
one person as having both a divine and a human nature. There are those
who although agreeing with the former statement would oppose its
explication in terms of nature, as it involves a substantialist
conceptuality which is believed to be unhelpful for our understanding
of Christ. We will consider this matter more fully in the following
chapter.
At present, however, we simply draw attention to the fact that Owen
used the idea of 'the two natures' to signify that the one person,
Jesus Christ the Mediator, was himself both God and man. He is
insistent that these natures are not simply our way of cataloguing the
rather different qualities or attributes that inhere in one cosinon
subject. They refer, rather, to distinct yet inseparable realities
which have their full being in the one person of Christ.
In calling these properties of the several natures in Christ
"adverse" or "contrary," they (the Socinians) would insinuate a
consideration of them as of qualities in a subject, whose mutual
contrariety should prove destructive to the one, if not both, or,
by a mixture, cause an exurgency of qualities of another
temperature. But neither are these properties such qualities,
nor are they inherent in any comon subject; but [they are]
inseparable adjuncts of the different natures of Christ, never
mixed with one another, nor capable of any such thing to
eternity, nor ever becoming properties of the other nature, which
they belong not unto, though all of them do denominate the person
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wherein both the natures do subsist.° 2	 I
We see, then, that Owen was inclined to interpret the natures of Christ
realistically. They were for him a helpful way of conceiving what it
meant for one person to be true man and true God. In this chapter we
have considered how he used this conception to affirm the
soteriological perspectives of both Athanasius and Anselm by referring
the agency of Christ's redemptive work not exclusively to God or man,
that is to one or the other of the natures, but to the person of the
Mediator.
But if the one person of Christ can be coherently conceived as
redeeming us through his life-giving action as the incarnate Word and
also by his willing and sacrificial obedience as the representative man
empowered by the Spirit, it means that christology can be expressed in
terms of both incarnation and inspiration, without dissolving either
the unity of Christ's person or the integrity of his agency.
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V
ThE SCX AND THE FAThER
Of the same being
We have considered n this thesis how Owen's christology incorporated
two rather different ways of understanding Christ's person which we
have characterised by the concepts of inspiration and incarnation. Our
particular interest is to examine whether these were in fact
successfully integrated by him into one coherent christology.
The underlying framework of Owen's exposition was the 'two-nature'
theory of Christ's person, a theory which although basic to the
Church's christological understanding from the fifth century till
modern times has now come under widespread attack. It is commonly
believed to be inadequate on two counts: firstly it is internally
incoherent, that is, the concepts of one person and of two natures are
mutually exclusive; secondly it is dependent on an unhelpful
substantialist conceptuality. Early this century P.T.Forsyth expressed
his concern with the use of this form of metaphysical language.
The formula of the union of two natures in one person is
essentially a metaphysical formula, and the formula of a
Hellenistic metaphysic, and it is more or less archaic for the
modern mind. The term "nature" is a purely metaphysical term,
and one which characterises a scholastic methaphysic of being
rather than a modern metaphysic of ethic.'
In the last chapter the question of internal coherence was addressed as
we considered how the distinct operation of the two natures need not
exclude a unity of agency in the person of the Mediator. It was argued
that Owen was able to give a consistent account of the integrity of
Christ's person within the framework of the two-nature theory.
We now need, however, to consider the second area of concern, that is,
whether and in what mariner it is necessary to use ontological language
and concepts in an exposition of the person of Christ.
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1. Introduction of the homoousion
More than any other term homoousios or 'of one substance' defined the
battleground of the great christological debates of the fourth century.
Although the concept had been suggested in a theological context before
Nicea, (Tertullian had written of the Son's 'unity of substance' with
the Father),2 it was here at the first Ecumenical Council in 325 A.D.
that the word was officially introduced to give expression to the
relation of the Son to the Father. Novel and lacking Scriptural
warrant, it was a term with which few delegates initially felt at home.
However, it was soon to dominate theological debate and for the next
fifty years most of the contending parties were defined by their
relation to it. Finally triumphant, the concept played an explicit
role in the Church's christological formulations and consequently
determined the parameters of the trinitarian discussion. Thus embedded
in the central doctrines of the Church, the homoousion contributed to
the dominance of substantial categories in theological thought for more
than a thousand years.
Why was the language of 'substance' or 'essence' held to be necessary
to define the relation of the Son to the Father? What were the key
theological issues in the great Arian debate?
2. Arian christology
Any study of the christology of the Arians needs to take into account
that these opponents of Catholic orthodoxy are known principally
through the writings of their adversaries and are therefore open to
possible misrepresentation. Without making such an allowance it is
hard to understand how their theology, as it is usually presented,
could have had so powerful an influence on a large portion of the
Church in the fourth century. Gregg and Groh in their careful study,
Early Arianism, have done well to suggest just how attractive an option
the Arians must have put to the Christian coeinunity of their day. Let
us look briefly at some of the results of their research.
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Their underlying thesis is that the Arians were motivated more by
soteriological than cosmological interests. 5 Whereas Athanasius
emphasised what has been called the 'physical theory', that is, that
the divine Christ caine to restore God's image and therefore ininortality
to man's nature; the Arians understood Christ as the Christian
prototype who needed to be imitated if salvation was to be achieved.4
They saw man as requiring a moral rather than physical transformation,
exemplified in Christ, who by faithful service attained oneness with
God through the harmony of his will with the divine. Thus Anus
argued:
Sharing in a single kind of sonship, Christ is one among many
brothers. Therefore, as the Son gained his name "by grace" and
was "by adoption" raised by God to himself, likewise other
creatures, being faithful in the manner of that "certain one"
chosen before time, might be recipients of the Father's favor and
glory.
The Arians consequently showed a particular sensitivity to the Biblical
portrayal of Christ as one who experienced all the frailties of man.
"Thus to the physical limitations of the body the Arians added the full
range of psychological and spiritual limitations of a creature,
buttressing each of their contentions with a Gospel reference." 5
 They
acknowledged Jesus' lack of knowledge and his experience of suffering
as expressed in his fear and agitation. Positively and in contrast to
Athanasius they emphasised his openness to change, by which they
indicated his potential for development, his ability to improve and
thus grow in wisdom and in grace. Of interest to our study is their
awareness of Jesus' need of the Spirit for his own moral growth.
Athanasius outlines their position.
• .except they shall dare, as coninonly, so now to say, that the
Son also by participation of the Spirit and by improvement of
conduct came to be himself also in the Father.7
Although acknowledging him to be pre-existent and the agent of
creation, the Arians insisted that the Son was himself a creature.
Like all believers he is a son by adoption not by nature. 9 He is
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called God in that he participates in divine grace,'° but they strongly
opposed the orthodox expression 'true God'. His divinity, they
maintained, was not qualitatively different from that of every
Christ ian.
What then is the nature of the relationship between the Son and the
Father? •'Conceived relationally rather than ontologically, and marked
by dependence rather than coequality, the "kinship" between the Father
and the Son for early Arian thinkers is grounded in the conception of
the will of God and the faculty of willing." Gregg and Groh believe
that the cardinal principle of Arian theology is that all creatures
including the Redeemer are ultimately and radically dependent on a
Creator whose sole method of relating to his creation was by his will
and pleasure. They quote Eusebius of Nicomedia.
There is nothing from his essence, but all things having come
into being by his will, each one exists as it was begotten. For
on the one hand there is God, but on the other are the things
which will be like his Word with respect to similarity, and the
things which came into being according to free will.'2
God is thus set over against all other beings, including the Son, which
exist only through an act of his will. (The Son's existence is
therefore the consequence of a free act and not of necessity.) It is
also only by will that God relates himself to his creatures, that is in
the framework of divine coninand and creaturely response.' So it is
that the Redeemer's work from creation through to crucifixion is
interpreted as the conformity of his life and work to the Creator's
will. In short, the relation of the Son to the Father is to be
construed in terms of his perfect harmony with the divine will.
Expounded in this form the coherence and attractiveness of the Arian
system becomes apparent. If, however, key elements of it are
theologically inadequate, such as its view of the nature of salvation
and the creaturely status ascribed to the Son, then it would seem that
an alternative category must be used to describe Christ's relation to
the Father. This was the lot that fell to the party led by the
Alexandrian bishops Alexander and Athanasius.
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3. The Athanasian alternative
Gregg and Groh give a suninary of the orthodox response. "Believing the
Arian picture of salvation blasphemous, orthodox representatives,
introduced and took battle positions behind the word hoinoousios,
judging that this idea of identity of essence could alone differentiate
the Son's divine likeness and unchangeability from that imitation
(mimesis) which the faithful appropriate 'through virtue from keeping
the coninandinents' • " 1 4 Although the homoous ion was only understood as
'identity of essence' at a much later stage of the debate, Greg and
Groh were right to appreciate the significance of the term in the
orthodox reply to the Arian christology.
It is apparent that the hornoousion was not merely an element of the
contemporary philosophical 'baggage' which unobtrusively attached
itself to the Church's formulations, rather it was a concept
consciously introduced into the christological discussion to safeguard
what was believed to be the vital concern of the Christian faith, that
is, the Son's essential divinity. Athanasian soteriology required a
divine Christ if incorruptibility and ininortality were to be imparted
to men. Sin had affected man's nature making it 'alterable', only the
'unalterable' divine nature could transform man's nature, setting it
free.
Good reason then that the Lord, who ever is in nature
unalterable, loving righteousness and hating iniquity, should be
anointed and Himself sent, that, He, being and remaining the
same, by taking this alterable flesh, 'might condemn sin in it,'
and might secure its freedom, and its ability henceforth 'to
fulfil the righteousness of the law'..
However, the notion of the Son's divinity was susceptible to various
interpretations. Salvation itself was generally understood as a form
of divinisation and believers were coninonly identified as theoi. How
in this context was one to differentiate the true divinity of the Son
from the participation of the divine nature experienced by all
Christians? For if Christ was divine only by participation he could
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not deify others.
For it is not possible that He. who merely possesses from
participation, should impart of that partaking to others, since
what He has is not His own, but the Giver's; and what He has
received, is barely the grace sufficient for Himse1f.
By conceiving of the Son's relation to the Father in terms of the
essence of the Father, the Council of Nicea brought a certain
conceptual clarity to the notion of the Son's distinctive divinity.
The Son was held to derive his being not from the Father's will but
from his essence, as a human son does from his father, or a fountain
does from the stream, to use Athanasius' favourite metaphors. This
idea is neatly suriinarised by Christopher Stead in his book Divine
Substance:
he derives from the Father by a process comparable to natural
generation, as opposed to some process of 'making', like that of
God's created works.'7
But the expression which was most effectively to distinguish the
christology of Athanasius and his party from that of the Arians was
that of the Son being 'homoousios' or 'of the same substance' as the
Father. Although originally lacking the precise significance it was
later to develop, the concept from the first clearly distinguished the
Son from all created being. Even the conservative Eusebius of Caesarea
conceded that the homoousion meant that:
the Son is entirely unlike created beings, but completely like
the Father.'
The ease with which the words 'essence', 'being' and 'nature' began to
be used interchangeably in this context suggests that the meaning of
the homoousion was not inextricably linked to or dependent on one
precise philosophy of being.' 9 It is, therefore, I believe quite wrong
to understand the concept as wholly dependent on an Aristotelean theory
of substance. For we have seen that the term was first introduced to
indicate the manner in which the Son derived from the Father. Stead
maintains that:
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• . . the vast majority of the texts examined above and
elsewhere, including those from Athanasius' de Decretis, indicate
that the phrase was not designed to make the directly ontological
statement about the Son, that he is 'of' the ousia (i.e. rank,
dignity, status) which is proper to the Father; but rather to
show that he derives from the Father by a process comparable to
natural generation, as opposed to some process of 'making', like
that of God's created works.20
Once introduced, however, the concept was recognised as requiring that
the same ontological description be given of both Father and Son. It
took time to work through the implications of this with respect to the
Father's monarchy and the Son's distinct subsistence. Nevertheless,
from the first, the homoousion served as a powerful tool for removing
any ambiguity attached to the notion of the Son's divinity, thereby
clearly distinguishing his own divine status from that of believers,
who merely participate in the divine nature.
Yet the question still remains, 'Did the 'homoousion' provide for the
Church a theologically adequate description of the relation of the Son
to the Father? Or was it too blunt an instrument to detail the
delicate and complex outline of such a relationship?' Three rather
different issues need to be considered in determining the theological
propriety of its introduction.
a. The new difficulties it introduced.
Principal among these was that the homoousion appeared to threaten
either the monarchy of the Father, or the distinct existence of the
Son, depending on whether the 'sameness' of 'ousia' was interpreted
generically or as a numerical unity. This brought into sharp focus the
implicit difficulties of any trinitarian conception of God, which
although eventually solved to the satisfaction of the Church, still
remained something of an enigma even to the faithful. However,
although the alternative Arian christology did not raise the question
of a divine trinity, the exalted status given to Jesus the creature as
the causal agent of all creation, did itself indirectly threaten the
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absolute monarchy of the Father.
b. The Son as servant.
The Arians portrayed the Son as totally dependent on his Father for his
authority and power; as needing the Spirit so as to live in obedience
to his Father's will; as freely choosing the good; and as continually
growing in knowledge and grace. The supporters of the homoousion
either ignored or denied all of these things with respect to Jesus.
Thus Athanasius argued against his reception of the Spirit; 31 held
Christ to be unchangeable; 22
 and opposed the idea that he advanced in
knowledge or grace.23
c. The Son as divine.
As we suggested above, the conceptual clarity brought to the notion of
the Son's distinct divine status was the underlying motivation for the
introduction of the 'homoousion'. It was seen to be an effective tool
to conceptualise the relation of the Son to the Father in a way which
would secure his essential divinity and ontologically set him with the
Father over against all created being. The Church's worship requirec4
such status for the Son, as did the Athanasian soteriology. It was
also believed that the New Testament bore witness to this understanding
of his relation to the Father. Having identified the divine status of
the Son as the most crucial theological issue, the Church was
eventually led to all but unanimously affirm the 'homoousion', even
though important aspects of the Gospel picture of Jesus as God's
servant were in danger of being effectively denied.
Is the 'hoinoousion' then, irreconcilable with the biblical portrait of
Christ as the servant of God, who is wholly dependent on him, and is it
therefore finally inadequate as a theological model of the relation of
the Son to the Father?
After the defeat of Arianism at the end of the fourth century, the
homoousion was so firmly embedded in the Church's theological
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understanding that such a radical questioning of its adequacy was not
seriously considered. In fact, it was not until the Socinian
controversy of the seventeenth century that the debate was reopened and
the possibility arose for these issues to be discussed afresh.
4. The Socinians
Persecuted for their opinions in both Protestan4t and Catholic
territories, the Socinians from all over Europe began to settle in
Racov in southern Poland, where they flourished from the mid-sixteenth
century till their banishment in 1658. From there they were to spread
to Hungary, the Netherlands and England sharing their ideas through
their numerous writings, the most famous and comprehensive being the
Racovian Catechism.
The Socinians were similar to the early Anabaptists in the radical
nature of their criticism of all the structures of the old religious
order, discarding everything that they believed had no biblical
warrant. They differed from them, however, in the high regard they
developed for academic learning and the emphasis they placed on reason
in matters of religion. At one time their academy in Racov had over
one thousand students enrolled and a printing operation that published
in a number of languages. 2 4
The distinctiveness of their theology lay in their rejection of the
doctrines of the Trinity and of the deity of Christ. These issues had
not been central in the Reformation debate, for both Catholics and
Protestants were generally agreed on their substance. Calvin had been
in sharp conflict with Servitus who could be described as an early
Socinian, but by and large the need had not arisen to defend anew the
theology of Nicea and Chalcedon. This is why the interaction of
clearly formulated Socinian ideas with orthodox theology in seventeenth
century Europe is of particular theological interest. The homoousion
was again being seriously questioned!
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a. Challenge to the Trinity
John Owen had some sympathy with the Soc inian reaction against the
complex trinitarian speculations of medieval scholasticism.
Their (the Socinians') great stumbling-block I look upon to be
the horrible corruption and abuse of the doctrine of the Trinity
in the writings of the schoolmen, and the practice of the
devotionists among the Papists. With what desperate boldness,
atheistical curiosity, wretched inquiries and babbling, the
schoolmen have polluted the doctrine of the Trinity, and gone of I
from the simplicity of the gospel in this great mystery. . . 26
The Socinian complaint, however, was not merely with the excesses of
trinitarian theorising by the schoolmen but with the intrinsic
irrationality of the doctrine even in its most basic form - that in God
there is only one essence, but three persons.
the essence of God is one, not in kind but in number.
Wherefore it cannot, in any way, contain a plurality of persons,
since a person is nothing else than an individual intelligent
essence. Wherever, then, there exist three numerical persons,
there must necessary in like manner, be reckoned three individual
essences; for in the same sense in which it is affirmed that
there is one numerical essence, it must be held that there is one
numerical person.2°
Using Boethius' definition of person as naturae rationablis individua
substantia, the Racovian Catechism argued that the triniarian formula
is itself a logical contradiction. For those, however, who were part
of the orthodox tradition this was no new difficulty. The Cappadocians
and Augustine in their trinitarian writings carefully defined 'person'
so that a distinction of divine persons did not necessarily entail a
division of the divine essence. Owen's own response to the Socinians
was that the essence of each person is the same divine substance, this
substance is one and the same although the persons are distinct.2'
However, Owen was opposed in principle to defending a doctrine of the
Trinity at this level. He believed there are two aspects to the
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doctrine, firstly the 'revelation' of it, by which he meant that which
is clearly indicated by the Scriptures.
Now, the sum of this revelation in this matter is, that God is
one;- that this one God is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost;- that the
Father is the Father of the Son; and the Son, the Son of the
Father; and the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of the Father and the Son;
and that in respect of their mutual relations they are distinct
from each other.2
Secondly there is the explication of it, by which he refers to the
exposition of the Trinity in the doctrinal formulations of the Church,
which though not essential for faith, have yet a part to play in the
edification of the be1iever. We might say that Owen distinguished
between a first and second order of theological explanation with
respect to the trinity. Now his apologetic strategy was to avoid
debate with the Socinians at the second order of trinitarian
explication, and to contend only for what he referred to as the content
of revelation.
We have not, therefore, any original contest in this matter with
any, but such as deny either God to be one, or the Father to be
God, or the Son to be God, or the Holy Ghost so to be.3o
He argued that if the direct express revelations of the doctrine are
confirmed, then their further explications will follow of themselves.3'
Let us consider what this means.
We suggested earlier in this chapter that the acceptance of the
homoousion in the fourth century brought into sharp focus the implicit
difficulties in the conception of the trinity. But can we not go
further than that? Were not the parameters of the the trinitarian
discussion actually determined by the doctrines of the monarchy of God
and the homoousion of the Son and the Spirit? Owen suggested that once
these 'first order' elements were allowed, the further explication of
the doctrine would more or less follow of itself. The central issue of
the debate, then, is not the precise details of trinitarian
explication, but the 'first order' doctrines that form the foundation
of it.
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Therefore, Owen, intent on getting to the heart of the Socinian
opposition to the trinity, chose to do battle with them on their
understanding of the person of Christ. This was the 'king-pin' on
which so much of the trinitarian question seemed to depend - the
relation of the Son to the Father.
b. Son by adoption
The Socinians made a radical break with the theological tradition which
for so long had interpreted the Son's relation to the Father in terms
of the homoousion. They understood Christ's nature to be that of a
man, mortal while he lived on earth but now immortal. 32 The Racovian
Catechism makes it quite clear in what limited sense his nature might
properly be spoken of as divine.
But if... you intend by a divine nature the Holy Spirit which
dwelt in Christ, united, by an indissoluble bond, to his human
nature, and displayed in him the wonderful effects of its
extraordinary presence; or if you understand the words in the
sense in which Peter employs them (II Peter i.4), when he asserts
that "we are partakers of the divine nature," that is, endowed by
the favour of God with divinity, or divine properties, - I
certainly do so far acknowledge such a nature in Christ as to
believe that next after God it belonged to no one in a higher
degree."
How then, did they interpret his sonship? What was the basis of his
peculiar relation to the Father? Their exposition is based on four
groups of biblical passages that refer to Christ as Son.
(i) He was the Son of God in that he was conceived by the Holy Spirit.
"The Holy Spirit will come upon you, and the power of the Most High
will overshadow you. So the holy one to be born will be called the Son
of God."(Luke i.35) Christ's unique conception, apart from a natural
father, entitled him to the name Son. This, however, did not imply
that he was a son by nature. As Jonas Schlichtingius argues for them:
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There are many sayings of Scripture which show that Christ is in
a peculiar manner, and on an account not coainon to any other, the
Son of God; but we may not hence conclude that he is a Son on a
natural account.
(ii) His sonship is understood in terms of his mission. ". . .what about
the one whom the Father set apart as his very own and sent into the
world? Why then do you accuse me of blasphemy because I said, 'I am
God's Son?"(John x.36) The Racovian Catechism details the nature of
that mission.
(Christ) being in a most remarkable manner separated from all
other men, and, besides being distinguished by the perfect
holiness of his life, endued with divine wisdom and power, was
sent by the Father, with supreme authority, on an embassy to
mankind.
(iii) Christ is designated 'Son of God' at his resurrection. In being
raised by God he was "as it were begotten a second time; - particularly
as by this event he became like God immortal."35
(iv) His exaltation and consequent heavenly rule qualify him to be
called 'Son of God.' For by this dominion and supreme authority over
all things he resembles and in some respect equals God. On this
account Scripture uses of him such phrases as 'a king anointed by God'
and 'Son of God' .
In each of these accounts the Socinians were careful to exclude the
idea that Jesus Christ was Son of God in essence or being. His sonship
was to be understood in functional terms, that is in relation to his
work or office and did not of itself suggest a divine status. However,
as Jesus grew both in grace and experience of divine power, his
resultant conformity to God meant that it was appropriate to call him
God. 'God', in this restricted and subordinate sense, is something
that he became, rather than something he was by nature. Smalcius
outlines this development.
Certainly, seeing that Christ was not such by nature, or in his
conception and nativity, as he was afterward in his succeeding
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age, he might justly on that account be called the 'adopted Son
of God.'3'
In sumary, Christ's sonship is to be understood in terms of his work
or mission. However, in that he achieved likeness to God, particularly
through his holiness and righteousness, it is appropriate to speak of
him as having become God, or as being the adopted Son of God.
c. Dependent on the Father
With this understanding of
Socinians were able, as the
radical dependence on God.
wholly incompatible with an
with the Father. We survey
Racovian Catechism.
the Son's relation to the Father, the
Arians before them, to emphasise Christ's
Such a relationship, they believed, was
understanding of the Son as 'homoousios'
their argument as it is outlined in the
The Scriptures declare that all the status, power and authority that
Christ possessed, indicating his divinity, are his not by nature but by
"gift of the Father; and refer it to the Holy Spirit, with which he had
by the Father been anointed and filled". 4 ° There is a consistent
testimony that it was God who had 'highly exalted him' and 'put all
things under him'.
Jesus himself ascribed all that he did, his words and his works to the
Father. It is not to his divine nature that he refers his empowering
but to the Holy Spirit. This leads the catechist to the conclusion
•'that the divine nature which some would claim for Christ must have
been wholly inactive and useless. 4 ' Christ repeatedly prayed to God
showing that he himself did not have a nature which would have made him
the 'supreme God'. "For why should he have recourse to another person,
and supplicate of him, what he might have obtained from himself?"43
He also frequently asserts that he did not come of himself but was sent
by the Father, speaking as his Father comanded and always doing only
his will. 43
 Such a subordinate status is difficult to reconcile with
equality of essence. Rather, Christ does not hesitate to affirm that
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the Father is greater than he, emphasising their intrinsic inequality
and on occasion even refers to the Father as his God.'4
We see then, that the Socinians believed that the relation of Son to
Father was one of absolute dependence and that this precluded the
possibility of an equality of essence between them. As we have seen,
they offered instead a rather different interpretation of sonship,
formulated in terms of Christ's mission rather than his nature or
substance. A divinity was ascribed to him on account of his holiness
and high office, but he was always to be distinguished from the
'supreme God'.
These were the two major prongs of the Socinian attack on the
homoousion. By demonstrating the inadequacy of that concept they
believed they had effectively undermined the orthodox doctrines of
Christ's divinity and the trinity, for the Church had no alternative
conceptual framework by which these doctrines could be supported. That
it was a formidable assault is apparent from the subsequent growth and
wide-ranging influence of Unitarianism in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.' 6
 It was also a contributing factor to the increase of a
general dissatisfaction within the Church with the orthodox dogmas
about Christ and the resultant determination to form a conception of
Jesus more in keeping with the Gospel witness." The question of
interest to us, however, is whether it was both possible and necessary
to defend the use of ontological language and concepts in explicating
the person of Christ.
5. Owen's response
In his Vindicae Evangelicae Owen wrote a comprehensive reply to the
Socinian arguments, and thereby indirectly offered a defence of the
homoousion. We begin by considering his response to their
interpretation of Christ's sonship.
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a. The eternal Son
His intention was to show that Christ was a son by nature and that
ultimately his relation to the Father must be referred to his eternal
generation from the Father's essence. If this was established it would
determine the significance of the sonship ascribed to Christ in his
incarnation, mission, resurrection and exaltation and thereby undermine
the Socinian interpretation of it as one which is totally explicable in
terms of his office or role.4'
Owen's intention was to defend the homoousion within the framework in
which it was first introduced, that is, as an explanation of how the
Son was derived from the Father. A major reason why the term 'Son' was
favoured by the Fathers as a more appropriate designation of the second
person of the Trinity than 'Logos' was that it included the notion of
his natural generation from the Father, an idea which suggested both
his equivalent status and also his subordination to him.
Owen offered a five-fold argument for this natural or essential sonship
of Christ. Firstly the New Testament repeatedly emphasises that Christ
is God's son in a quite unique sense. He is the true, proper, only-
begotten Son of God. These terms indicate that Christ's sonship should
not be understood as merely metaphorical, but that it is in some
respect arialagous to natural sonship. 4
 In particular the emphasis on
his being 'the only-begotten Son' suggests that there is a relation of
nature or essence rather than merely an external role that he filled.
Secondly a contrast is made in Scripture between those who are sons by
adoption, received by grace and favour, and the only-begotten Son. The
eighth chapter of Romans is an example of this distinction.
the apostle had before mentioned other sons of God, who became
so by adoption, verses 15, 16; but when he comes to speak of
Christ in opposition to them, he calls him "God's own" or proper
"Son," - that is, natural Son, they being so only by adoption.4°
But neither Arians nor Socinians were able, nor did they wish, to make
such an absolute distinction between the sonship of Christ and that of
believers in general. The Scriptural differentiation, then, between
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the adopted sons and God's own Son, would seem to severely weaken their
argument.
Thirdly the dignity ascribed to Christ requires an 'essential' equality
with the Father. "(W)ith God, equality of essence can alone give
equality of dignity and honour; for between that dignity, power, and
honour, which belong to God as God, and that dignity or honour that is
or may be given to any other, there is no proportion, much less
equality. • "° Owen believed that the equality of honour with the
Father which is on occasion ascribed to Christ would be blasphemous
apart from an equality of essence.
	 v
Fourthly the Scriptures indicate that Christ has been begotten by a
communication of the divine essence. One of the verses that he uses to
demonstrate this is John v.26. "For as the Father has life in himself,
so he has granted the Son to have life in himself." Of this he
remarks:
It was by the Father's communication of life unto him, and his
living essence or substance; for the life that is in God differs
not from his being.5'
The homoousion is sometimes thought of as a static concept, but Owen
here offers a very dynamic interpretation of it. For him the Son's
derivation from the essence of the Father means that he has life in
himself - that he too becomes a life-giver. This was precisely the1
point that Athanasius wished to defend b y the homoousion: the Son's
ability to give life to, or divinise, others, which was not possible if
he, like all believers, merely participated in the divine nature.
Finally the biblical portrayal of Christ as the express image of the
Father's person, or the image of the invisible God, indicated for Owen
a likeness of nature or essence. "...Christ is the essential image of
the Father, and not an accidental image, an image so as no creature is
or can be admitted into copartnership with him therein...
To hurriedly award the victor's laurels to Owen after this brief
summary of the debate on sonship might seem to overlook the breadth of
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the Socinian counter-argument. They denied both Christ's pre-existence
and his role in creation. They saw no absolute distinction between
Jesus and other believers, for he was also an adopted son. That a
sonship of function did not establish full divinity, was a point they
would have willingly conceded to Owen, for this was precisely their own
argument: Christ's sonship did not imply his essential divinity. The
divine status that they did ascribe to him, in the manner of the
Arians, was more of a gesture to the 'high christology' suggested in
the New Testament, than a necessary part of their theology. They
argued that Christ is 'a God', but not the 'supreme God'. In fact,
their concept of divinity was so qualified that they believed it did
not threaten a belief in the absolute monarchy of God. It is
interesting that when Socinius had himself insisted that Christ ought
to be worshipped, other leading Socinians were able to demonstrate that
this was inconsistent with their principles.62
Clearly the Socinian theology was a well thought-through and
superficially coherent system, but it was precisely this coninitment to
consistency which Owen used to reveal its manifest weaknesses. The
universal practice of the Church in offering praise to Jesus as to God
does have a New Testament foundation, but the Socinian theology was
unable to account for it, and therefore the Socinians were compelled to
disallow it. Perceiving that Christ shared fully in our human nature
and conditions, they failed to acknowledge or adequately explain the
Biblical portrayal of him as one who also had an absolutely unique
relation to the Father. They were consistent in denying to the person
of Christ any pre-existent status or role in creation, but the more
internally consistent their exposition was, the less it accorded with
the Biblical portrayal of the Son of God as the one through whom the
universe was made and whose original status was such that he had to
humble himself in order to take the form of a man. In conceding some
sort of acquired divinity to Jesus they highlighted their central
weakness, that is, that their interpretation of the Son's relation to
the Father in wholly functional categories did not adequately account
for the high christology of the New Testament. Owen suninarises the
distinction between their respective positions.
.and our difference with the Socinians herein is, - we believe
that Christ being God, was made man for our sakes; they say, that
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being only a man, he was made a god for his own sake.(I p.326)
The Socinians were, thereby, forced to conceive of divinity in relative
terms. But this is an interpretation of Scripture which the Jewish and
therefore monotheist world-view of the New Testament writers prohibits
us from making.
Owen, we have seen, upheld the divine status of Christ by interpreting
the relationship of the Son to the Father as a 'natural' sonship, that
is one which implied that Christ was of the same essence as the Father.
Xir purpose in this discussion has not been to provide a defence of the
Son's divine being, but to examine whether ontological categories are
necessary in our description of the relation of the Son to the Father
if we are to give an adequate account of his divinity. So far we have
seen that both in the fourth and the seventeenth centuries it was the
explication of Christ's soriship in terms of nature and essence, rather
than mission or function, that was held by all parties as necessary to
account for the Son having a divine status which was equal in dignity
with that of the Father. Those who were opposed to ascribing this
level of dignity to the Son were therefore compelled to deny that his
relation to the Father could be expressed in terms of being or
substance.
However, we have still to consider the second prong of the Socinian
argument, that is, that the dependent role of the Son precluded his
essential equality with the Father. It would seem that it was this
that lay at the heart of their dissatisfaction with orthodox
christology. Believing that the Gospels so clearly portrayed Christ as
dependent on and subservient to the Father they could not allow the
equality of status that a natural or essential sonship implied.
Earlier in the chapter we suggested that Athanasian christology failed
to meet this difficulty, and simply neglected the Biblical portrait of
Jesus as dependent on God. Was Owen's christology able to provide a
more satisfactory solution?
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b. The Son as Mediator
Owen's argument as outlined in the last chapter is that, for the sake
of men and in free obedience to the Father, the Word or Son of God
assumed a human nature and thereby condescended to take the office of
Mediator.
This Word was made flesh, not by any change of his own nature or
essence, not by a transubstantiation of the divine nature into
the human, not by ceasing to be what he was, but by becoming what
he was not, in taking our nature to his own, to be his own,
whereby he dwelt among us.
The incarnate life is thus referred to the person of the Mediator, who
is both continuous with the eternal Son of God and yet not to be simply
and absolutely indentified with him. Owen held that:
The person of the Word, or the eternal Son of God, may be
considered either absolutely as such, or as designed in the
counsel, wisdom, and will of the Father, by and with his own will
and consent, unto the work of mediation between God and man.
This 'double consideration' enabled him to explain how Christ, although
as eternal Son equal to the Father, could nevertheless as Mediator be
elevated in status and made the heir of all things. Thus in his
exposition of the phrase "whom he appointed heir of all things" in
Heb.i.2 he begins:
The Son, as God, bath a natural dominion over all. To this he
can be no more appointed than he can be to be God. On what
account he bath his divine nature, on the same he bath all the
attributes and perfections of it, with all things that necessary
on any supposition attend it, as supreme dominion doth.5'
However, Christ's elevation in status cannot be referred simply to his
human nature. "Nor doth this denotation of him respect merely the
human nature; for although the Lord Christ performed all the acts of
his mediatory office in and by the human nature, yet he did them not as
man, but as God and man in one person, John i.14, Acts xx.28."5'
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Owen uses the title 'Mediator' to signify that person, and it is to
him, as such, that all the privileges belong with which he is invested
on account of his office. "Nothing, indeed, can be added unto him as
God, but there may be to him who is God, in respect of his
condescension to discharge an office in another nature which he did
assume. "
Owen's christology therefore, while affirming the Son's essential
divinity, acknowledges that in fulfilling the office of Mediator it is
necessary for him to be equipped by the Father for his work, and after
his resurrection it is proper to speak of him being given all authority
and dominion, and made heir of all things. For in his role as Mediator
Christ is totally dependent on and therefore subordinate to the Father.
The key principle underlying his thought in this exposition is that
"inequality in respect of office is well consistent with equality in
respect of nature". The Son and the Spirit, although of the same
divine nature as the Father, both condescend to their particular
offices in the economy of salvation. The subordination of the Son and
the Spirit to the Father, which are indicated in these offices, does
not entail any inequality of nature between the three persons.
We considered earlier how Owen held that the person of the Mediator was
the 'principium quo' of the activity of both natures. This, we saw,
allowed him to emphasise the reality of the religious experience of his
human nature, as totally dependent on God and in need of the Spirit for
growth in grace, holiness and power. Owen, therefore, had no
hesitation in acknowledging the reality of Jesus' prayers to his
Father, but would not grant the Socinian argument that this entailed an
inequality of being.
Though the divine nature prayed not, yet he who was in the form
of God, and humbled himself to take upon him the form and
employment of a servant, might end did pray. The Godhead prayed
not, but he who was God prayed.'°
In sumary, Owen's christology not only conceded but vigorously
affirmed the radical dependence of the Son on the Father as he
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condescended to the office of Mediator in the economy of salvation.
However he held this to be quite consistent with the Son's possession
of a nature which was hornoousios with the Father. Christ was both the
natural son of the Father and yet wholly dependent on him. The two
concepts are not mutually exclusive.
6. Conclusion
The aim of this chapter has been to examine the legitimacy of Owen's
use of the 'two nature' theory to explicate the person of Christ,
particularly with respect to its dependence on ontological language and
concepts. In order to do so we have examined the motivating factors
and the theological implications arising out of the introduction of the
homoousion to the Church's christological discussion.
It would appear that the term allowed the relation of the Son to the
Father to be conceived of as one of natural generation, that is,
generation from the essence of the Father and so distinguished from a
relation of obedience to his will. The Son was thereby recognised as
having the same being or essence as the Father and as equal to him in
dignity. The weakness of the theory was that it appeared to exclude
the Gospel portrayal of Christ as one who was wholly dependent on God
throughout the course of his life.
We outlined Owen's response to the Socinians as the debate over the
homoousion was opened afresh in the seventeenth century. Many of the
same issues were raised, but whereas the Arians interpreted Christ's
sonship in terms of his relation to the Father's will, the Socinians
understood it principally as referring to the office he filled. In
both cases all parties to the discussion were aware that to limit the
relation of the Son to the Father to functional categories would
undermine his unique status of equality with him, and that the concept
of an ontological relationship was able to effectively preserve it.
The significant new factor in the debate was the use made by Owen of
the concept of Mediator, which allowed him to affirm the dependent
status of the Son in the mediatorial office to which he condescended.
while maintaining the essential equality of his being with that of the
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Father.
We have not attempted to provide a defence for the belief that the
person of the Son is equal in dignity to that of the Father, but merely
to show that both in the Arian and the Socinian debate it was by means
of ontological concepts that this status was effectively maintained.
Owen also reminded us that it was the recognition of the Son's equality
of status with the Father expressed in ontological categories that
formed the ground of the classical trinitarian discussion. I believe
he was right in implying that the orthodox Christian interpretation of
God as Trinity would collapse apart from this understanding of Christ.
One of the characteristics of the modern period of theology has been
the attempt to avoid the problems suggested by the use of ontological
language. David MacKinnon in his study 'Substance in christology - a
cross-bench view' provides a number of sophisticated defences for its
role in christology, answering those who either oppose the place of so
metaphysical au idea in theology, or conversely who hold that the
concept has been shown in modern philosophy to be inadequate and
believe that the notion of event is more primitive and therefore more
useful as an ontological concept than that of substance. He argues
positively that "the homoousion gave men who mastered it a surer
purchase-hold on the relations of simpler, more immediately moving,
certainly profounder theological affirmations". 00
Nonetheless, I have a measure of sympathy with those who were
frustrated with orthodoxy's failure to give an adequate account of the
Son's dependent status as servant of God and who, in finding the figure
of the Saviour as given in the creeds to be "unreal, unimaginable, and
untenable", sought alternate categories, normally functional, by
which to understand his relation with the Father. By this means they
were often able to provide a complementary understanding of his person,
emphasising his absolute dependence on God, the gradual growth in his
self-consciousness that he was the Messiah, or his role as the great
exemplar of the moral life. But these in themselves were equally
deficient in their explication of christ. They consistently failed to
conceive of his relation to God in a way that made it appropriate for
the Church to worship him as equal in status to the Father himself.
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One important work which has attempted to maintain a high christology
in terms of the Son's function alone is that of Oscar Cullrnann in The
Christo1oy of the New Testament. His argument for Jesus' divine
status is suiiinarised towards the end of the book. "The Gospel of John,
Paul, and Hebrews follow this idea of revelation through to its logical
conclusion: Jesus Christ is God in his self-revelation." 2 Without
necessarily agreeing with u1lmann's interpretation of the New
Testament authors here, it seems to me that he has been unwittingly
forced to introduce a concept reliant on ontological categories in
order to establish his high christology. The underlying idea is that
God's self-revelation entails the substantial presence of God himself,
which is dependent on the theory that only God can reveal God. But
this means that the divine status of Christ is not constituted by his
revelatory action, but rather presupposes it. The lesson to be learnt
from the Arian and Socinian Ti.bat functional categories
cannot in themselves account for the Son havin\divine dignity equal
to that of the Father and that they consequently fail to provide a
conceptual framework which justifies the praise of feked to him b y the
worshipping Church.
Then I heard every creature in heaven and on earth and under the
earth and on the sea, and all that is in them, singing:
"To him who sits upon the throne and to the Lamb
be praise and honour and glory and power,
for ever and ever!"	 (Rev.v.13.)
To conclude, the christology of John Owen helps us to understand why
the person of Jesus Christ, considered in terms of his relation as Son
to the Father, must be explicated in both ontological and functional
categories; the concepts of the one cannot simply be reduced to those
of the other. If the temptation to orthodoxy in the early Church was
to neglect the latter, the converse now appears to be true.
The reader will also appreciate that although approaching the matter
from the perspective of form rather than of content we have, by arguing
that the Son's relation to the Father must be expressed in terms of
both ontology and function, indirectly defended an underlying
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assumption of this thesis: an adequate christology must incorporate
the concepts of both incarnation and inspiration.
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VI
11€ SON AND 1IiE Q1IIJ)Rfl
An 'autokinetic' human nature
1. The relation between the natures
In the last two chapters we have considered how Owen might defend the
'two-nature theory' of Christ's person both from a charge of
incoherence and for the use it makes of substantial or ontological
language.
But even when the 'two-nature theory' was widely adopted a major
difficulty for christology still remained. For our survey of some of
the classical christological expressions suggests that the Church,
although dependent on this theory for a considerable period of time,
nevertheless by and large failed to bring its perception of Christ as
the incarnation of the eternal Son of God into a coherent relation to
the Gospel portrayal of Jesus as a man inspired by the Hol y Spirit.
What was the key step taken by Owen which enabled him to integrate
these two rather different perspectives into one coherent christologiy?
It would seem that it had to do with his understanding of the relation
between Christ's divine and human nature. On the one hand, he
emphasised that the eternal Son bad assumed human nature into personal
or substantial union with himself, on the other he argued that all
direct divine activity on the human nature of Christ was that of the
Holy Spirit. We suggested earlier that these two concepts can be
considered as forming a 'master-story' suninarised as:
The Holy Spirit renewed the image of God in the human nature
which the eternal Son had assumed into personal union with
himself.
This master-story or condensed narrative provides a suggestive and
determinative framework which links together these two christological
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ideas into one coherent structure, and thereby allows us to conceive of
Christ in terms of both incarnation and inspiration.
The question of interest to us in this chapter is whether Owen's
underlying thesis is justified. Other than in the actual assumption of
human nature, is it proper to conceive of the Spirit, rather than the
Word, as the divine agent acting directly on the humanity of Christ?
Owen is quite aware of the difficulties confronting his position.
It may, therefore, be, and it is objected, "That whereas the
human nature of Christ is assigned as the in ynediate object of
these operations of the Holy Ghost, and that nature was
immediately, inseparably, and undividedly united unto the person
of the Son of God, there doth not seem to be any need, nor indeed
room, for any such operations of the Spirit; for could not the
Son of God himself, in his own person, perform all things
requisite both for the forming, supporting, sanctifying, and
preserving of his own nature, without the especial assistance of
the Holy Ghost?"
Yet, in spite of these objections, Owen realised it was necessary to
take seriously the Biblical portrait of Jesus as a man annointed by the
Holy Spirit, and we saw earlier how he was able to produce extensive
testimony from the Scriptures that throughout his life it was the
Spirit that formed, energised, sanctified, comforted, raised and
glorified the man Christ Jesus. The corollary, however, is not so
clear. Was OwTjustifiedin arguing that, other than in assuming it
to himself, the eternal Son in his divinity did not act directl y or
inediately on his own human nature, but only indirectly through his
Spirit? Owen realised that to establish his position there was a need
also to argue by the 'analogy of faith', that is from other theological
truths which bear upon it. 2
In evaluating the validity of his theory, then, let us begin by
considering the christological difficulties involved in maintaining its
converse, that is, that the divine Word or eternal Son determines the
human life of Jesus directly or ininediately, rather than indirectly by
means of his Spirit.
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2. The Apollinarian solution
The Arian debate focused attention on the status of the Word or Son of
God. At the Council of Nicea it was acknowledged that he was of one
substance with the Father and this was eventually recognised as a
standard of christological orthodoxy. But long before the dust was to
settle on that discussion the question of the Word's relation to what
we here will simply call the humanity of Jesus began to surface.
Athanasius outlines his understanding of it.
Now, the Word of God in His man's nature was not like that (of
the human soul limited to the body); for He was not bound to his
body, but rather was himself wielding it, so that He was not only
in it, but was actually in everything, and while external to the
universe abode in the Father only.3
Two or three ideas typical of Athanasius's christology are suggested
here and it might be helpful to highlight them. The Logos or Word is
the personal governing principle which provides and gives life to the
whole of creation and his action with respect to his human nature is
one aspect of this wider work, similar in some respects to that of the
soul to the body. In fact Athanasius often refers to the body as the
instrument of the Word which he here graphically portrays as being
wielded by him. In all this the agent of Jesus' human nature is
clearly the Word, while his humanity is merely the instrument through
which he acts. Kelly aptly describes this relation: ".. .the Word for
Athanasius was the governing principle, or hegemonikon, in Jesus
Christ, the subject of all the sayings, experiences and actions
attributed to the Gospel figure."4
However, with such an uncompromising conception of the eternal Son's
determination of Jesus' life, some explanation was needed to account
for the human frailties and sufferings which the Gospels attribute to
him. Athanasius did so by simply ascribing all these to his flesh.
in nature the Word Himself is impassible, and yet because of
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that flesh which he put on, these things are ascribed to Him,
since they are proper to the flesh, and the body itself is proper
to the Saviour.'
Some things then are spoken of him as God and others of him as 'He that
bore flesh'. Atbanasius suggests it is a fairly straightforward matter
to distinguish between these two areas. "For if we recognise what is
proper to each, and see and understand that both these things and those
are done by One, we are right in our faith, and shall never stray.'
This explanation does not fit as awkwardly with his original position
as it might first appear, particulary if we remember that Athanasius
viewed the relation of the Word to the humanity as similar to the
Platonic and therefore dualistic understanding of the relation of soul
and body. We simply have to recognise what belongs to each. The
difficulty, however, arises when we consider Christ's frailties, not
merely in his physical body or in his emotions, but in his intellect,
will and spirituality. Athanasius' model will not allow him to ascribe
these to the flesh for these are functions not of the instrument but of
him who wields it. He is, therefore, forced to be less than fair with
the passages in Scripture which speak of Jesus growing in wisdom and
grace or lacking complete knowledge.?
This brief analysis of Athanasius' christology is instructive in that
it highlights the inherent difficulty faced by any theory which would
eruphasise the Word's role in directly determining the humanity of
Jesus. For if the Word is the governing principle of his life, what
account are we to give of the human will, knowledge and spirituality of
Jesus?
Apollinarius' answer was unambiguous, the Word in effect replaced these
faculties in the life of Jesus. We would be unwise, however, to view
this as merely a naive short-circuit of the christological problem.
His handling of the issues was both sensitive and subtle. For
soteriological reasons he was wholeheartedly opposed to the dualism
suggested by any view that there were two principles operating in
Christ. "The metaphysical framework from which Apolliriarius (sought)
to interpret the being of Christ (was) a picture of the substantial
unity of man as a synthesis of body and soul." He understood the
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Logos to be both the directive principle of Christ's life and the life-
giving energy of his whole physical being, resulting in one vital
hypostasis or nature.
Apollinarius was both carefully and logically developing a tendency
that was already present in Athanasius and other supporters of the
Nicene Creed. But when what was implied by them became explicit in his
writing and when a human mind was not simply neglected, but actually
denied of Jesus, the Church reacted strongly. At the Council of
Constantinople it was generally accepted that the manhood of Christ
must be complete, a whole man with his own human mind or soul.
Historical theologians have described Athanasius' form of christology
as being of the Word-flesh type in contrast to the Word-man type which
emphasised that Christ's humanity possessed a mind or rational soul.
One of the reasons this latter form triumphed in the christological
debate was that it was more able to satisfy the demands of soteriology.
The widely accepted theory of the atonement at that time understood the
Son's assumption of human nature to be a means by which God renewed
man's nature in general. Gregory Nazianzen's celebrated expression
suminarises the argument:
For that which He has not assumed He has not healed; but that
which is united to his Godhead is also saved.9
Clearly if the mind of man, which is the seat of impurity in him, is to
be saved, it is essential that the human nature which Christ assumed
should include a fully human mind.
Air interest in this discussion is with the functional relation between
the Word or divine nature and the humanity of Jesus. In the fourth
century the emphasis on the Word's ininediate or direct determination of
the human life of Christ inclined naturally towards Apollinarianism.
However, the Church's reaction to this theory and its affirmation that
Christ possessed a human mind did not mean that the Word was no longer
considered as determining the human life of Jesus.
The 'coninunicatio idomatuin' although originally put forward as a
lingustic explanation for the practice of referring the action of one
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nature to the other, soon developed into a way of conceiving how the
human nature was effectively and directly determined by the divine.
Thus John of Damascus writes with respect to Christ's human will:
And we hold that it is just the same with the deification of the
will; for its natural activity was not changed but united with
his divine and omnipotent will, and became the will of God, made
man • 10
The result was that orthodox theology particularly in the East,
although affirming that Christ was ontologically one with us lacking
nothing that was human, yet implicitly denied that his human nature
thought, learned and responded to God in a way that was continous with
our own. Almost without exception the Fathers would not concede that
Jesus grew in knowledge or needed to pray for grace for himself. If
the Word determines the humanity, acting directly upon it, the full
functioning of the human nature is effectively denied. I believe
C.E.Raven was by and large correct in his assesment. "Apollinarius can
only be condemned by those who are prepared to allow that the whole
Greek school from Justin to Leontius and John of Damascus is
similar.. .since the divergences between them and the heresiarch are
merely verbal and superficial." 7h	 4
So far our discussion has been limited to the Patristic Age, but some
of the same patterns are apparent in the christology of more modern
times. As interest grew in the concept of man's personality in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, its 'core' was often understood as
the centre from which his 'authentic' actions sprang. With this came a
new form of Apollinarianism. The core of Christ's 'personality', his
ego, was understood to lie in the divine Son rather than in his human
nature and in this way the Word was conceived as the ininediate
determinative force in the 'personal' dimensions of Jesus' human
actions. So Maurice Relton argued:
The Divine Logos was capable of being the Ego, not only of his
Divine but also of His human Nature; because His Personality in
virtue of its Divinity already embraced all that is most
distinctive of a truly human personality.12
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The theory found apparent support in a misunderstanding of the earlier
theory of 'anhypostasia', conceiving of it in psychological rather than
ontological terms, and possibly it was this that prevented many from
seeing its more natural link with Apolliriarius' position.
Quite different in content but encouraged by a similar impulse has been
the concept of the 'kenosis' of the Son in the incarnation, when this
has been understood as his self-emptying or laying aside of aspects of
his divine nature. With the underlying assumption that the eternal Son
must directly determine the human life, yet, unwilling to divinise
Jesus' human actions, theologians have found it necessary to argue that
there is some voluntary limitation on the Son's divine attributes.
Although the theory has come under widespread criticism, more subtle
mutations of it continue to appear, for those who would uphold the
doctrine of the incarnation see no other way for the Son to determine
and yet not violate Jesus' humanity, even though this be at the heavy
theological cost of 'humanising' the divine nature.
3. An alternative account
It would seem, then, that there are inherent difficulties in any theory
based on the assumption that the Son directly determines the human
nature of Christ. But is this the only alternative? As Gregory of
Nyssa put before the adherents of Apollinarianism:
Was it necessarily the case.. .that two complete entities,
divinity and humanity, could not coalesce so as to form a real
unity? Or that the coexistence of two distinct volitional
principles in one individual was inconceivable?
In short, are we left with the unsatisfactory choice of the
divinisation of man, or the 'humanisation' of God, in order to explain
the incarnation, or can we overturn the assumption that the Son
directly determines the human nature and allow rather that each nature
operates according to its own characteristic properties, finding its
unity in the one incarnate 'hypostasis' or person, so that the actions
performed in each nature are in fact the actions of the one person
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Jesus Christ? Leo in his celebrated 'Tome' indicates his favour for
this latter alternative.
For each nature retains its own distinctive character without
loss; and as the form of God does not take away the form of a
servant, so the form of a servant does not diminish the form of
God. . . .Each form, in communion with the other, performs the
function that is proper to it; that is, the Word performing what
belongs to the Word, and the flesh carrying on what belongs to
the flesh.t4
And this, in essence, was the postion upheld in the Definition of
Chalcedon.
• . . the distinction of natures being in no way abolished because
of the union, but rather the characteristic property of each
nature being preserved, and concurring into one Person and one
subsistence. . .
A common error, I believe, in reading the Definition is to interpret
its reference to the two natures statically rather than dynamically,
that is, to see it as maintaining that Christ had a full complement of
human properties, but that these did not necessary operate in a human
way. But what does it mean to affirm that Christ had a human will
other than that he willed as a human? By 'the characteristic property
of each nature being preserved', those who formulated the Definition
surely intended to suninarise the concept which had been more fully
expressed by Leo in the phrase 'each form in communion with the other
performs the function that is proper to it'. If this is so, a
framework was given in the Definition of Chalcedon which allowed the
humanity of Christ to be conceived as effective, operating according to
its own characteristic principles rather than as directly determined by
the Word.
We have argued that the Church did not in practice hold on to this
insight, for its soteriology required only the existence rather than
the full operation of a human mind or rational soul. The consequent
development of the concept of coiiimunicatio idiomatum allowed this human
mind and spirituality of Christ to be understood as so determined by
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the divine nature that a true appreciation of Christ's humanity was
effectively lost.
In the seventeenth century John Owen reaffirmed the concept of Christ's
human nature as 'autokineton', that is as a self-determining spiritual
principle, fully self-conscious and as creature open and responsive to
God, rather than as ininediately or directly determined by the Son. He
held that:-
His divine nature was not unto him in the place of a soul, nor
did immediately operate the things which he performed, as some of
old vainly imagined; but being a perfect man, his rational soul
was in him the immediate principle of all his moral operations,
even as ours are in us.'°
His christology, along with that of Chalcedon, thus forms part of what
we have described as an alternate account of the relation of the divine
and human natures in Christ. But how are we to assess its validity?
4. The nature of Christ's humanity
It would appear from our above discussion that the argument for the
Word's determination of the human nature of Christ resolves itself into
a question concerning the reality of his humanity. The real point at
issue is whether the experiences of the man Christ Jesus were continous
with our own? Did he pray, face temptation, depend on divine strength
and encouragement, grow in knowledge and grace and struggle to live a
life of obedience in a way which was not qualitatively different from
the possibilities that are open to us? In short did he, as man, face
God as we do? If he did it would appear that his human nature is not
directly determined by his divinity, but has its own principle or
centre of operation, experiencing and knowing God through the Spirit.
What arguments can Owen bring to bear to establish that Christ's
humanity was indeed of this sort? We will consider two aspects of his
soteriology and also his understanding of Jesus as God's revelation.
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a. Jesus as our prototype
We have seen that Owen understood man's alienation from God as arising
from his defacement of the divine image which he bore. This image
included his moral likeness to God in righteousness and holiness; his
ability to recognise and respond to God's glory in creation and also
the power to obey him and thereby to live continually with him in a
relation of love and trust.' 7 A necessary aspect of his reconciliation
to God, therefore, is the restoration to his nature of this lost image.
How are we to understand Christ's part in bringing about this renewal
of God's image among men? Of particular significance to our present
discussion is the passive role that Owen ascribed to Christ in this
work, arguing that the divine image was first renewed in Christ's human
nature, as a prototype of what God by his Spirit was to do in the whole
Church. God's purpose, he held, is that Christ:
might be the pattern and example of the renovation of the
image of God in us, and of the glory that doth ensue thereon. He
is in the eye of God as the idea of what he intends in us. . .'
This is an important concept and we need to pause and consider how well
founded it is. It receives its impetus from his perception that the
Christian life can be understood in terms of conformity to the person
of Christ and that the Spirit is given to us for no other purpose than
to unite us to him and make us like him.'°
The great design of God in his grace is, that as we have borne
the "image of the first Adam" in the depravation of our natures,
so we should bear the "image of the second" in their
renovation. ZO
Clearly there is widespread Biblical support for the idea that our
spiritual renewal and growth in grace can be described in terms of our
conformity to Christ.
And we all, with unveiled face, beholding the glory of the Lord,
are being changed into his likeness from one degree of glory to
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another; F or this comes from the Lord who is the Spirit. (2
Cor.iii.18)
Now Owen held that this transformation of the Christian into the
likeness of Christ is in effect the restoration of the divine image in
him. Such an identification was possible because of his interpretation
of the divine image in terms of sanctification and of spiritual life.
The Christian is therefore called both to conformity to Christ and also
to put on a new nature created after the likeness or image of God
(c.f.Eph.iv.23), for they are in essence the same thing.
Owen appears to be justified, then, in holding that Christ is the prime
example for the Christian life and that assimilation to his likeness is
to be identified with the renewal of the divine image in the believer.
But has he any grounds for arguing that this divine image was first
restored in Christ's own human nature so that his whole life was in
effect the prototype of the Christian life? A passage which he finds
particularly instructive in this matter is from the second chapter of
Hebrews.
For it was fitting that he, for whom and by whom all things
exist, in bringing many sons to glory, should make the pioneer of
their salvation perfect through suffering. For he who sanctifies
and those who are sanctified have all one origin. That is why he
is not ashamed to call them brethren... (Hebrews ii.1.O,l1. RSV)
A sanctifying work is presupposed in Christ who thereby becomes a
pioneer in the faith for other believers. As Owen argues: "It is
Christ who sanctifieth believers; yet it is from God, who first
sanctified him, that he and they might be of one, and so become
brethren, as bearing the image of the same Father." 21 What God did in
Christ he was later to do in us, and thus the source of our
sanctification is coninon, the image we bear is coninon, thus we are
truly brethren.
We have spent some time considering this concept of Christ as the
prototype of the believer because it clearly has far-reaching
implications for an understanding of his humanity. The man Christ
Jesus as the object of the Spirit's sanctifying and renewing work uust
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have learnt and experienced grace as we do, knowing sanctification
through suffering and finding God's help through fervent prayer. If he
is truly our prototype and example then he too must have stood before
God "in a genuinely human attitude of adoration, obedience, a most
radical sense of creaturehood."22
We are examining whether Owen can establish that Christ's humanity was
such that his experience of God was in no way qualitatively different
from possibilities that are open to us. So far we have looked at the
implications which arise from his understanding of Christ's passive
role as the prototype of the Christian life. Let us now examine what
may be learnt of his humanity from Owen's exposition of the active part
Christ played in giving over his life to suffering and death.
b. Jesus as willing priest
Owen believed Christ's work as Mediator between man and God could be
referred to three distinct offices or roles which he exercised with
respect to the Church. As king he received a delegated authority from
God to rule his subjects and to subdue his enemies. As prophet he was
raised up by God from among his brethren to make known to the Church
the divine will by teaching and instruction. But his office as priest,
whereby he made atonement for his people, differs from the other two in
that it is directed not towards men but towards God on behalf of men.23
God is, therefore, the object of Christ's priestly work. It is before
him that Christ stands as our advocate and continues to make
intercession on our behalf; and it is to God that he offered himself as
a sacrifice. For the high priest is always chosen from among men to
act on their behalf in relation to God, to offer gifts and sacrifices
for sins.(c.f. Heb.v.l) This means that although salvation should be
considered, from first to last, as God's gracious and loving initiative
in reconciling an alienated and helpless world, rieverthelesss the
actual act of atonement must also be seen as an act towards God of one
who is man. We will consider the nature of this act and its
implications for Christ's humanity by briefly following one line of
Owen's discussion.
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He held that there was no value or efficacy in the sufferings and death
of Christ considered in themselves:
For what excellency of the nature of God could have been
demonstrated in the penal sufferings of one absolutely and in all
respects innocent. .
Its effectiveness can only be understood with respect to God's covenant
to save sinful men, and it is in this context alone that these
sufferings are made good and tend to God's glory. (XIX p.89) Similarly
the efficacy of the sacrifice is related to the attitude of the
offerer.
It is the mind, and not the matter, tbat gives measure and
acceptance unto an offering.25
Owen wished to emphasise that it is Christ's manner and motivation in
the giving over of his life that brings glory to God and value to his
sacrifice. This motivation included his love to mankind and compassion
to those caught in sin; his unspeakable zeal for the glory of God; his
attitude of submission and obedience to his will; and his own faith and
trust in GOd25
But by recognising that Christ's attitude in laying down his life is an
integral part of the efficacy of his death, Owen effectively undermines
what we might call an Apollinarian view of the atonement. For if it
does not merely consist in his physical death, but in the fear and the
tears, in the faith and the prayer and in the submission of the will
that led to it, then an active human mind and will are an essential
aspect of that whole event. To substantiate his argument let us
consider his exposition of the following passage from Hebrews.
In the days of his flesh, Jesus offered up prayers and
supplications, with loud cries and tears, to him who was able to
save him from death, and he was heard for his godly
fear. (Heb.v.7)
Owen holds that 'flesh' is used here to signify the frailties, weakness
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and infirmities of our nature in which Christ shared throughout his
life, but which here refers particularly to his last days when all his
sorrows, trials and temptations came to a head. The preceding verses
show that the prayers and supplicat ions he offered at this time were an
aspect of his priestly ministry. They should not be considered as
'petitory' to procure that which is good, but as 'deprecatory' to keep
off or turn away that which is evil, as were those of the high priest
when he confessed the sins of Israel over the head of the scape-goat in
order that the curse of the law might be averted.31
But the priest is in sympathy with those for whom he prays, for he too
is beset with weakness. Owen, therefore, understands the verse as
referring directly to Jesus' agony in prayer at Gethsemane, and he
argues that the torment experienced there can not be explained merely
as the fear of a man facing a gruesome death. "Where, then, is the
glory of his spiritual strength and fortitude? where the beauty of the
example which herein he set before us?" 33
 We must, rather, look for a
deeper cause for the dreadful, trembling conflict which seemed almost
to dissolve his whole being.
Owen believed it bad to do with Jesus' awareness of God in his holiness
and righteousness as the author and upholder of the law and his
understanding of his own impending death in terms of the law's
curse.(Gal.iii.13) It is this that caused his sense of spiritual
desertion and separation from all comfort and joy in his relation with
God the Father, and which culminated in his cry of dereliction from the
cross.
The inadequacy of any portrayal of Christ's passion as the suffering of
God at the hands of men, or the identification of God with man's tragic
condition, now becomes apparent. Gethsemane does not allow Christ's
tribulations to be viewed so docetically. The central actor in that
dark drama experiences spiritual separation from God and he does so
with human fears and a human faith. The person of Christ is truly God
and thereby value, dignity and efficacy was given to his passion,
nevertheless it was in his human nature that he gave himself up, knew
the agony of spiritual dereliction and tasted death.
Owen's theology is interesting because in it there is recovered an
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appreciation of the full and active humanity of Christ. His exposition
of Christ as a willing priest who lays down his life as an atonement
for sin requires an understanding of his humanity as one which knew the
full depths of spiritual desertion and dereliction by God. Yet if he
was both man and God how could his humanity experience such a sense of
separation from God? Owen answers:
And this dereliction was possible, and proceeded from hence, in
that all communications from the divine nature unto the human,
beyond subsistence, were voluntary.30
We are back where we began. The eternal Son does not immediately
determine the humanity of Christ, the communication is 'voluntary'
rather than 'natural' and is always through the Holy Spirit. A sense
of divine desertion is possible for Christ as man in his suffering
precisely because his experience of God is not immediate but is
indirect and by means of the Spirit.
In this chapter we have been examining the validity of Owen's assertion
that the eternal Son does not directly determine or operate on the
human life of Jesus. On the one hand we have argued that its converse
tended historically towards some form of either Apollinarianism or
kenoticism. On the other we have seen how Owen's soteriology requires
a view of Christ's humanity as operating according to its own
principles, rather than as directly determined by the Word. His
soteriology thereby provides positive support for his theory.
There is, however, an idea in contemporary theology which appears to
radically undermine it. This is the conception of Christ as God's
self-revelation, which was developed by Karl Barth. Let us briefly
consider how damaging it actually is to Owen's position.
c. Jesus as God's revelation
The point at issue is whether Jesus Christ reveals God by his own
divine nature or through his humanity as it is inspired by the Holy
Spirit. The former is destructive of Owen's theory for it implies that
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in revealing God, Christ's divine nature is the direct determing
principle of his words and actions. This is the position that Barth
affirms:
the statement about Christ's deity is to be understood in the
sense that Christ reveals his Father. But this Father of His is
God. He who reveals Him, then reveals God. But who can reveal
God except God Himself?3'
The underlying concept is that revelation must be self-revelation and
therefore only the divine nature can truly reveal God. In fact
Christ's deity is conceived in terms of his revelation of God.
Paririenberg is aware of the importance of this argument and maintains
that: 'The demonstration of the connection of Jesus' divinity with the
concept of revelation constitutes one of Barth's greatest theological
contributions." 33
 I believe its significance in the world of ideas
lies in the fact that it gave to the post-Enlightenment Church a way of
conceiving the deity of Christ which did not appear to suffer from the
epistemological problems that had discredited the naive objectivism of
an earlier age.
Owen's understanding of Christ in terms of God's revelation is quite
different as is apparent from his discussion of the opening verses of
Hebrews.
In the past God spoke to our forefathers through the prophets at
many times and in various ways, but in the last days he has
spoken to us by his Son. (Heb.i.1)
There is both a distinction and a measure of continuity between the
revelation that came through the prophets and that which was in Christ.
The distinction has to do with the being and status of the person
through whom the revelation is given and it is this that the author of
the epistle goes on to develop at some length. The continuity arises
from the fact that it is God who in both cases is the author of the
revelation. '
Owen examines the idea that it is the Father and not the Son who is the
source of the revelation. It indicates that God has so revealed his
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mind to him so as to be said to speak to us in him. Owen sees it as a
characteristic of the whole New Testament witness that it is from the
Father that Christ heard the word and learnt the doctrine that he
declared to the Church, it did not come from himself.
And this is asserted wherever there is mention made of the
Father's sending, sealing, anointing, commanding, teaching him;
of his doing the will, speaking the words, seeking the glory,
obeying the commands of him that sent him.
Now if the source of the revelation is the Father, how then does he
reveal himself to the Son? For in his divine nature Jesus Christ, "as
he was the eternal Word and Wisdom of the Father. . .had an omnisciericy
of the whole nature and will of God, as the Father himself hath,
because the same with that of the Father, their will and wisdom being
the same." 5
 It was clearly, then, not as the eternal Word that the
Son was taught by the Father, but as he took the form of a servant.
The Lord Jesus Christ discharged his office and work of revealing
the will of the Father in and by his human nature.. . for although
the person of Christ, God and man, was our mediator.. .yet his
human nature was that wherein he discharged the duties of his
office and the 'principium quod' of all his mediatory actings, I
Tim.ii.5."
Therefore, as Christ received the Spirit that he might in all holiness
obey God, so also was he endowed with the Spirit beyond measure that he
might be "the great prophet of the church, in whom the Father would
speak and give out the last revelation of himself." 7 What
distinguishes the revelation in Christ from that of Moses and all other
prophets is "the infinite excellency of his person above theirs."
The person of the mediator, God and man, as the agent of the revelation
gives to it its dignity and value, even though it was done through his
human nature.
It is apparent from this outline that if Barth's conception of
revelation is in essence correct then Owen's interpretation of the
relation of the divLie nature to the humanity of Christ, and
consequently his appreciation of the radical creatureliness of Christ
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in all that he does, is mistaken. Now it is rather unlikely that a
major foundation of contemporary theology will be effectively
discredited in the eye of the reader by these few paragraphs,
nevertheless in defence of Owen's position we raise the following
questions.
Firstly, how firm is the biblical foundation for the conception of
revelation as self-revelation, that is, that only God can reveal God?
Pannenberg, who upholds the idea, recognises that it is modern. "The
exclusive use of the concept of revelation for God's self-disclosure
goes back to German Idealism, especially to Hegel." 39 He concedes that
the words in Scripture translated by 'to reveal' and 'revelation' do
not have this meaning at all, but believes that the content of the idea
can be found in the Old Testament 'word of demonstration' formulas
"that designate the knowledge of Yahweh's divinity as the purpose of
God in history".4°
Clearly the power of the idea lies not in its biblical base but in its
ability to provide a framework for conceiving of the divinity of Christ
in a post-Kantian world. How would Owen respond to so pragmatic a
defence of its use? It is worthy of note that in the apologetics of
his own day the divinity of Christ was often derived from the
miraculous nature of his ministry. Owen, however, did not believe it
was possible to do this.
The naked working of miracles. I confess, without the influence
of such other considerations as this argument is attended withal
in relation to Jesus Christ, will not alone of itself assert a
divine nature in him who is the instrument of their working or
production. 41
An important principle emerges. According to Owen it is not possible
to simply read off Christ's divinity from his incarnate activity,
whether it be his sinless life, miraculous ministry, supernatural
birth, resurrection or, as in our above discussion, in his revelation
of God. For although in his person he was both God and man, his work
of mediation was carried out through his human nature. This meant
there were no aspects of his activity where God, or the divine nature,
replaced the normal operation of his humanity. In short if we reject
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Apollinarianism there i$'no element of Christ's incarnate life which we
can simply isolate as being that of God and not of man.
How then do we come to know the divinity of Christ? Owen held that it
was by the Holy Spirit. It was the Spirit that bore witness to Christ
"that he was the Son of God, the true Messiah, and that the work that
he performed in the world was coninitted unto him by God the Father to
accomplish". 43 Christ died an ignominous death and was believed by
most to be an imposter. It was the Spirit's work by means of his small
group of followers to testify of him through their words and through
the signs which accompanied them and it is by him that faith is
maintained in the world today. 43
 It is the Spirit that convicts and
reproves of sin, but it is also by him that the veil is lifted and we
are able to see the glory of God in the face of Christ Jesus.
We have argued that whenever the divine nature is considered as
directly determining the humanity of Christ, some aspect of his human
nature is either neglected or denied. This leads us naturally to our
second question. How does Barth understand the relation between the
Word of God, that is Christ as God's revelation, and his humanity?
Is the humanitas Christi as such the revelation? Does the divine
sonship of Jesus Christ mean that God's revealing has now been
transmitted as it were to the existence of the man Jesus of
Nazareth, that this has thus become identical with it?44
Barth goes on to show why the answer must be negative. Jesus Christ
the man is not to be identified with the revelation. His argument
makes sense once we accept his interpretation of the concept of
revelation. Nevertheless the breach implied here between the Word of
God and Jesus the man can only be damaging for christology for it
inevitably leads to the neglect of the historical life of Christ as the
basis for our knowledge of God. Thus Barth argues:
Jesus Christ is also in fact the Rabbi of Nazareth who is hard to
know historically and whose work, when He is known, might seem to
be a little commonplace compared to more than one of the other
founders of religions and even compared to some of the later
representatives of His own religion. . . .The veil is thick. We do
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not have the Word of God otherwise than in the mystery of its
secularity. This means, however, that we have it in a form which
as such is not the Word of God... 	 (I 1 p.165)
With this Owen would have sharply disagreed. There is a suggestion in
it that Jesus of Nazareth, the historical form of the Word of God, is
secondary. We can be agnostic about the historical details of his life
and relatively unimpressed by his person, nevertheless we are still
called to offer worship and obedience to Jesus Christ as the
trancendent Word of God. But Christ the Mediator is one person, not
two. (Xir response to the Rabbi of Nazareth is our response to God's
Son. Owen held that Jesus' historical life is commonplace only to
those whose eyes have not been opened by the Spirit to recognise the
glory of his person. The distinction lies in our perception, not in
his reality. The humanity of his one person has ultimate significance
for in it and through it God is made known to us and redemption is won
for us.
We have structured our discussion in an attempt to undermine Barth's
interpretation of revelation as self-revelation by indicating the
insufficiency of its scriptural basis and some of the unhelpful
implications it has for christology. It was necessary to do this if
Owen's thesis was to be defended, for Barth's conception of divine
revelation as the action of Christ in his divinity, does undermine
Owen's theory that the eternal Son determines the human nature of
Christ only indirectly and by means of the Holy Spirit. 	 C
We believe, however, that Owen's position can and should be defended
for it offers a coherent way of understanding the true creaturehood of
the man Christ Jesus within an incarnational christology.
5. The self-consciousness of Jesus
On the basis of Owen's theory it woul4 appear that we are entitled to
ask questions about the self-consciousness of Jesus as he is man.
There might or there might not be sufficient material for New Testament
scholars to provide responsible answers, but there does not seem to me
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to be any compelling argument why the venture is either intrinsically
impious or doomed to failure. If the physical body of Christ operated
as ours does, what ground, other than incipient Apollinarianism, can
there be for maintaining that his human mind or self-understanding was
wholly different from our own? Although Owen did not explicitly deal
with Jesus' self-consciousness, he was interested in the extent of the
knowledge possessed by the incarnate Christ and the manner by which he
attained it.
In his commentary on Hebrews he argued that Christ had in principle a
complete knowledge of God and his will. But in practice this was not
his to exercise either as a child or as an adult, but rather he grew
"in all that wisdom and knowledge which the human nature was capable
of.,. .without destroying its finite being or variety of conditions'.4e
There seems no reason, then, to consider the functioning of Jesus'
human self-consciousness as discontinuous with our own, forming and
developing as he grew in his experience of himself, the world and of
God. Rather, it was only in the content of this perception of himself
that the distinction lay. Of Jesus' self-understanding we offer a
tentative description, for although we are uncertain of the details, we
believe such an outline is in principle possible to draw.
Through his experience of God, mediated by the Spirit, Jesus came to
believe that he was living in a unique relation to the God of Israel,
analagous to that of a son to his father. Linked to this there was a
growing conviction that he had been commissioned by God to a work of
ultimate redemptive significance among his people. The Gospels suggest
that this faith in his distinctive relation to the Father required
divine support and strengthening, the outstanding example of which
occurred at his baptism when a 'voice from heaven' affirmed his divine
sonship. There were also times when this faith was tested and
challenged and the accounts of his temptation in the wilderness give a
dramatic description of his struggle and final refusal to seek some
explicit and external evidence which would prove to himself the reality
of his relation to God. Prayer was thus a spiritual necessity for his
own faith and for the successful completion of his mission. Suffering,
as always, proved to be the sensitive but effective divine instrument
by which his person was refined and developed into spiritual maturity.
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P.T.Forsyth inquires:
Is it too much to press into the deeper meaning and condition of
such growing obedience, and to say that as he did the deeper will
he knew the deeper doctrine, his grasp of sonship also
grew?(p. 121)
How much he knew and when he came to understand it is an ongoing task
for New Testament scholarship to explore, as is the investigation of
the part played by the various Old Testament messianic concepts in his
perception of who he was. For it seems to have been through the
mediation of one or more of these conceptions that he came to believe
that he had a personal history that went back before time. This does
not imply that he suddenly had a universal knowledge of all reality,
physical and spiritual, but rather that he identified himself with one
who had come from the Father's side. It would be on the basis of this
developed self-understanding that he found the personal authority to
forgive men of their sins and offer them life in the kkngdom which he
taught was being inaugerated in and through his ministry. It would
also have provided him a framework to understand the divine call or
mission that led him finally to Jerusalem and death.
He was not suffering from religious delusion for the content of his
self-understanding is known by the Church to be true, the person who
argued in the streets of Jerusalem was not only a descendent of David,
but was also his Lord - an idea that appears to have delighted the
cofilnon people, although undoubtedly scandalising the religious
leadership of the day . (Mark xii.35-37)
Neither was his experience that of a schizophrenic for the simple
reason that the divine nature never suddenly 'broke in', leaving his
human mind and will as a mere spectator of his actions. Rather, his
human self-consciousness knew and experienced God always indirectly and
by means of the Hol y Spirit, for only in this way could it remain truly
human.
Here lies our motivation for this excursion into the self-understanding
of Jesus. If his knowledge of his own divine sonship flowed out of an
active faith, (and how else can we interpret the wilderness
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temptations?) and if his human self-understanding was an integrated and
continuous reality, it would seem that Owen was correct in arguing that
the divine Word determined the humanity of Christ only indirectly and
voluntarily by means of the Holy Spirit, rather than ininediately or
naturally, in which case his thoughts and ideas would have been those
of God.
6. Conclusion
We began by arguing that Owen's ability to hold together or integrate
the two christological types which we have described as incarnational
and inspirational was in large measure an outcome of his understanding
of the relation between the divine and human nature of Christ. In
particular its success depended on whether he was justified in his
thesis that, other than in assuming it into personal subsistence with
himself, the Son acted on his human nature only indirectly and by means
of the Spirit.
As the discussion progressed we saw that the issue resolved itself into
questions concerning the nature of Christ's humanity. Were the
experiences of the man Christ Jesus continuous with our own? Did he
stand before God as we do? Did being truly human mean not merely the
possession of a catalogue of static human qualities, but also include
acting and responding in a fully human way? If so it would suggest
that the process by which Christ as man learnt of God was similar to
our own religious experience, that is, it was mediated by the
enlightening, encouraging, comforting, empowering and sanctifying work
of the Holy Spirit.
Now the positive argument of this chapter has been that Christ's
humanity was indeed of this sort. His role as the prototype of the
Christian life and the nature of his priestly office whereby he gave up
his life on behalf of his people and knew separation from God, both
point to the reality of his active humanity in a manner which the
tradition has often overlooked. We also attempted to show that Owen
was correct in holding that Christ revealed God, not ininediately by his
divine nature, but rather through his humanity as a man whom the Spirit
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bad specifically anointed that he might bring good news to the poor.
Finally we argued that it was possible to describe Jesus' self-
consciousness as one which was integrated and continually developing,
and therefore of the same nature as our own in its operation if not in
its content. In short we have argued from Owen that the experiences of
the man Christ Jesus were continuous with our own.
The underlying assumption of the discussion has been that the integrity
of Christ's human nature, understood in this active sense, can only be
maintained if the divine Word is recognised as operating on it not
directly or immediately, but rather indirectly through the Spirit.
This assumption is based on the perception that our own experience of
the Spirit does not violate the integrity of our humanity. For
although every spiritual act that we perform has its source in God's
wisdom and will and flows from the redemptive life and work of Christ
as that life is effectively imparted to us by the Spirit, nevertheless
our humanity is not bypassed or directly determined by the divine
nature, rather our human mind, will and affections continue to function
in a way which is appropriate to their own being. Therefore, if
Christ's human experiences were if fact much like our own, it would
appear that his human attributes were not merely the passive
instruments for divine thoughts, decisions or feelings, rather, they
would have always operated actively in a fully human way knowing,
serving, obeying and glorifying God as we do through the Holy Spirit.
Negatively, we have argued that where the Word was held to directly
determine the human nature of Christ, operating as the single subject
of all his actions, there was always an incipient tendency to either
some form of Apollinarianism or kenoticism. One way or the other the
active and real humanity of Christ was inevitably neglected or
undermined.
But if Owen is thereby justified in his thesis that the eternal Son
determines or operates on his human nature only indirectly and by means
of the Spirit, he has in effect established the link which holds
together or integrates the two christological types which we have
characterised by the concepts of incarnation and inspiration. For this
thesis of his makes it possible for us to form a coherent 'master-
story' of the form:
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The Holy Spirit formed, sanctified and energised the human nature
which the eternal Son had assumed into personal union with
himself.
And it is this 'master-story' or condensed narrative which enables us
to conceive how Jesus Christ can be considered as both the incarnation
of the eternal Son of God, and also as one who is inspired and anointed
by the Holy Spirit.
We need to consider one other major difficulty that confronts Owen's
christology. It arises in connection with the clear distinction he
makes between the action of the Son and that of the Spirit with respect
to the human nature of Jesus. Is such a distinction justifiable? If
it is, what are the implications for trinitarian theology?
An almost unchallenged principle of orthodox trinitarian theology has
been that the external actions of the Trinity are indivisible. How
then was Owen as part of that tradition nevertheless able to so clearly
make this distinction between the action of God as Son and God as
Spirit with respect to the human nature of Jesus?
169
NYFES to {AjER SIX
1
	











J.N.D.Kelly, Early Christian Lkctrines, fifth edition, Adam &
Charles Black (London, 1977), pp.285ff.
5
	
Athanasius, Four Discourses Against the Arians, III 34, NPNF,
second series, vol.IV, p.412.
6
	
Ibid., III 35, p.413.
7
	
Ibid., III 51, pp.421ff.
8 Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, vol.1, From the
Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451), E.T. by John Bowden, second
edition, Mowbrays (London & Oxford, 1975), pp . 330ff.
9
	 Gregory Nazianzen, To Cledonius the Priest against Apollim9rius,
NPNF, second series, vol. VII, ep. ci, p.440.
10
	
John of Damascus, Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, III 17, NFF,
second series, vol.IX, p.66.
11 Quoted in Harry Johnson, The Humanity of the Saviour. A Biblical
and Historical Study of the Human Nature of Christ in relation to
Original Sin, with special reference to its Soteriological
Significance, The Epworth Press (London, 1962), p.196.
12 H.Maurice Relton, A Study in Christology. The Problem of the
Relation of the Two Natures in the Person of Christ, SICK (London,
1934), p.227. P.T.Forsyth in his important book The Person and
Place of Jesus Christ, (London, 1909) develops this idea. "But if
we follow the New Testament as a whole and as a Gospel, we must
think of the divine element as constituting the historic
personality. . ." p.247.
13
	 Quoted in Kelly, p.296.
14 Quoted in Creeds, Councils and Controversies. Documents
illustrative of the history of the Church A.D. 337-461, Ed. by









John Owen, Christologia: Or, a Declaration of the Glorious Mystery













22 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. I, E.T. by Cornelius




John Owen, An Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews, vol. 2,
p.149.
24
	 Hebrews 2, p.89.
25





	 Hebrews 4, pp.496ff.
28
	 Hebrews 4, p.503.
29





31	 Karl Barth, Church Ek,ginatics, The Ek,ctrine of the Word of God,
second edition, Ed. by G.W.Bromi].ey & T.F.Torrance, T.&T.Clark
(Edinburgh, 1980), I 1, p.406.
32	 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus - God and Man, SCM Press (London,
1985), p.130.
33	 Hebrews 3, pp.5ff.
34	 Hebrews 3, pp.28ff.
35	 Hebrews 3, p.30.
36	 Hebrews 3, p.30.
37	 Hebrews 3, p.30.
38	 Hebrews 3, p.31.
39	 Pannenberg, p.127.
40	 Ibid., p.128.
41	 John Owen, Vindicae Evangelicae; or the Mystery of the Gospel
Vindicated and Socinianism Examined, Works 12, p.174.
42	 Works 3, pp.183ff
43	 Works 3, p.184.
44	 Karl Barth, I 1, p.323.
45	 Ibid., p.165.




The Son and the Spirit as distinct agents
1. (Xir knowledge of God as Triune
As a faithful young Puritan minister John Owen used to visit his people
in the parish of Fordham teaching both adults and children the basic
doctrines of Protestantism from two catechisms which he himself
composed.' In the larger one it is asked: Do we know God as he is?
The answer is: No; his glorious being is not of us, in this life, to be
comprehended. 2
 The same concern is apparent at the end of the section
on the Trinity. Question: Can we conceive these things as they are in
themselves? Answer: Neither we nor yet the angels of heaven are able
to dive into these secrets, as they are internally in God; but in
respect of the outward dispensation of themselves to us by creation,
redemption, and sanctification, a knowledge may be obtained of these
things, saving and heavenly.3
Why did Owen so stress the inherent incomprehensibility of God even at
this basic level of Christian instruction? (e reason was his belief
in the value of a religious sense of awe before the transcendent
mystery of a holy God. We cannot see or comprehend God. "For, in
itself, the divine nature is hid from all living, and dwelleth in that
light whereunto no creature can approach." 4
 As all our rational
conceptions are swallowed up and lost when dealing directly with that
which is absolutely ininense, eternal, infinite, the inadequate
knowledge we do have of God's perfections comes mainly by removing all
imperfections. "What we deny of God, we know in some measure - but
what we affirm we know not; only we declare what we believe and
adore. 6
However, it was also the Aristotelian or empirical temper of Owen's
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epistemology that required a doctrine of God's incomprehensibility. He
held that "our knowledge of things is more by their operations and
proper effects than from their own nature and formal reason.
Especially is it so in divine things, and particularly with respect
unto God himself." Therefore our inability to know God's nature is
not only due to the infinite distance between the Creator and the
creature but also due to the way in which things in general are known,
that is not directly but through their effects, not inunediately through
intuition but indirectly through our experience of their activity.
Owen's conception of a mediated knowledge of God was in sharp contrast
to the epistemology of his major theological opponents. The Quakers
claimed that the 'inner light' gave them an imediate access to God and
therefore an intuitive knowledge of him, while the Socinians contended
for a rationally based understanding of God's essential nature. Owen
was vigorously opposed to both.
But as to the being of God, and his subsistence in the Trinity of
persons, we have no direct intuition into them, much less
comprehension of them.?
The subsistence of his most single and simple nature in three
distinct persons, though it raises and enobles faith in its
revelation, yet it amazeth reason which would trust to itself in
the contemplation of it - whence men grow giddy who will own no
other guide, and are carried out of the way of truth.
The alternative epistemology proposed by Owen is that we come to know
the nature of God through his effect on the world of our experience.
He did not use such self-consciously empiricist language, yet he
expresses the same idea.
But this God, invisible, eternal, incomprehensibly glorious, bath
implanted sundry characters of his excellencies and left
footsteps of his blessed properties on the things that he bath
made; that, by the consideration and contemplation of them, we
might come to some such acquaintance with him as might encourage
us to fear and serve him, and to make him our utmost end.9
Although these characters of divine excellence placed upon the works of
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creation and providence are limited and inadequate, in the person of
Christ there is a complete image and perfect representation of the
Divine Being and excellencies. (He is a complete image, not of all
that God is, but of God in so far as He offers himself as the object of
our faith, trust and obedience.)'°
This is the ground of our knowledge of the Trinity. "In the person and
mediation of Christ (which are inseparable in all the respects of faith
unto him) there is made unto us a blessed representation of the
glorious properties of the divine nature"." For Christ, in
accomplishing God's will, makes known what God does for us, in us and
towards us, and thereby brings to light the mystery of the Trinity, or
the subsistence of the three persons in the unity of the same divine
nature. 2
Owen is aware that not all our knowledge of the Trinity can come in
this way for the internal acts of the divine persons towards one
another and the distinct, divine, external actings of each person are
not known by any representations open to our experience but only by
verbal testimony.' 3
 He also concedes that the Scripture, through which
we now receive our knowledge, is a doctrinal affirmation rather than an
actual representation of the nature of God. Yet he insists that the
whole Scripture is built on this foundation, or proceeds on this
supposition - that there has been a real representation of the divine
nature unto us, which it declares and describes.' 4 It is with these
qualifications in mind that Owen holds our knowledge of the Trinity to
be founded on real representations of the divine nature in creation,
redemption and sanctification. Such an epistemology would have more
sympathy with some modern attempts to derive the Trinity from the
history of Jesus the Son, than with Augustine's search for trinitarian
patterns in the human psyche.
2. The essence of the doctrine
How does this effect his exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity? It
is well to remember that at that time it was under vigorous attack from
the Socinian.s who held it to be contrary to reason and far removed from
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a straightforward interpretation of Scripture, particularly in its
dependence on abstruse philosophical terminology and concepts. These
charges had been difficult to answer and the faith of many ordinary
believers had been confused and shaken. It was to this need that Owen
addressed himself in his popular and short work on the Trinity. His
belief in the incomprehensibility of God and the manner of his self-
manifestation, together with an awareness of the content of the current
debate, led him to formulate and defend the doctrine from Scripture in
a greatly simplified form, avoiding where possible the use of
sophisticated and technical vocabulary.
Now, the sum of this revelation in this matter is, that God is
one; - that this one God is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; - that
the Father is the Father of the Son; and the Son, the Son of the
Father; and the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of the Father and the Son;
and that, in respect of this their mutual relation, they are
distinct from each other.'5
It was only the contents of this affirmation, rather than its further
explication, that Owen believed to be necessary for faith and in need
ofldndication against its opponents and in this task he concentrated
his effort. "We have not, therefore, any original contest in this
matter with any, but such as deny either God to be one, or the Father
to be God, or the Son to be God, or the Holy Ghost so to be."'°
Yet he did acknowledge, somewhat reluctantly it would seem, that the
explanation and further development of this basic affirmation was of
some value for the protection and edification of the church. 17 The two
areas in which he offers such an explanation, albeit briefly, concern
the nature of God's unity and the distinction between Father, Son and
Spirit.
"Now this oneness can respect nothing but the nature, being, substance,
or essence of God. God is one in this respect." Owen thus argued
that there is one essential, divine nature, considered not only as a
generic unity but as a numerical unity of substance. "This one nature,
substance, or essence, being the nature, substance, or essence of God,
as God, is the nature, essence, and substance of the Father, Son, and
Spirit; one and the same absolutely in and unto each of them: for none
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can be God, as they are revealed to be, but by virtue of this divine
nature or being. "1 9
As to the distinction within the Trinity Owen refers it to the three
hypostases or persons, distinctly subsisting in the same divine essence
or being. Following the Cappadocians 2 ° he defines a divine person as
nothing but the divine essence, upon the account of an especial
property, subsisting in an especial manner. Thus in the person of the
Father there is the divine essence and being, with its property of
begetting the Son, subsisting in an especial manner as the Father, and
because this person has the whole divine nature, all the essential
properties of that nature are in that person. The wisdom, the
understanding of God, the will of God, the immensity of God, is in that
person, not as that person, but as the person is God. 2 ' This last
distinction is important. It means that none of the essential
attributes of the Godhead are to be distinctively attributed to a
particular person.
The conclusion of Owen's exposition is that each person having the
understanding, the will, and power of God, becomes a distinct principle
of operation; and yet all their actings 'ad extra' being the actings of
God, they are undivided, and are all the works of one and the self-same
22
It is apparent that even in this brief explanation Owen has been unable
to avoid entering the complexity of the historical trinitarian
discussion. A fuller account of his trinitarian thinking is revealed
in his other writings where an explication of trinitarian doctrine is
necessary for the adequate exposition of some of the central
theological themes. The rest of this chapter will consider one aspect
of this thinking , namely his resolution of the tension implicit in the
dual affirmation of the paragraph above. 'Each person is a distinct
principle of operation and yet all ad extra actings of God are
undivided.'
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3. Opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa
Owen affirms the doctrine, integral to both Western and Eastern
trinitarian theology, 23
 that all external operations of the Trinity are
indivisible. Every person "is the author of every work of God, because
each person is God, and the divine nature is the same undivided
principle of all divine operations". 34
 The doctrine follows from a
particular understanding of God's unity. The nature of God is one and
the same, undivided in all the persons and yet this nature is the
principle behind all divine activity. Such activity or works of God,
being the effect of divine power which is essentially the same in each
person, must therefore belong equally to each person. 26 He gives an
analogy to illustrate the concept. "(I)f it were possible that three
men might see by the same eye, the act of seeing would be but one, and
it would be equally the act of all three."2°
The difficulty facing this doctrine is the clear and repeated
ascription by the Scriptures and the Church in its worship of various
divine acts to particular persons of the Trinity. To account for this,
use is made of the theological device of 'appropriation'. il1iam Hill
explains it succinctly: What is in reality a coninon prerogative of the
trinitarian members is predicated of one alone to manifest his personal
uniqueness in the Godhead.21
Owen details the basis on which such predications are made. There is a
distinction, relation and order in the mariner of subsistence of the
divine persons and so in the undivided activity of the divine nature
each person does the same work according to the order of their
subsistence. Every activity of God, then, although generally assigned
to each person, is particularly ascribed to the one whose
characteristic property is manifested in it, or who in a particular way
condescends to it. Hence to the Father are assigned the works of
nature or the old creation; to the Son all divine operations related to
the recovery of mankind by grace; and to the Spirit those works of God
through which grace is made effective in us.2'
However, the principle of appropriation leaves intact the underlying
doctrine that: every divine work, and every part of every divine work,
is the work of God, that is of the whole Trinity, inseparably and
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undividedly.
4. Distinct principles of operation
The position outlined above reflects a trinitarian orthodoxy, which was
accepted by and large without criticism by Owen. It is interesting,
however, to examine whether this 'orthodoxy' is in fact consistent with
some of the major areas in his theology.
a. The Spirit as a distinct person
In his treatise on the Spirit 'A Discourse Concerning the Holy Spirit'
Owen intended to establish that the Spirit "is in himself a distinct,
living, powerful, intelligent, divine person". 3 ° His central argument
was that the persons of the Trinity are so distinct in their peculiar
subsistence that distinct actings and operations are ascribed to them.
In particular "there are the external acts of one person towards
another.. .So the Father gives, sends, cooinands the Son, as he had
condescended to take our nature upon him, and to be the mediator
between God and man. So the Father and the Son do send the Spirit, as
he condescends in an especial manner to the office of being the
sanctifier and comforter of the church." 31 This manifest distinction
in activity indicates for Owen a distinction of persons. But does not
an unqualified doctrine of the indivisibility of God's external
activity, as outlined above, preclude such an argument? How can an
undivided activity demonstrate distinct persons?
This difficulty is highlighted in his debate with the Socinians who
granted the divinity of the Spirit's activity, yet held that he is not
a person but a quality in the divine nature, or simply the power that
God puts forward for a particular purpose. Owen, however, maintained
that:
He is not a mere instrument or servant, disposing of the things
wherein he bath no concern, or over which he bath no power; but
in all things he worketh towards us according to his own will.33
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He argued, rather, that the Spirit is a person, for it is "he to whom
all personal properties, attributes, adjuncts, acts and operations, are
ascribed, and unto whom they do belong"." But as it stands a
doctrine of the indivisibility of the external activity of God devalues
the reality of the particular ascription of such acts and operations to
the Spirit and would thereby vitiate his argument.
b. The Son assumes human nature
A similar problem arises in considering the incarnation of the Son. As
the assumption of human nature is an outward act of God, Owen holds it
to be an act of Father, Son and Spirit. The wisdom, power, grace, and
goodness manifest in it are essential properties of the divine nature
and are therefore the action of each person equally participant in that
nature. "As unto authoritative designation, it was the act of the
Father. . .As unto the formation of the human nature it was the act of
the Spirit. . .As unto the term of the assumption, or the taking of our
nature unto himself, it was the peculiar act of the person of the
Son." 4 But the question of interest to us is, 'who actually assumed
human nature, the Trinity or the Son? Owen's answer is clear. "(F)or
the Father did not assume the human nature, he was not incarnate;
neither did the Holy Spirit do so; but this was the peculiar act and
work of the Son." 5 Yet can an external work of God be so divided?
How did Owen harmonise these apparently conflicting positions: on the
one hand a coiinitment to the indivisibility of the external divine
activity and on the other a theology which vigorously affirms the
distinct personal agency of the Spirit and the Son?
5. Resolution
A seemingly insignificant passage in his discussion on appropriation
provides a clue to his solution and gives an insight into the direction
of his theology. In this passage he outlines a second reason, other
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than their order of subsistence in the trinity, for assigning or
appropriating certain acts of God to particular persons.
(The works of God are eminently assi gned to one person) where
there is a peculiar condescension of any person unto a work,
wherein the others have no concurrence but b y approbation and
consent. Such was the susception of human nature by the Son, and
all that he did therein; and such was the condescension of the
Holy Ghost also unto his office, which entitles him peculiarly
and by way of eminence unto his own works.°
Owen is indebted to John of Damascus for this key phrase, 'a work
wherein the others have rio concurrence but by approbation and consent'.
But in that phrase the doctrine of 'opera ad extra sunt indivisa' is
significantly undermined. For it admits a real distinction in divine
activity, maintaining only the coninon approval of the persons. Let us
look more closely at John's use of it.
John had been considering the unity of the divine action. "Further the
true doctrine teacheth that the deity is simple and has one simple
energy", Yet he allowed an exception to this rule. "But quite
distinct is all that pertains to the divine and benignant incarnation
of the divine Word. For in that neither the Father nor the Spirit have
any part at all, unless so far as regards approval and the working of
inexplicable miracles which the God-Word, having become man like us,
worked, as unchangeable God and son of God." Was this an innovation
by John? Hardly, for he had no ambition to do more than gather
together and suninarise the best theology of the Greek Fathers. He was
here merely verbalising the accepted view that the Son was the distinct
subject of the incarnate life. In fact he even allowed that in certain
of Christ's divine acts Father and Spirit were also operative.
Nevertheless, he had drawn attention to an obvious exception to the
rule of the indivisibility of the external divine activity.
Owen capitalises on this exception, developing it to include not only
the Son's assumption of human nature and all that he did in it, but
also going an important step further by recognising a second divine
activity in which the rule could not be strictly applied, and that was
the condescension of the Spirit to his particular office.
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As a result Owen's theology is able to treat of the Son in his
incarnate work and the Spirit in the fulfilment of his office as the
distinct agents of their own activity. The contradictions suggested
above, in his exposition of the distinct personality of the Spirit in
his office and the Son's assumption of human nature, do not in fact
arise, for the doctrine of the indivisibility of God's external
activity has been qualified in these two instances, requiring only the
concurrence by approbation or consent of the other divine persons.
The above summary is a rather one-sided account of the resolution in
Owen's theology of the dual affirmation: each person is a distinct
principle of operation and yet all 'ad extra' actings of God are
undivided. The latter was qualified in the manner described, but this
resulted in a weakening of its strictures rather than an overthrow of
its content. In fact Owen continued to affirm the indivisibility of
the 'opera ad extra' as the background against which his discussion of
the distinct activity of the persons should be understood. Naturally
adverse to theological innovation, he cited John of Damascus to avoid
the charge of novelty and by introducing the qualification as an aspect
of the principle of 'appropriation', he somewhat disguised its
modifying function.
6. Consistent?
Yet how consistent was Owen in affirming the indivisibility of the
divine activity and nevertheless allowing that the Son and the Spirit
fulfilled their respective offices acting as distinct agents? The
whole question turns on the legitimacy of a distinction he made in the
external trinitarian activity.
• . .we must consider a twofold operation of God as three in one.
The first hereof is absolute in all divine works whatever; the
other respects the economy of the operations of God in our
salvation. In those of the first sort both the working and the
work do in comon and undividedly belong unto and proceed from
each person. Se
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However in "those operations which, with respect to our salvation, the
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit do graciously condescend unto", a
distinction is apparent in the activity of the persons. For instance
the incarnate Son, in his office as mediator, is not considered without
qualification as divine, but as subordinate to and dependent upon God.
His activity in that office is that of an agent distinct from the
Father. However in the Son's work, asarkos, he acts absolutely as God
and his work is in reality indivisible from that of the Father and
Spirit, even though it is ascribed as appropriate to the different
persons.
Now if it is legitimate to make a distinction between the Son
considered as a divine person absolutely, and as he has humbled himself
and condescended to the office of mediator, then Owen would appear to
be justified in applying the same principle to the Holy Spirit in his
condescension to his own particular role or office in the economy of
salvation.
In short the indivisibility of the external divine operations applies
to the trinitarian persons only as they are considered as divine
persons absolutely and not as they condescend to their particular
offices in the work of our salvation Owen's position here appears to
me to be quite consistent.
7. Strictures on the tradition
Through this analysis Owen overcame a real impasse in traditional
trinitarian thinking. James Mackey has drawn attention to nature of
the problem and I sumarise his argument. When the 'homoousios' was
applied to the Spirit, the Cappadocians argued for his equal divinity
by showing that his activity can also be attributed to the other
persons. This tendency increased till it yielded the principle
formulated by Gregory of Nyssa: 'the oneness of their nature must needs
be inferred from the identity of their operations'. Consequently it
was extremely difficult to secure the distinctions between the Three by
using the 'opera ad extra'. In fact, Mackey argues, the Cappadociaris
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were only able to consistently draw distinctions between the Three by
using the older subordinationist model for the Trinity which the
homoousite doctrine had been developed to replace.4°
We can illustrate the development of the doctrine of the indivisibility
of the activity of the divine persons by an examination of this idea in
some of the Fathers. It would appear that it was initiated by
Athanasius who believed that the divinity of the Spirit could be
demonstrated through his unity with the Word. "For not that the Spirit
is separate from the Word, but by being in the Word, he is in God
through him."4'
This conjunction of the work of the Spirit with the Son was further
developed by Basil of Caesarea who held that "in all things the Holy
Spirit is inseparable and wholly incapable of being parted from the
Father and the Son.' 42 Basil understood the Gospel account of the work
of the Spirit in the life of Christ as demonstrating the conjunction of
their activity. 4 The 'homoousion' had already been established for
the Son, and so by closely linking the Spirit's activity with that of
Christ, it was believed that his deity could be likewise secured.
In similar fashion Gregory Nazianzen sought to prove the Spirit's
divinity from his relation to the life of Christ.
But now the swarm of testimonies shall burst upon you from which
the Deity of the Holy Ghost shall be shown to all. . . .Look at the
facts:- Christ is born; the Spirit is His Forerunner. He is
baptized; the Spirit bears witness. He is tempted; the Spirit
leads Him up. He works miracles; the Spirit accompanies them.
He ascends; the Spirit takes His place.44
Yet in this exposition the action of the Spirit is only closely linked
to that of Christ, they are distinct agents doing the same sort of
work. The principle was still to be formulated which made their action
totally indistinguishable. Gregory of Nyssa lead Cappadocian thought
towards that critical next step.
Suppose we observe the operations of the Father, of the Son, of
the Holy Ghost, to be different from one another, we shall then
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conjecture, from the diversity of the operations, that the
operating natures are also different.46
Difference of operation meant difference of nature. If the Son and the
Spirit had the same divine nature their operations must be absolutely
indivisible. This concept became a part of Western orthodoxy primarily
through the work of Augustine, who further developed some of its
implications.
Central in Augustine's exposition of the Trinity is his affirmation
that, "the Father and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as they are
indivisible, so work indivisibly." 46 (It is interesting to notice that
the argument has been reversed and now moves from the nature of God's
being to the manner of his operation.) This theory, together with the
principle of 'appropriation', is carefully used by him to interpret,
what had become for him, some awkward passages in Scripture. One of
these was Mark ill in which a voice from heaven said, 'You are my
Son'. Was it the voice of the Father or the Trinity? His solution
indicates the direction of his trinitarian thinking. "Not that the
voice could be wrought without the work of the Son and of the Holy
Spirit (since the Trinity works indivisibly), but that such a voice was
wrought as to manifest the person of the Father only". 47 A unified
action nevertheless manifests a distinct person. This is parallel to
his understanding of the incarnation. ". . . just as the Trinity wrought
that human form from the Virgin Mary , yet it is the person of the Son
alone; for the invisible Trinity wrought the visible person of the Son
alone." 4 Augustine thus held the divine action that led to the
incarnation as indivisible. The trinitarian persons, then, never act
distinctly on the world of our experience.
Augustine was also unwilling to grant reality to the 'ad extra' acts of
the divine persons towards one another, as is illustrated in his
handling of the Scriptural affirmation that the Father sends the Son.
The sending of the Son, being a divine work, is an act of the Trinity
and therefore also an act of the Son. It is only by appropriation that
he ascribed it to the Father. "Since, then, that the Son should appear
in the flesh was wrought by both the Father and the Son, it is fitly
said that He wh appeared in that flesh was sent, and that He who did
not appear in it, sent Him." 4 Thus for Augustine and those within his
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trinitarian tradition any relation between the divine persons which has
respect to the economy of salvation is ruled out. Barth speaks for
that tradition.
Can we really think of the first and second persons of the triune
Godhead as two divine subjects and therefore as two legal
subjects who can have dealings and enter into obligations one
with another? This is mythology, for which there is no place in
a right understanding of the Trinity as the doctrine of the three
modes of being of the one God. . .
This is the logical outcome of the doctrine of the indivisibility of
the divine activity - the biblical witness to the reality of the
relations between the Father, Son and Spirit in the economy of
salvation can be relegated to the category of myth and therefore
ignored.
8. New possibilities
We suggest that this theory of the indivisibility of the divine
operations, having developed and become part of the orthodox tradition,
exercised a debilitating effect on theology in general and christology
in particular. Let us consider briefly how Owen's theology, no longer
wholly committed to it, differed in its directions and concerns.
His epistemology was clearly at odds with its presuppositions. His
belief in a mediated, rather than an intuitional or rational knowledge
of God, meant that the Triune nature of God ' s being could only be known
through his action among us. Scripture bears witness to the
experienced activity of God, and that is how in some measure we come to
know his ineffable being. The economy reveals the nature of God. Thus
Owen's epistemology followed the Cappadocians in maintaining that "we
know our God from his operations", t
 but in direct contrast to them, he
was aware that it is only by the distinction in this activity that we
know him to be triune, for his work is a witness not merely to his
unity but also to his diversity.
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Owen's soteriology flowed out of his understanding of the dynamic
inter-relationship between the divine persons in the economy. The
Father's sending of the Son and giving of the Spirit, the Son's love of
and obedience to the Father, the Spirit's glorification of the Son,
together form part of that vibrant framework of divine interaction by
which God's redemptive work is to be interpreted. A soteriology which
would limit the reality of the divine interrelationship to the hidden,
inner being of the Godhead, can only offer an impoverished exposition
of the atonement in terms of the undifferentiated action of God.
One of the strengths of Owen's theology is his vital pneumatology in
which he affirmed the distinct personality and work of the Holy Spirit.
In contrast, an emphasis of the indivisibility of all external divine
activity results in a loss of the distinctiveness of the Spirit's work,
often understanding it as mere1y the immanent activity of a
transcendent God or the immediate presence of a departed Christ. The
persistent movement is towards a binitarian, if not monistic,
conception of God.
This theory has also played its part in producing what we might
describe as a 'one-sided' christology. If' it is conceded that an
adequate understanding of Christ must conceive of him as both the giver
and the receiver of the Spirit; as God among us and as the prototype
man of faith totally dependent on God, then Christ will need to be
interpreted in both incarnational and inspirational categories, that
is, in relation to the Son and to the Spirit respectively. If,
however, the action of the Son and the Spirit are considered to be
indivisible, the distinction between these two conceptions is lost and
there is a tendency for one to dominate at the expense of the other.
This inability to so distinguish between the activity of the Son and
the Spirit helps to explain the failure within the Church to
consistently maintain both of these aspects of the reality of Christ.
We have seen that the patristic age by and large witnessed the
dominance of an incarnational christology and a neglect of the biblical
conception of Christ as the one anointed by the Spirit and dependent
upon him for grace in his own life and in his service for God.
However, when Jesus' empowering by the Spirit was appreciated, as among
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the Antiochenes, then the relation of the Word to Christ's humanity
also tended to be understood in inspirational categories, such as
indwelling, and the unity of his person, or doctrine of the
incarnation, was endangered.
The strength of Owen's trinitarian theology is that, while affirming
the essential unity of God, it recognised a real distinction in the
action of the divine persons not only internally and reciprocally in
the inner being of the Godhead as orthodoxy allowed, but also outwardly
as they condescend to their particular roles in the economy of
salvation. This trinitarian interpretation of divine agency unshackles
a number of areas of theology from a theory which, it would seem, owes
more to rational speculation than biblical affirmation for its
development.
In particular, we have seen that it allowed Owen to distinguish between
the Son's action in assuming human nature into personal subsistence
with himself and the Spirit's work in forming, sanctifying and
energising that nature. But it was precisely this distinction which
enabled his christology to coherently affirm that Jesus Christ is both
the incarnate Son of God and also a man of like nature with ourselves,
inspired by the Holy Spirit.
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1. The problem of christology
How are we to understand the person of Christ? Why did he rise a great
while before dawn to pray? Did he live as we do, a creature before
God, totally dependent on the Father for his physical and spiritual
well-being? Were his sufferings and his temptations of the same nature
as our own? Was he in continual need of divine grace, comfort and
empowering through the Holy Spirit? Is his life, his own growth in
knowledge and grace, a pattern for each of us to follow if we would
live to God?
A positive response to these encourages us to raise some rather
different questions. Did the whole event of his life and death have
ultimate significance for mankind's relation to God? Is he the one
through whom creation itself will finally be redeemed and restored? Is
there a sense in which he is the very source of life, the one who
himself gives the Spirit to the Church. Is the Holy Spirit also his
spirit, that is, the Spirit of Christ. In the light of our knowledge
of him do we need to readjust our whole understanding of the very being
of God? Is Christ in his own person the worthy recipient of our
unconditional trust and worship?
This path of enquiry leads us to the heart of what I understand to be
the christological problem - the attempt of the Church to give a
coherent and meaningful account of Christ's person in the light of its
affirmative response to both these sets of questions. The actual
content of that response is perhaps best sunxnarised in the formula used
by Irenaeus.
.while He received testimony from all that He was very man, and
that He was very God. . .'
This is the dual affirmation with which the Christian comunity has
generally tried to come to terms in its christological reflection,
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believing that any adequate explanation of the person of Christ must
incorporate both concepts if it is to be true to the Gospel witness and
if it is to be the basis of an adequate soteriology. Whether it will
ever be able to do this wholly successfully is, I think, rather
unlikely . Nevertheless even when painfully aware of its failure to
bring to coherent expression the reality of him who is the object of
its faith, the Church has continuall y felt impelled to move beyond
the vere deus, vere homo in its confession and explanation of Christ.
The motivation behind this has been not only the desire to make sense
of the faith, but also the determination to defend it against
distortion.
What patterns emerge in the various christological formulations that
have arisen in this ongoing process? It is interesting that a number
of theologians do offer a somewhat similar analysis of how they might
be classified. Among them I find particularly helpful the pattern
discerned by Norman Pitteriger:
One group of Christians has tended to say that this person is God
living and acting humanly. Another has tended to say that this
person is the Man in whom God lives and acts.2
We have, however, used slightly different criteria to characterise the
two forms of christology into which the various ways of thinking about
Christ appear most naturally to fall. This we have done with the
concepts of inspiration and incarnation. In the former Jesus Christ is
interpreted as a man who is fully empowered by the Holy Spirit in his
redemptive ministry and in his unique relation of dependence on God.
In the latter he is understood in the light of the act of the eternal
Son of God who in humility assumed human nature into personal union
with himself and lived among us in the form of a servant.
Now these two christological types correspond roughly to the different
aspects of Christ's person suggested by the two sets of questions we
raised at the beginning of this chapter. At first glance they appear
to be mutually exclusive. Can they, however, be coherently held
together? In short, we are asking whether it is possible for
christology to give a consistent account of Christ as the one who
prayed to the Father and received comfort and strength through the Holy
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Spirit, growing in knowledge and grace and yet also to recognise him as
the incarnation of the eternal Son of God.
It has been the aim of this thesis to examine whether the christology
of John Owen does in fact coherently incorporate both these
perspectives.
What then were the salient features in Owen's exposition of Christ's
person? The underlying framework of his whole interpretation is that
of the incarnation of the Son of God. By this he did not mean the
transformation of the eternal Son or Word into humanity, but rather the
assumption by the Son of human nature into personal union with himself.
With this careful use of words Owen safeguarded the integrity of the
divine nature, God in his being remains God. Nevertheless the person
of the Son does not merely enter into a relation with a human being,
rather in taking to himself all the properties of human nature it is
proper to affirm that he, that is the person of the incarnate Son, is a
true man.
Although the resulting union is a consequence of the Son's volition, in
that he freely chose to take the form of a servant, it is nevertheless
a natural rather than voluntary union. The 'oneness' is a matter of
essence or ontology rather of will or action. It is a hypostatic
union because the person of Christ is one individuated or distinct
entity, that is, one hypostasis or person.
So far Owen has adhered fairly closely to the type of christology
developed by Cyril of Alexandria. He differed, however, in the way he
was to maintain the integrity of both Christ's humanity and his
divinity. If his person is not to be considered as a mixed or hybrid
being, part God and part man, then both his human and divine natures,
although inseparable, need to be recognised as in some sense
distinguishable, each operating in accordance with its own
characteristic properties. The coimiunicatio idiomatum is used merely
as a linguistic tool to explain why one nature is sometimes referred to
as the subject of the properties of the other, but it does not imply
any actual transference of properties between the natures.
What then is the functional relation between the human and divine
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natures of Christ? Ontologically they are substantially united in one
hypostasis or person, yet if they form two distinguishable principles
of operation, how are we to understand their interaction? In short how
does the divine Word lead, guide or determine his own humanity without
undermining its integrity and turning it into a mere, passive
instrument of the divine subject?
Owen's deceptively simple answer was that it was by means of the Holy
Spirit. The significance of this idea both for christology in
particular and for theology in general cannot be easily overestimated.
It allowed him to conceive of the man Christ Jesus as one upon whom the
Spirit was operative in every aspect of his life. The Holy Spirit
formed his body; enabled him to advance in wisdom and grace; comforted
him in trial; equipped him for his prophetic ministry; empowered him
to perform wondrous deeds; sanctified his life; raised and glorified
his body. In close harmony with the Gospel record Owen could affirm
all the elements of what we have described as an inspirational
christology, yet he was able to do so within the framework of an
Alexandrian interpretation of Christ as the incarnation of the divine
Word.
If the step which Owen took so as to be able to affirm both an
incarnational and an inspirational christology is comparatively
straightforward, the question of whether he was justified in so doing
is far from clear. A number of general difficulties arising from his
exposition spring ininediately to mind. First, there is the question as
to whether a christology which affirms the distinct operation of
Christ's two natures is able to maintain successfully the unity of his
person as the one subject of his incarnate life.
Developing a conception coninon among the Latin Fathers, Owen's strategy
was to indentify the person or agency of the incarnate life with Christ
in his office as Mediator, that is as the God-man. To do this he made
a distinction between the person of the Son considered as incarnate,
and considered absolutely, that is, as the second person of the
Trinity. Such a distinction appears necessary if we are, in our
explication of Christ, to be true to the Gospel account of his
dependent and therefore subordinate relation to the Father as incarnate
and yet also to maintain the ontological equivalence of status he has
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with respect to the Father in his divine being. Owen often described
the incarnation as the event whereby the person of the Son, remaining
what he was, became what he was not. In that there is no
transformation of the divine nature, the Son remains what he is. But
in assuming human nature to himself the person, as incarnate, becomes
what he was not, that is one who is both God and man.
Conceiving of the person of Christ in this way does not imply that he
is some form of tertium quid or divine-human amalgam, for his person is
known always in two distinguishable natures. As to agency, Owen
considered the person to be the original principle or agent of all that
is done in the incarnate life; the natures are the two ininediate
principles by which and from which the agent works; the actions are the
effectual operations of either nature; the apotelesma or effect of his
actions with respect to God and men relates to the person, the Lord
Christ, he who is both God and man.
Owen's analysis here does present a problem with respect to the use of
the word person. We now normally understand personal agency in the
light of a psychological model of a human person. But this model is
clearly inadequate to express the agency of one who is God-man acting
through his two natures, even though it might have value in clarifying
what it means for that person to be and act as a human. The confusion
arises because of the ambiguous use of the word person, a fact that
needs continually to be born in mind while reading Owen.
A second difficulty which modern theology, in particular, has with
Owen's christology is the use it makes of ontological categories in its
interpretation of Christ. It is often held that nature language or the
language of being is far too static to model the dynamic reality of
Christ. Put in this form this was not a question which Owen was called
to face directly. Nevertheless in his defence of the deity of Christ
in the debate with the Socinians the central issue concerned the nature
of the Son's relation to the Father, a debate which I believe does have
a direct bearing on the place of ontology in christology. The Socinian
argument, in short, was that the relation must be understood in terms
of Christ's mission or ministry, that is in functional categories only.
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Owen, however, argued that the unique relation of the Son to the Father
and the high status ascribed to him in the New Testament writings could
not be adequately accounted for in terms of his mission alone.
Treading a path similar to that taken by Athanasius in his debate with
the Arians, who considered the relationship as being founded on God's
will alone, Owen upheld the argument that the Son was of the Father's
essence, as suggested by the model of natural generation. The life
that is in God does not differ from his being and thus in coninunicating
his life to the Son there is an effective coninunication to him of the
divine essence. "For as the Father has life in himself, so he has
granted the Son to have life in himself." (John v.26) God's essence is
interpreted both dynamically and vitally, sharing in that essence means
that Christ himself becomes the active giver of life.
Owen also sought to undermine the position of his opponents by showing
that the efficacy of Christ's ministry is in fact dependent on the
nature of his person or being . He draws heavily from the argument of
the book of Hebrews whose principal aim is to establish the superiority
of Christ's person to the angels, to Moses and to the Levitical
priesthood, along with his close alliance to mankind, as the basis for
proving the greater efficacy of his priestly sacrifice to that of the
Mosaic order. The person, therefore, cannot be interpreted wholly in
terms of ministry or function, for the efficacy of that ministry is
itself dependent on the nature of the person. There were, for example,
others before Christ such as Moses who...
.had as much power, and as great a presence of God with him, as
any mere man could be made partaker of; yet was he not in his
ministry the saviour of the church - nor could he be so any
otherwise than typically and temporally.'
Christ could effectively redeem the Church for, unlike Moses, he was in
his person a son and not merely a servant, a sonship that consequently
needs to be interpreted in ontological and not merely functional
categories.
The third difficulty raised with respect to Owen's christology relates
specifically to his central thesis - that other than in assuming it
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into substantial union with himself, the divine Son acts on his own
human nature only indirectly and by means of the Spirit. Can such an
argument be justified theologically? Owen defends it by demonstrating
that the Gospels refer to the action of the Holy Spirit all aspects of
divine empowering in Christ's human life and experience. He makes no
attempt, however, to answer the opposing position, that is, that the
divine Son does directly determine or operate on his own human nature.
In defence of Owen's thesis, however, we have considered some of the
weaknesses that arise from this alternative position, that is, that the
divine Son does act directly upon his own human nature. It is
dependent on the idea that there is one immediate determining principle
in the incarnate Christ and that that is the divine Son or Logos. Such
a theory, we have argued, tends naturally to either Apollinarianism,
the implicit denial of an active soul or ego in the humanity of Christ,
or kenoticism, the transformation or limitation of the divine nature
so that the humanity is not overwhelmed by its operation.
In either case the integrity of Christ's active humanity appears to be
threatened. The whole issue is thus transposed into a question
concerning the reality of Christ's human experience. Did he stand as
we do, a man before God, dependent on the divine Spirit for all
aspects of his physical and spiritual being? Owen's soteriology, which
recognises Christ's life to be a prototype of that of the Christian,
requires that his experience of God be considered as wholly continuous
with our own. But the passion of Christ must also be interpreted in
terms of his active humanity. The awful sense of spiritual desertion
and separation from God known by him at Gethasemane and Golgatha cannot
be glossed over and treated docetically. Full weight must rather be
given to the fact that the cry of dereliction was that of man in deep
spiritual darkness sensing that he had been abandoned by his God.
The theory that the divine Son acts directly on the human nature and is
therefore the immediate subject of all Christ's human actions, simply
does not accord with the Gospel witness to the reality of Christ's
human experience. Far better, it seems to me, is to consider the
subject of the passion to be the person of the Mediator, the one who is
both God and man, and who experienced all the darkness of spiritual
dereliction in and through his human nature, a nature that always
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operated according to its own characteristic principles. But if this
is correct, it would appear that Owen was justified in his thesis that
other than in the personal assumption of human nature, the divine Son
operated upon it only indirectly and by means of the Spirit.
Fourthly, we consider the difficulty that Owen's christology raised for
his interpretation of trinitarian agency. In keeping with the orthodox
tradition he held that all the external acts of the persons of the
Trinity were indivisible. Yet by regarding the trinitarian persons as
distinct principles of operation, and in particular by distinguishing
so clearly between the action of the Son and of the Spirit with respect
to the human nature of Jesus, he appears to undermine this doctrine.
Some of the apparent inconsistency is resolved, however, by his
unobtrusive introduction of a theory which effectively modifies the
opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa.
(The works of God are eminently assigned to one person) where
there is a peculiar condescension of any person unto a work,
wherein the others have no concurrence but by approbation and
consent. Such was the susception of human nature by the Son, and
all that he did therein; and such was the condescension of the
Holy Ghost also unto his office, which entitles him peculiarly
and by way of eminence unto his own works.4
In practice this meant that Owen's theology was able to treat of the
Son in his incarnate work, and the Spirit in the fulfilment of his
office, as the distinct agents of their own activity. The theory is
dependent on the distinction he made between the Son considered as a
divine person absolutely and as he has humbled himself and condescended
to the office of mediator, and the application of the same principle to
the Holy Spirit in his condescension to his own particular role or
office in the economy of salvation. It is only in the fulfilment of
these roles that they may be considered as distinct agents.
The resolution of the problem of trinitarian agency is not explicit in
Owen's writing, and he is hesitant to challenge openly the traditional
formula, nevertheless the whole direction of his theology, and in
particular his interpretation of the person of Christ, requires a
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modification of the opera trinitatis ad extra sunt mdi visa in the
manner outlined above.
It is apparent, then, that Owen did affirm an inspirational
christology in the context of a doctrine of the incarnation. We have
argued that he was able to integrate these two apparently disparate
concepts through his quite original interpretation of the work of the
Spirit as the basis of the interaction between the divine and human
natures in the person of Christ. We summarised his theory in the
following form.
The Holy Spirit renewed the image of God in the human nature
which the eternal Son had assumed into personal union with
himself.
In defending the coherence of Owen's christology in the face of the
four areas of difficulty outlined above, we are not claiming that he
was wholly consistent, nor that the problem of Christology has finally
been solved. Firstly, the ambiguous way he used the word person and
his ambivalent approach to the opera trinitatis are but two important
areas of his work that need further development. Secondly, Christ as
the object of our christological reflection must surely always remain a
mystery who continues to defy adequate theological expression.
Nevertheless, I believe the christology of John Owen does coherently
integrate these two distinctive ways of understanding the person of
Christ in a manner which is helpful for reflective Christian faith and
significant for the christological discussion both past and present.
2. Owen and the coherence of Chalcedon
The Council of Chalcedon was summoned by imperial coninand during a
period of vigorous christological conflict in the Church. The
intention was to establish peace by drawing up a 'definition of faith'
which all Christians in the empire would be called upon to accept. The
theological task which faced the assembled bishops was to somehow
mediate between two quite different types of christology, generally
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known to us as Alexandrian and Antiochene.
It is not always appreciated just how distinctive these two forms of
christology are. For instance, the central thesis of R.V.Sellers' book
Two Ancient Christologies is "that there is no fundamental
difference between the Christological teaching of the Alexandrines and
that of the Antiochenes". 5 He therefore regards the conflict as tragic
and unnecessary and due in great measure to the antagonistic spirit
existing between the opposing parties.
It seems to me, however, that Sellers has failed to discern how each of
these christological types was a well thought-through, internally
coherent system which appeared to exclude the alternative account. To
illustrate this we refer to Sellers' own discussion. He gives a
helpful summary of the principal weakness of Alexandrian christology.
Thus the principle that the manhood (of Christ) was allowed to go
through its own laws is, in effect, surrendered: instead, we have
a moral and intellectual growth which is only in appearance.. . in
his desire to preserve the reality of the redemption, Cyril
sacrifices the reality of the manhood: Christ may be the
Representative Man, holding all men to Himself, but the
redemption is not brought about by a Redeemer who is suffered to
endure any real inward conflict.
Sellers goes on to ask a vital question for soteriology. "How, then
can Christ be in all points tempted like as we are if, as soon as
temptation arises, the Logos steps in and uses His power to quash the
human impulse?" 1 It is, however, in his final evaluation of such a
christology that we are forced to disagree with him.
Yet one can exaggerate the extent of this weakness which Cyril
shares with all the Alexandrine teachers, and it is well that we
should see it as a flaw, though by no means a major flaw, in a
doctrinal structure for which, in its entirety, we can, surely,
have nothing but praise.
How pervasive the influence of docetism must continue to be if a
twentieth century theologian can consider as only slightly flawed a
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christology which denies that Christ was tempted as we are? The
Antiochenes not only recognised this practical denial of the active
manhood of Christ as a gross distortion of the Gospel account of Jesus'
whole life, but saw it as undermining their main soteriological
interests, which were conceived in ethical terms around a doctrine of
Jesus as the second Adam, perfectly obedient to the divine will and as
the first fruits of a renewed humanity.
The point, often overlooked, is that the christology of the
Alexandrians inevitably led to this effective denial of the active
humanity of Christ. It was not their historic bitterness towards the
Antiochenes, but the inner logic of their own system which seemed to
require it. Cyril and Severus were very able theologians, and their
interpretation of the hypostatic union as one which implied the direct
determination by the divine Son of his human nature meant that they
could not concede that Christ actually grew in knowledge and grace or
was genuinely tempted.
In a recent and fairly sympathetic study on Severus, lain Torrance
reminds us that in the Alexandrine tradition the subject of the
incarnate life is always considered as the divine Word. "There is an
emphasis that God the Word is the sole subject throughout, but that
somehow two concrete things (pragmatata) have come and remain
together." For Severus this meant that if Christ on occasion acted in
a human way it was because the Word specifically permitted it, to
demonstrate the reality of his humanity.
He (Severus) quotes Cyril against Theodore, saying that the Word
incarnate "feared by dispensation, inasmuch as he sometimes
allowed his flesh by dispensation to suffer the things which
belonged to it, he did not preserve its propriety undiminished:
for it is seen in many cases not to have suffered the things
which clearly belong to its nature, for it was united to the
Word, the Maker of nature".'°
The Alexandrians, although affirming the presence of a real manhood,
always struggled to account for the humanity of Christ's actions. It
is only by special dispensation that his human nature ever acts in a
human way. In the normal course of events his manhood does not suffer
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those things which belong to its nature for it has been united to the
Word.
Small wonder then that the Antiochenes so vigorously opposed such a
christology. For them salvation depended on the manhood of Christ
having itself overcome sin. Theodore of Mopsuestia argues:
If [the Man assumed] did not receive a soul, and if it was the
Godhead that conquered sin, then what was effected can be of no
possible advantage to us. The Lord's struggle would have been no
more than gratification of the love of display.11
Consequently, they affirmed a real and active humanity of Christ. How
then do they explain the unity of Christ's person? It is in their
understanding not a union of being or nature, but rather one of will or
purpose. So Nestorius maintains:
• . the union of God the Word with these (his body and soul) is
neither hypostatic nor natural, but voluntary, as consisting in
the property of will and not of nature.'2
The union is conceived as forming one prosopon which suggests one
appearance to an external world rather than the existence of one
distinct individual subsistence. Nestorius argues for a unity of
action rather than being. ". . .in actions He made Himself a likeness to
will that which He [the Logos] wills, that there might be one and the
same will in both of them and one prosopon without division." 9 It is
apparent that the Antiochenes gave to prosopon a meaning quite distint
from that of hypostasis.
The doctrine of the one prosopon is not, therefore, to be taken
as an equivalent for the later dogma of 'hypostatic union'. For
Theodore, the one prosopon is indeed a persona coinmunis: the
outward unity of presentation which is the result of the Word's
dwelling of the Man.'4
The opponents of the Antiochenes were right in seeing that this use of
prosopon provided an inadequate conceptual basis for safeguarding the
integrity of Christ as one distinct entity. Harmony of will or action
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between the Man and the Logos; the indwelling of the Logos in the Man
as in a temple; unity of affections and a sharing of honour and dignity
all fail to secure what the Alexandrians required, that is, the
ontological unity of Christ's person. But this is precisely what the
Antiochenes could not offer, for they had no way of conceiving how it
might be affirmed without endangering the reality of Christ's human
experience.
Therefore, in contrast to Sellers, we argue that Alexandrian and
Antiochene christologies formed two internally coherent, distinct and
inadequate, theological systems, between which a coherent integrating
bridge had yet to be conceived.
How then are we to characterise the Definition of Chalcedon? Drawing
on both traditions it presented in confessional form the elements
necessary for an adequate christology, which included the substantial
unity of Christ's person and the full and active reality of both his
manhood and his Godhead. It is therefore a misunderstanding, I
believe, to interpret it as providing the parameters within which a
number of orthodox christologies are possible. 15
 On the contrary,
there was no christology to hand which was able to incorporate
coherently these central elements. Therein iay the Definition's
essential instability and the theological reason why the controversy
continued unabated in the centuries beyond Chalcedon with such tragic
consequences for the unity of the Church.
What has Owen to do with all this? The reader will be aware from the
way the discussion has been structured that it is our contention that
Alexandrjan and Antiochene christologies broadly correspond to the
ways of thinking about Christ which we have earlier described in our
exposition of Owen as incarnational and inspirational.
We have already seen that Owen was closely dependent on Cyril's
christology in his exposition of the doctrine of the incarnation. But
in what sense can Antiochene christology be conceived as inspirational
in the way we have used that term with respect to Owen? In the
introductory chapter we detailed how the recognition by Theodore of
Mopsuestia of the humanity of Jesus in his fears and prayers led
naturally to his acknowledgement of Jesus' need for the Spirit in his
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daily life.
It was this man.. .and not the Divine Word, that needed the Spirit
to justify him, to enable him to overcome Satan arid work
miracles, to teach him what he should do; and for all these
purposes he received the indwelling of the Spirit at his
baptism. 10
This emphasis on the Spirit's action in all aspects of the life of
Jesus the Man, including the energising power to act against foul
spirits and perform miracles, was strongly opposed by the Alexandrians
and anathematized by Cyril in his third letter to Nestorius.
Theodoret, however, vigorously defended it," illustrated how firmly
the Antiochenes were committed to maintaining the full humanity of
Jesus' actions and his continual need for the empowering action of the
Holy Spirit in all that he did. It is true that they went on to stress
a union of the Logos with the Man, but even this tended to take an
inspirational form, which is apparent from the difficulty Antiochene
christology always has in establishing a sufficient ground for any
distinction made between the relation of the Son and that of Spirit to
the Man Jesus.
Now it has been the argument of this thesis that John Owen not only
affirmed, but by and large successfully integrated an inspirational and
incarnational christology. If this is substantially correct and if we
are right in interpreting Alexandrian and Antiochene christology in
terms of incarnation and inspiration, then Owen's christology not only
incorporated the essential elements of these classical streams of
christolgical thought, but provided a coherent means of bringing them
into some form of conceptual unity.
To do this he was indebted to the third stream that played a part in
the confluence of christological ideas at Chalcedon, that is, the Latin
tradition with its soteriological awareness that Christ be recognised
as the Mediator, the God-man, who in his full manhood and divinity is
effectively able to reconcile man to God. But more significantly, it
was his pneumatology, his understanding of the Spirit's work as the
dynamic unifying principle of Christ's personal activity, which enabled
him to integrate successfully an Alexandrian and Ant iochene
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christology.
Consequently, the Definition of Chalcedori, sometimes regarded as an
irrational but necessary compromise between these two systems of
thought, indirecty finds in the christology of John Owen its own
coherent exposition, so important to it if it is again to be recognised
as a "signpost against all heresies".'°
Negatively, however, Owen's christology provides a critique of
Chalcedon, highlighting its failure to posit the means of its own
integration, that is, by a doctrine of the Spirit's work with respect
to the person of Christ.
3. Coherence axid modern christology
Has modern theology been able to bring together these two different
ways of understanding Christ and so present a coherent explication of
his person?
In his book God was in Christ D.M.Baillie gave a helpful analysis of
the christological debate in the earlier part of this century. The
discussion centred on the religious significance of 'the Jesus of
History', by which Baillie meant "Jesus as he really was in his life on
earth, which includes of course what he did and said, what He intended
and what He taught". 2 ° Although general agreement had been reached in
the theological world concerning the reality of the Lord's humanity,
opinion diverged on the extent of our knowledge of his historical life
and of the value of such knowledge for Christian faith.
It is helpful to consider the background to this debate. The rise of
modern historical science during the previous century bad led to a more
'critical' approach to the New Testament and "a new consciousness that
it might be possible to get behind creed and tradition and gospel, to
penetrate the mists of ecclesiastical dogma, and to find the simple
historical truth about Jesus of Nazareth." 31 Amid all the perplexities
and uncertainties of faith, here, in the historical Jesus, there
appeared to be something plain and unambiguous. This, it was held, is
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where faith needed to begin and only then to be led on to dogmas about
Christ, for if "the original disciples came to regard Jesus as Messiah
and Lord and Son of God, it imist have been primarily because His human
life and personality had made such an impression on them".12
Yet a two-fold reaction had set in against this straight-forward and
persuasive way of approaching christology. Firstly, a new radicalism
bad emerged in the historical study of the Gospels, associated with the
phrase 'form criticism', and based on the principle that the Gospels
throw more light on the early Christian preaching and teaching than on
what Jesus actual said and did. Serious doubt was therefore raised as
to whether it was possible to get any significant 'hard' evidence of
Jesus as he actually lived and thought, that is, apart from the
theological interpretation in which the Church presented him.
Secondly, there had been a dogmatic or theological reaction to the
christology which was based on 'the historical Jesus', arid this had
been most powerfully presented by theologians associated with a school
of thought often known as 'the Dialectic Theology' or 'Theology of the
Word'. Fmil Brunner was a representative of their ideas.
Christian faith does not arise out of the picture of the
historical Jesus, but out of the testimony to Christ... .Faith
presupposes, as a matter of course, a priori, that the Jesus of
history is not the same as the Christ of faith.31
It is not merely that historical criticism is unable be reconstruct a
reliable account of Jesus as he really was, but that the whole
enterprise was believed to be misguided, for the concern of faith is
with the biblical Christ rather than with the life of Jesus. Thus Karl
Barth argued:
There is no reason why historico-critical Biblical research
should not contribute to the investigation and exposition of this
historical Christ of the New Testament, instead of. . .chasing the
ghost of an historical Jesus in the vacuum behind the New
Testament.
This new school of thought tended, therefore, to be far more radical in
205
its historical approach than the earlier liberalism. Barth interpreted
Jesus' human life not as a revelation but as a concealment of GOd2
Far "from having any superhuman kind or source of knowledge in the
days of His flesh, Jesus did not, as He faced His passion, even succeed
in seeing 'a frontier, a meaning, a future, in what He had to
suffer". 2 Thus the Gospel story of the life and character and
teaching of Jesus is not of itself considered to be a revelation of
God, other than in the Resurrection, the forty days before the
Ascension and the occasional anticipation of this glory in the
miracles. 27
In this light the debate concerning the significance of Jesus'
historical life is seen to be not so much a question of historical
method or of the reliability of the Gospel acounts, but rather a matter
of christology. The gulf existing between 'the Jesus of history'
movement and the 'Theology of the Word' owed its being to a different
understanding of God's revelation of himself and of the nature of
salvation, and consequently to a different perception of the relation
of the divine and human in the person of Jesus Christ.
Baillie, although sensitive to the many weaknesses of 'the Jesus of
history' movement, believed that the attempt to construct historically
the figure of Jesus was of the greatest importance for Christian faith.
If there is no revelation, no 'unveiling', of God in the human
personality and career of Jesus, but only a 'veiling'; if God in
Christ is as much as ever a deus absconditus, not a deus
revela tus; what are we the better of the coming of God in Christ?
Where is the light that saves us, the knowledge that sets us
free?2 s
The concepts of soteriology are interdependent with those of
christology. Baillie therefore recognised that his best defence for
the significance of the human history of Jesus was a careful
explication of the person of Christ. Although he often refered in his
exposition to the concept of paradox, his christology is not
particularly distinctive and fits comfortably into one of the two
standard ways of understanding Christ's person.
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The relation of the divine to the human in Christ is held to be of the
same type but in complete and perfect form as the divine indwelling in
the believer. If the paradox of grace in which our actions can be
attributed both to ourselves and to God "is a reality in our poor
imperfect lives at all, so far as there is any good in them, does not
the same or a similar paradox, taken at the perfect and absolute pitch,
appear as the mystery of the Incarnation?"20
Baillie has developed what we would describe as an inspirational
christology, characteristic of the adherents of the 'Jesus of history'
movement. Jesus is a perfectly receptive man into whose life God
breaks in with full revelation. Paradoxically his actions are both
divine and human. Baillie's cofilnitment to orthodoxy leads him to
incorporate into his christology the concepts of both a glorified and a
pre-existent Christ, but they fit rather awkwardly into his scheme. He
might well have been more consistent if, like Schleiermacher, he simply
discarded the concept of the eternal Son, for it does riot appear to be
essential to the structure of his christology.
The strength of his exposition lies in his recognition that Christ can
be "regarded as in some sense the prototype of the Christian
life. . .refusing to claim anything for Himself independently and
ascribing all the goodness to God". 3 ° Such a view ascribes a high
salue to the details of the history of Jesus. How he lived in the
world and before God, the social, ethical, political and religious
dimensions of his personal history together form the model and goal of
the Christian life for the believing coninunity. They are in his person
a revelation of the very nature of God and without them Christian faith
lacks substantiation. This christological perspective allows Jesus'
history to be considered not only as a paradigm for the Church's life
of faith, but also as providing the decisive and necessary critique of
her continual failure to reflect in practice the truth of the Gospel.
Karl Barth, on the other hand, had no concern in the defence of the
historical details of the life of Jesus, his deeds and his sayings, for
his own christological perspective did not recognise them as having
final significance, thereby indicating how sharply he differed from the
inspirational scheme to which 'the Jesus of history' school adhered.
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Although it is notoriously difficult to classify neatly a work as rich
and diverse as his, I do believe the thesis of Charles Waidrop's book
Karl Barth's Christology: its basic Alexandrian character is
essentially correct.
For Barth, Jesus Christ is essentially divine. As the act of God
and also as the divine subject who acts in eternity and in time,
he is directly identical with God himself. In the incarnation
he becomes the bearer of human nature, which has no independent
existence and is not a person in itself. He is not merely a
human person who is related to God in a special way, but the all-
embracing divine reality in which all men have their being.3'
Although Barth affirms the reality of Christ's humanity he consistently
regards the agency or the subject of the incarnate Christ in his
mediatorial role as a divine being.
In a way different from Israel's prophets He is not there to
receive and transmit the Word of the Lord, but he speaks Himself,
in fact He is the Word. He accomplishes a plenipotentiary
representation of God in which God Himself is the witness for man
before Himself and the witness in man for Himself. He is not an
instrument of divine action. He acts himself divinely and
therefore as a true Mediator.32
But it is precisely here, 1 believe, that his christology is defective.
If Jesus Christ's work of revelation and reconciliatn is always seen
as a divine act, albeit in a human form, then that particular human
form with its own distinct history are not of final theological
significance. Only a soteriology which is able to recognise that it
is also as man, that is by human action, that the Mediator is required
to reconcile men to God and that the human life of Christ is of itself
a revelation of God, will take seriously the details of Jesus' human
history.
The time has come to bring this discussion together. We have
highlighted one important area of modern christological debate, that
is, the discussion over the significance for Christian faith of the
208
history of Jesus of Nazareth to which the Gospels bear witness. We saw
that the conflict between the two schools of thought was ultimately one
of christology and concerned the relation of the divine and the human
in the person of Jesus. It was, in short, a conflict between an
inspirational and an incarnational way of understanding Christ's
person, both of which, we have argued, are inadequate expressions of
his whole reality.
Modern theology thus continues to be faced with essentially the same
problem of christology which has confronted the Church since the
Patristic Age. How are we to coherently hold together these two ways
of understanding the person of Christ, each of which is necessary and
yet of itself inadequate as a full expression of his reality?
A common temptation is to treat the problem as an unreal one. Thus it
is often argued that a difficulty in understanding Christ's person only
arises because the matter is treated within the framework of an alien
Greek metaphysic; or that religion is being conceived in physical
rather than ethical categories; or that static, ontological concepts
have been allowed to replace the functional language with which the New
Testament describes Christ; or that narrative is the only appropriate
linguistic form for theological statement. The list goes on. The
different prescriptions have in common the conviction that a change in
method or underlying metaphysic will soon show that the problem of
christology is unreal and will disappear if approached from the right
perspective.
Yet surprisingly, in only slightly altered guises, incarnational and
inspirational christologies continue to arise in different ages and
within different philosophical world-views, whenever the Church finds
itself reflecting seriously on the person of Christ. The problem is
real and will not be superficially dismissed. The coherence or
rationality of christology depends on somehow or other being able to
bring together in a consistent manner these two distinct ways of
understanding his person.
The argument of this thesis is that Owen did so through his
interpretation of the Spirit's work in the humanity of Christ.
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To the question raised at the beginning of this section as to whether
modern christology has effectively been able to integrate an
incarnational and inspirational christology we would have to answer,
no, at least not as it was represented in the discussion over the
significance of 'the Jesus of history'. Between the christological
types of Barth and Baillie there was no successful link or bridge.
Baillie's concept of Jesus Christ as the man perfectly open to the
divine indwelling and will of God fails to allow for the transcendent
otherness of Christ's person as God himself among us in human form
reconciling us to the Father. Conversely Barth's understanding of the
Word of God as the intnediate or direct subject of divine revelation and
reconciliation undermines the significance of the particular humanity
assumed in the incarnation.
We saw earlier how Owen's christology could be conceived as a coherent
integration of Alexandrian and Antiochene christology. Can we use his
ideas in the same way to bring together the perspectives of Barth and
Baillie? Unfortunately I think not.
'The Jesus of history' movement reflects a sensitive understanding of
Christ as man in his relation to God, with which Owen would have been
in deep sympathy. Yet it seems to be locked into a methodology which
bars it from attaining the complementary perspective, that is, the
conception of Christ as God himself among us in human form. While it
is true that our knowledge of God properly begins with the person of
Jesus as he was made known among us, christology, Owen would argue,
must be shaped in the context of God's saving purpose to reconcile to
himself men and women in a way which fully expresses the glory of all
the properties of his divine being. Only a doctrine of the
incarnation, that is, the recognition that God, in the person of the
Son, has humbled himself and taken to himself true humanity can
adequately account for the requirements of this soteriology. However,
the determinative role that questions of epistemology are still allowed
to play in the way the person of Christ is unfolded is a major barrier
to the reemergence of such an incarnational christology among those whc
affirm the value of the history of Jesus.
On the other hand, the concept of Christ as God's self-revelation
---	 • -developed by Barth appears to exciucie an inspirational christoiogy
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through its failure to take seriously the significance of the
particular humanity of Christ. If he is to be the Mediator between God
and man, Christ's saving action must also be fully human, that is, it
must also be as man that he reconciles us to God and manifests the
divine nature and will. The theory that it is in his divinity that
Christ reveals God does not seem to account for the New Testament
emphasis that Christ makes known one who is other than himself, a
concept which is apparent whenever mention is made of the Father's
sending, sealing, anointing, commanding, teaching him; of his doing the
will, speaking the words, seeking the glory, obeying the commands of
him that sent him. In his divinity as the eternal Word and Wisdom of
God, the Son has no need to be taught of the Father, it is rather in
his humanity that he is anointed by the Spirit so that he might bring
good news to the poor and proclaim the year of the Lord's favour. But
this is a perspective which is excluded by the interpretation of
Christ's divinity in terms of revelatory unity.
We would argue, therefore, that a major reconstruction of christology
is needed today if there is to be a coherent integration of these two
ways of thinking about Christ. (Xir study of Owen suggests that the way
forward is through a careful reassessment of the implications of the
Spirit's work in the life of the incarnate Son. However, at present
there appears to be an insufficient basis for a doctrine of the
distinctive work of the Spirit in the humanity of Christ. The
inspirational christology of Baillie provides no conceptual framework
for distinguishing between the action of the Word in assuming human
nature and that of the Spirit in empowering, sanctifying and comforting
the person of Jesus. Likewise, although the theology of Barth is
developed around a trinitarian structure, the enlightening and
convicting role of the Spirit among men, whereby he lifts the veil of
darkness and reveals the glory of God made known in the person of
Christ, has in fact been largely assumed by the Word. For Barth it is
the Word rather than the Spirit that is present in the Scriptures and
in proclamation as the ininediate agent of divine reconciliation. There
does not appear to be enough space in his theology for a distinct
doctrine of the Holy Spirit as the immediate principle of divine
activity in the humanity of Christ.
In short, it would seem to me that modern theology is not sufficiently
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trinitarian to be able to integrate successfully the two basic and
recurring forms of christology which we have characterised by the
concepts of incarnation and inspiration.
We have argued, however, from our study of John Owen that an
integration of the concepts of Christ as the incarnate Word of Cod and
as the Son inspired by the Spirit is possible. By incorporating them
both, Owen's christology brings a measure of theological stability to
the Definition of Chalcedon and also serves as a pointer to the
trinitarian direction modern christology must take if its divisions are
to be healed. But most significantly it offers to the children of
faith the hope of greater coherence in their understanding of the
person of Christ.
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